Robert A. Pape:

My recent Foreign Affairs article, “Iran and the New Rules of Global Power,” argues that the Iran war has fundamentally changed America’s strategic position in the Middle East.

On Thursday evening, I want to take the next step—and address the question the article leaves open.

What if the Iran war did not simply expose a weakness in American strategy?

What if it marked the end of the geopolitical model the United States has relied on since the 1991 Gulf War?

For more than three decades, American power rested on four assumptions: forward bases could safely project power, air superiority would dominate the battlefield, precision strike would produce rapid victories, and overwhelming technology would allow the United States to defeat regional adversaries quickly and at relatively low cost.

The Iran war challenges every one of those assumptions.

The United States has demonstrated overwhelming military superiority. Yet it has struggled to achieve the political objective that matters most: restoring secure commercial access to the world’s most important maritime corridors. At the same time, relatively inexpensive missiles and mass-produced drones have placed American bases, allies, and critical energy infrastructure under sustained pressure.

If that assessment is correct, then the question is no longer simply whether the United States wins in Iran. It is whether the military model on which Washington now spends roughly $1 trillion each year—and is preparing to spend substantially more—still produces the strategic outcomes it was designed to achieve. If not, this is no longer just a military debate. It could become one of the defining strategic, budgetary, and political questions heading into the midterm elections.

What if the Iran war is revealing not that America needs to spend more—but that it has been investing in the wrong theory of military power?

Has the second precision revolution fundamentally changed the relationship between military technology and military power?

Has precision warfare spread far enough that second-tier powers can now deny the United States the kind of rapid, decisive victories that defined the post-Cold War era?

And if the post-1991 model has broken, what replaces it?

Those are the questions I’ll examine Thursday evening—including why I believe the answers extend far beyond Iran and will shape American strategy in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and every region where forward-deployed U.S. forces remain central to deterrence.

Prof Pape Live Briefing

Thursday, July 30 • 7:00 PM ET

Glede na to, da ZDA niti teoretično ne morejo premagati Irana (brez da bi v procesu poskušanjapovzročile, da Iran vrže v zrak Izrael in vse naftne monarhije na Bližnjem vzhodu ter povzročile globalno energetsko katastrofo), je najbolj racionalna strategija Irana, da ZDA povzroči takšno škodo in takšno ponižanje, da se nikoli več ne bodo pomislile napasti Irana. To pa seveda pomeni, da obdržijo kontrolo nad Hormuško ožino in ostalimi trasnportnimi koridorji ter držijo v šahu tako ZDA kot vse zahodne države. Enako kot jih z monopolom pri redkih zemljah drži Kitajska. Seveda bo vmes prišlo do preusmerjanja energetskih tokov, toda do tega novega stanja bo Iran že imel dovolj velik arzenal jedrskega orožja kot učinkovitega obrambnega odvračevalca.

Izrael in ZDA sta z nepremišljenim napadom na Iran ne samo osvobodila Iraan izpod mednarodnega embarga, pač pa iz njega naredila velikega globalnega igralca in hkrati sprožila proces svojega sestopa s trona globalnega hegemonain regionalnega nasilnika. Težko je najti večjo strateško politično napako v sodobni zgodovini. Morda je primerljiva napaka lobiranje ZDA za vključitev Kotajske v svetovno trgovinsko orgamizacijo in preselitev proizvodnje na Kitajsko.

Many versions of the same question: why would Iran value a deal when it knows that He can tear it up on 11/4 or any time after?

As I understand it, the Iranian thinking is that Trump and the US in general has been chastened. Given how painful and humiliating this has been, once he gets out he would be loath to go back in. The US would need to come up with a theory of why fighting Iran again would yield a different result in the future. There is none, especially given the magazine situation.

The Iranians believe that they can lock-in their control of Hormuz as the price for letting him go. And this would then enable them to discipline the West in perpetuity.

The Iranian assessment and strategy is correct. They will be able to pull this off bc they enjoy unambiguous escalation dominance.

What a remarkable rise to great power status! They’ll be writing doctoral dissertations on the rise of Iran as a great power decades into the future.

Robert A. Pape, profesor političnih ved na Univerzi v Chicagu, specialist za mednarodno varnost ter ustanovni direktor projekta Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST), je prejšnji teden v Foreign Affairs objavil zanimiv članek »Iran and the New Rules of Global Power: The Making and Unmaking of American Dominance«. Pape v njem trdi, da sedanji konflikt med ZDA in Iranom ne pomeni zgolj še ene regionalne vojne, temveč simbolni konec obdobja ameriške vojaške dominacije, ki se je začelo z bliskovito zmago nad Irakom leta 1991.

