By replacing Russian supplies with more distant and politically contingent sources, the EU has changed the route of its dependence rather than escaped it
Europe’s effort to reduce its energy dependence on Russia is ending in an awkward place: greater exposure to the US. When the EU embargoed Russian oil products in February 2022, it had to replace a supplier that accounted for roughly 40 per cent of its diesel imports, according to a contemporary Bruegel analysis. Trade flows moved, but refineries and demand did not disappear. Bruegel noted that third countries could consume Russian diesel at home and sell their own output to Europe. Sanctions therefore altered routes, intermediaries and costs more than they removed Europe’s vulnerability. When global supplies tighten, European buyers must still bid up the price of the remaining barrels.
Eurostat’s Comext data show how important Saudi Arabia and the US have become. In January 2026, Saudi Arabia supplied 41.6 per cent of the value of EU diesel imports, the US 23.7 per cent and India 10.5 per cent. By May, the American share had reached 35.3 per cent, with US deliveries worth €1bn. The pattern was volatile: the US share fell to 19.6 per cent in July. Yet a European Commission statement in September is more revealing. Energy spokesperson Anna-Kaisa Itkonen said the US had supplied about half of EU diesel imports in August. That is the core of Europe’s problem. A supplier with such a large share can materially worsen European supply conditions merely by restricting exports.

You must be logged in to post a comment.