Dobra analiza Policy Tensorja:

The objective in the counter-radar war is both defensive and offensive. Blinding the US even partially degrades the US ability to strike Iran. It also makes Iranian attacks more effective and less likely to be intercepted. In particular, the attacks on the bases in Jordan are meant to open up a corridor through which strikes on positions in Israel can be carried out.

The US is concentrating its armada in rear area bases in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and above all, Israel. The point of concentrating these assets is that they can be sheltered under the same ballistic missile defense shields. It allows the US and Israel to conserve interceptor inventories. This is not without risk however. As we saw in the Ben Gurion risk model, Iran can defeat even a four-layered defense-in-depth with a large enough salvo of ballistic missiles, and bag entire air wings.

Depending on the size and scope of the American or US-Israeli assault, the Iranians may retaliate with a devastating counter-air attack on Ben Gurion—which is now closed to civilians. But Iranian strategy seems to be evolving in an anti-personnel direction. The IRGC claimed yesterday to have killed more US personnel. They have declared repeatedly in recent days that they will respond to US attacks on civilians. Yesterday’s anti-personnel attack was ‘in response to the US Army’s attack on pilgrims.’

Suppose the US attacks civilian targets this weekend with heavy air operations. How will the Iranians respond? First, Iran will have to respond to discrete high-value targets like energy and power infrastructure with tit-for-tat attacks against the same across the Gulf. Second, the Iranians will retaliate against the bases that the US uses for the air operations. Third, the Iranians will retaliate for blood with blood. If the US kills a dozens of civilians, especially if it does so in a spectacular war crime, the Iranians will respond with anti-personnel attacks.

They have said an equal number. But the truth is that a large, even if strictly proportional, anti-personnel attack on US forces comes with a serious risk of being counterproductive in that it might result in the stiffening of American spines. But Iran’s theory of victory relies on exploiting US political vulnerability; it wants the opposite to happen.

So Iran will have to scope its counter-personnel attack more carefully than tit-for-tat. The right level depends on the political threshold in the US at which the narrative shifts from ‘Trump is needlessly getting America troops killed with no plan in sight’ to ‘Iran killed so-many Americans’.

What makes this escalation spiral so frustrating is that there is no military solution here. The US escalation is likely to create a lot more problems that it solves. When this round is over, the US will still not be in any position to get the Iranians to let go of Hormuz. The coming escalation may get him into a bigger soup than the one he is in already.