Pape izhaja iz primerjave dveh vojn v Perzijskem zalivu, ki označujeta začetek in konec obdobja ameriške unipolarnosti. Operacija Puščavski vihar leta 1991 je svetu pokazala, da lahko ZDA z uporabo satelitskega nadzora, precizno vodenega orožja, naprednih komunikacij in zračne premoči v nekaj tednih uničijo vojaško moč velike regionalne države. Hitra zmaga nad Irakom, dosežena s samo 147 ameriškimi smrtnimi žrtvami v boju, je ustvarila prepričanje, da Washington razpolaga ne le z vojaško superiornostjo, temveč tudi z dominacijo pri eskalaciji: zmožnostjo, da hitro, poceni in z omejenim tveganjem vsili želeni politični rezultat. Na tej predstavi ni temeljila samo ameriška zunanja politika, temveč tudi širša globalizacija. Države so zmanjševale obrambne izdatke, podjetja so raztegnila dobavne verige po svetu, finančni trgi pa so geopolitična tveganja obravnavali kot obvladljiva, ker naj bi ameriška moč zagotavljala varnost ključnih trgovinskih poti.

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Savdijci so sicer res izgradili dva strateška naftovoda, ki potencialno lahko nadomestita precejšen del izpada transporta nafte v primeru zaprtja Hormuške ožine. Prvi je vzhodno-zahodni naftovod do terminala Yanbu v Rdečem morju. Drugi je SUMED, ki povezuje Yanbu prek Egipta z Mediteranskim morjem. Zdaj, ko so Hutijci in Iračani zbombardirali oba konca vzhodno-zahodnega naftovoda, naj bi se – kot trdi spodnji zapis – Saudijci lahko izognili blokadi Rdečega morja prek uporabe naftovoda SUMED. Vendar ima ta trditev dve veliki logični napaki.

Prvič, Savdski izvoz nafte pred zaprtjem Hormuza je znašal okrog 7 mbd (milijonov sodčkov na dan), prek vzhodno-zahodnega naftovoda so Saudijci lahko transportirali okrog 4.5 mbd (torej okrog 65 % predvojne ravni), kapaciteta SUMED pa je 2.5 mbd (torej okrog 35 % predvojne ravni).

In drugič, SUMED je povezan s terminalom Yanbu – če nafta do Yanbu ne pride zaradi prekinitve naftovoda, Savdijci tudi prek SUMED ne morejo izvažati nafte.

Aramco built a reroute to avoid Hormuz and the Red Sea entirely.

Yanbu to Ain Sokhna, through the SUMED pipeline, out through Sidi Kerir, then around the Cape of Good Hope to reach Asia.

That workaround now costs about 5 dollars a barrel more in freight, insurance, and pipeline fees.

On a single shipment, that is roughly 10 million dollars.

Aramco is now building a separate pricing formula for these cargoes because the standard Asia OSP formula does not capture any of it.

The safer route was never actually cheap.

It was less visible, not less expensive…

Oil is getting more expensive

 

Povzetek tega odličnega komentarja nebuloz zahodnih analitikov:

“Katastrofa je neizbežna, če Peking ne bo prevzel kombinacije politik držav, ki trenutno rastejo trikrat počasneje od Kitajske.”

Eswar Prasad of Brookings has written the FT’s periodic instruction to China on how to run its economy. It follows the established template: concede the achievements in a subordinate clause, then explain that catastrophe looms unless Beijing adopts the policy mix of the countries currently growing at a third of its rate.

China, we learn, is “in serious trouble”, while growing at about 4.3 percent – a figure no G7 economy has come close to in years, and roughly double the US rate. Inflation has turned positive after a deflationary spell; industrial profits are rebounding. In any other country this would be reported as a soft landing. For China it is presented as calm concealing catastrophe.

China must “reduce reliance on public investment and exports”.

But since around 78 percent of China’s growth derives from capital inputs, cutting investment means cutting growth. This is simply the US inviting China to engage in economic self-harm. Public investment is the mechanism through which China has built its infrastructure, energy, transport, and industrial base. It is the mechanism through which China has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. It is the mechanism through which China has built a high-tech economy that now competes with the West across the board.

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Dobra analiza Policy Tensorja:

The objective in the counter-radar war is both defensive and offensive. Blinding the US even partially degrades the US ability to strike Iran. It also makes Iranian attacks more effective and less likely to be intercepted. In particular, the attacks on the bases in Jordan are meant to open up a corridor through which strikes on positions in Israel can be carried out.

The US is concentrating its armada in rear area bases in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and above all, Israel. The point of concentrating these assets is that they can be sheltered under the same ballistic missile defense shields. It allows the US and Israel to conserve interceptor inventories. This is not without risk however. As we saw in the Ben Gurion risk model, Iran can defeat even a four-layered defense-in-depth with a large enough salvo of ballistic missiles, and bag entire air wings.

Depending on the size and scope of the American or US-Israeli assault, the Iranians may retaliate with a devastating counter-air attack on Ben Gurion—which is now closed to civilians. But Iranian strategy seems to be evolving in an anti-personnel direction. The IRGC claimed yesterday to have killed more US personnel. They have declared repeatedly in recent days that they will respond to US attacks on civilians. Yesterday’s anti-personnel attack was ‘in response to the US Army’s attack on pilgrims.’

Suppose the US attacks civilian targets this weekend with heavy air operations. How will the Iranians respond? First, Iran will have to respond to discrete high-value targets like energy and power infrastructure with tit-for-tat attacks against the same across the Gulf. Second, the Iranians will retaliate against the bases that the US uses for the air operations. Third, the Iranians will retaliate for blood with blood. If the US kills a dozens of civilians, especially if it does so in a spectacular war crime, the Iranians will respond with anti-personnel attacks.

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Kot poroča New York Times, odločitev Donalda Trumpa, da za zdaj odloži obsežno vojaško eskalacijo proti Iranu, ni posledica politične zadržanosti, temveč predvsem vojaških omejitev. Ključni razlog je hitro praznjenje ameriških zalog prestreznih raket Patriot in druge protizračne obrambe, ki so postale kritično potrebne za zaščito ameriških baz in zaveznikov na Bližnjem vzhodu. Pentagon opozarja, da bi večja ofenziva lahko pustila ameriške sile brez zadostne zaščite pred pričakovanim iranskim povračilnim odgovorom.

Po navedbah NY Times je predsednik združil ožji krog svetovalcev, ki so ga opozorili, da bi nova faza bombardiranja Irana prinesla bistveno več tveganj kot koristi. Poleg izčrpavanja zalog prestreznikov obstaja nevarnost širše regionalne vojne, ogrožanja ključnih zalivskih zaveznikov, motenj v svetovni oskrbi z energijo ter novih begunskih valov. V Washingtonu zato vse bolj prevladuje ocena, da bi bila cena eskalacije previsoka.

Posebej zgovoren je podatek, da so ZDA od začetka spopadov porabile že več kot 1.200 raket Patriot, katerih posamezna cena presega štiri milijone dolarjev. Zaloge so zato padle na raven, ki po ocenah vojaškega vrha že omejuje ameriško operativno sposobnost. Smrt treh ameriških vojakov v Jordaniji (gre za uradno številko, medtem ko so neuradne ocene bistveno višje), potem ko je iranska balistična raketa prebila protizračno obrambo, je dodatno pokazala, da je ameriški obrambni ščit povsem porozen.

Članek razkriva tudi pomembno politično spoznanje: intenzivnejši napadi Irana niso prisilili k popuščanju, temveč so okrepili notranjo kohezijo države. Del Trumpovih svetovalcev ocenjuje, da bombardiranje dosega ravno nasprotni učinek od želenega, saj iranskemu vodstvu omogoča mobilizacijo prebivalstva okoli zunanje grožnje, medtem ko se pripravljenost za pogajanja zmanjšuje.

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Odličen komentar glede zgroženosti ameriških zahodnih vazalnih držav nad ravnanjem gospodarja. Prehod iz unipolarnega v bipolarni svetovni red prinaša temeljito prevrednotenje cene varnosti za srednje velike države. V obdobju ameriške hegemonije so ZDA zaradi svoje neizpodbitne premoči razmeroma poceni zagotavljale varnostni dežnik zaveznikom, zato je bila njihova obramba dejansko implicitno subvencionirana. Z vzponom Kitajske pa ima vsaka ameriška varnostna zaveza višji oportunitetni strošek, zato ZDA postopoma zmanjšujejo obseg in spreminjajo pogoje svojih jamstev. Evropa in Kanada se zato prvič soočata z dejanskimi stroški lastne obrambe. Ne gre za ameriško “izdajo”, temveč za konec dolgoletne geopolitične subvencije, ki jo je omogočala unipolarna ureditev in ki je v bipolarnem svetu ni več mogoče ohranjati.

The crisis of the middle powers is a repricing event that occurs in the transition to a bipolar world, when the old guarantees are being renegotiated.

In a unipolar world the hegemon is willing to absorb security costs that would otherwise be distributed among its allies. But that deal was only offered because of how cheaply the US could provide it. When no one can rival the hegemon, the marginal cost of extending the umbrella was small, so everyone underneath got protection that was priced far below what they’d pay to provide it themselves.

But bipolarity destroys that math. Now every commitment by the US has an opportunity cost against a rival theater, so the US has to ration and reprice its commitments, and the middle powers are discovering what security actually costs. That’s what I mean by repricing.

Europe and Canada are acting like the US is betraying something. But they’re not being cheated. What’s actually happening is a withdrawal of a subsidy they were treating as a structural feature of the world rather than a contingent bargain that was only ever available because the hegemon’s cost of extending it was low. And when you lose a great deal, it feels like an injustice even when nobody promised it to you forever. And that’s not a criticism of them, it’s just what it’s like to be on the receiving end of a repricing.

Their reaction is entirely predictable and understandable because they’re being pushed to build something they don’t want to, because the thing they actually want (the American security guarantee) isn’t being offered at the old price anymore.

This same thing happened during the interwar period. Britain could no longer afford to underwrite the old order and the US was pulling into isolation and wasn’t willing to provide it yet. So everyone got the bill and nobody wanted to pay it, and the result was the 1930s. That’s why the middle powers crisis occurs in the transition.

And that’s where we are once again. Ironically, the ones most upset about the new deal are often the ones who were the loudest critics of the old one. You take the umbrella for granted until it starts to rain.

Evropska komisija poskuša izboljšati konkurenčnost evropskih proizvajalcev tako, da nabija carine na nekatere kitajske končne izdelke, kot so denimo e-avti. Že samo to je ppvsem zgrešen koncept, kot sem že večkrat pisal, kajti če baterija predstavlja 30-40 % vrednosti e-avta, dva kitajska proizvajalca (CATL in BYD) pa kontrolirata 70 % globalnega trga z baterijami za e-avte, evropski proizvajalci e-avtov ne morejo nikoli postati konkurenčni kitajskim. Zato pospešeno prenašajo razvoj in proizvodnjo e-avtov v Kitajsko.

Vendar se problem še dodatno zaostri, ko upoštevamo trgovino s komponentami (vmesnimi proizvodi). Kitajska ima pri tem “nuklearno opcijo” v obliki licenciranja oziroma izvoznih prepovedi ključnih komponent oziroma kritičnih materialov  za njihovo proizvodnjo. In ta nuklearna opcija je bistveno hujša od nuklearne opcije, ki jo ima Iran z nadzorom nad Hormuško ožino, kajti tam obstajajo še drugi ponudniki homogenih energentov in različni obvozi. Pri ključnih kompoenentah in kritičnih materialih pa tega ni – ni alternativnih ponudnikov enakovrednih komponent in ni obvozov. Če EU uvede visoke carine na uvoz kitajskih e-avtov, lahko Kitajska prepove (omeji) izvoz avtomobilskih baterij v Evropo. Lahko omeji izvoz ostalih ključnih komponent, ki bazirajo na kritičnih materialih.

Zadnji tak primer iz tega tedna je: ko je Komisija na spisek podjetij, sodelovanje s katerimi je na embargu, uvrstila 14 kitajskih podjetij, se je kitajska vlada nemudoma odzvala z recipročnim ukrepom – z uvrstitvijo 14 evropskih večinoma orožarskih podjetij (med njimi nemški gigant Rheinmetall) na embargo listo. Ta podjetja ne morejo iz Kitajske dobivati kompoenent in materialov, ki se lahko uporabljajo za “dual use” (za civilno in vojaško uporabo).

V glavnem, ker Evropa za Kitajsko zaostaja za 20 do 30 let pri dobavni verigi za ključne komponente za sodobne high-tech industrije in izdelke, si EU ne more privoščiti resnejše trgovinske vojne s Kitajsko. Nasprotno, državam EU se splača tprosto trgovati s Kitajsko in priti do teh ključnih komponent (in po nižjih cenah), vzporedno pa se lotiti resne industrijske politike za izgradnjo dobavnih verig.

Pomen vmesnih proizvodov (komponent) za konkurenčnst in blaginjo je bila tema mojega doktorata, stoletje nazaj. Spodaj je – v odzivu na komentar Policy Tensorja – opisana logika pomena vmesnih proizvodov in proste trgovine z njimi ter opcije, ki so na voljo zahodnim državam.

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Marko Golob

O tem sem na tem blogu pisal večkrat. Namreč o razmerju med izšolanimi inženirji na leto in njihovi kvaliteti. Primerjava z zalivskimi monarhijami niti ni relevantna, bolj zanimivo je dejstvo, da Iran izobrazi letno isto število inženirjev kot 3 in pol krat večja Amerika. Ki je, poleg Izraela kot glavne sile iz ozadja, pravi nasprotnik, ne zalivske monarhije. Ob tem je zanimiva pripomba ameriškega profesorja, da ameriški študenti inženirstva dosežejo znanje matematike iranskih maturantov šele v 2. letniku fakultete.

Drugo dejstvo je, da je bila iranska strategija razvoja zelo premišljena, zelo optimalna s stališča razpoložljivih kapacitet. Zelo zgodaj, bolj kot kdorkoli drug, so spoznali pomen dronov. Da raket niti ne omenjamo, čeprav so tukaj orali ledino tako Rusi kot Američani. Raketne enote so bistveno manj ranljive kot letalstvo in bistveno težje je organizirati obrambo pred njimi.

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