Jiang Xueqin o tem, kakšne bodo posledice za svet, ko bodo ZDA izgubile vojno proti Iranu

Jiang Xueqin je kitajski profesor, ki je zaslovel leta 2022 kot ustvarjalec YouTube kanala Predictive History (»Profesor Jiang«), kjer predava o zgodovini, geopolitiki, filozofiji in »prediktivni zgodovini«. Uporablja zgodovinske vzorce, teorijo iger in analizo, da napoveduje prihodnje dogodke (npr. velike vojne, premike velesil, konec Pax Americana itd.).Posebej je postal viralen v letu 2024–2026, ker je v predavanjih leta 2024 napovedal:

  • vrnitev Donalda Trumpa na oblast,
  • da bodo ZDA začele vojno z Iranom,
  • da bodo ZDA v takšni vojni na dolgi rok izgubile (zaradi geografije, vzdržljivosti, ekonomije itd.).

Ko so se te napovedi (ali del njih) uresničile v kontekstu aktualne vojne v letu 2026, so ga na družbenih omrežjih (zlasti na Kitajskem, v arabskem svetu in na Zahodu) začeli imenovati »kitajski Nostradamus«. Njegovi klipi o Iranu, Izraelu, ZDA, civilni vojni v Ameriki in podobnih temah dosegajo milijone ogledov (kanal + klip kanali kot Prof. Jiang Clips imajo več sto tisoč naročnikov).

V pravkar objavljenem intervjuju pri Carlsonu Tuckerju je analiziral, kaj se bo zgodilo v svetu zaradi ameriške vojne z Iranom in kakšne bodo globalne posledice po ameriškem porazu.

EU = nekdanja Jugoslavija?

V nekdanji Jugoslaviji smo se pritoževali, da Slovenija nima nekega vpliva, da nima prostora za razvoj. No, zdi se, da smo v EU prišli z dežja pod kap. Opravka imamo samo še s tem, česa ne smemo.

In tudi svoboda govora je padla na podobno raven.

Možnosti ameriškega zavzetja Hormuške ožine: Britanske lekcije iz Gallipolija

Zavzteje Hormuške ožine spominja na britansko-francosko-ruski poskus, da bi zasedli turški ožini Bosfor in Dardanele ob začetku 1. svetovne vojne. Ni se dobro končalo za zaveznike.

The Gallipoli campaign (1915–1916) was a disastrous Allied attempt during WWI to knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war by seizing the Dardanelles strait and capturing Constantinople. It failed primarily due to strategic hubris and poor planning: the Allies grossly underestimated the Turkish defenders, relied on faulty maps, and suffered from fractured leadership between naval and land commanders. Initial naval assaults were stymied by hidden minefields, and subsequent land invasions devolved into a bloody, eight-month stalemate in treacherous terrain, eventually forcing a total evacuation after roughly 500,000 total casualties.

Nadaljujte z branjem

Možnosti uspeha izraelsko-ameriške kopenske invazije na Iran: Lekcije iz iraško-iranske vojne

Trump and Netanyahu see the same mirages as Saddam

On September 22, 1980, Saddam Hussein assembled a force of 50,000-70,000 men, 2,500-3,000 tanks, IFVs and APCs, supported by about 120-150 aircraft and 400 pieces of artillery/MLRS, and invaded the Iranian province of Khuzestan.

The Iraqi army of the era was modern, well-equipped, and technologically superior. Capitalizing on the chaos sown by the Islamic Revolution, it surged across the Iranian plains. With such a massive force, it seemed invincible, who could have possibly stood in its way?

The advance was rapid. In less than a week, the Iraqi tanks crossed the Karun River and surrounded key cities. The flat topography of Khuzestan favored the armored doctrine. Until the advance stopped.

When they tried to enter Khorramshahr, the Iraqi vehicles got stuck in narrow streets and were hunted by Iranian militiamen with grenade launchers (RPGs). This forced Saddam to divert even more troops to the south, turning the place into a meat grinder.

Nadaljujte z branjem

Eskalacijska past: Vojna proti Iranu je prešla v fazo sistemske destrukcije

Robert Pape, profesor politologije na univerzi v Chicagu, specializiran za varnostna vprašanja, ima prav: vojna proti Iranu je v skladu z eskalacijsko lestvico prešla na višjo raven, vendar ta eskalacijski preskok ni linearen, pač pa eksponenten. Vojaške eskalacije po določeni stopnji ni več mogoče kontrolirati, pač pa gre po svoji logiki. Vojna proti Iranu je iz logike disrupcije (transaportnih poti za energente in surovine) prešla v fazo sistemske destrukcije.

To v praksi pomeni, da se ne pogovarjamo več o tem, koliko tednov bo ostala zaprta Hormuška ožina, pač pa koliko let bo potrebnih, da se ponovno vzpostavijo porušene enrgetske kapacitete in energetska infrastruktura. Eno je zaustaviti promet z naftnimi in plinskimi tankerji, povsem nekaj drugega pa je uničiti plinska in naftna polja in rafinerije ter plinske in naftne terminale. Pri prvem se pogovarjamo o nekaj dnevih ali tednih, pri drugem pa o letih. O letih, ko na trgu sistemsko zmanjka denimo 10-20 % energije in ključnih surovin. Pogovarjamo se o dolgotrajni inflaciji in recesiji, pogovarjamo se o dolgotrajni stagflaciji.

Morda sta Izrael in ZDA bila pripravljena plačati ceno disrupcije, toda Iran je v svojem eksistenčnem boju z uničevanjem energetske infrastrukture postavil bistveno višjo ceno. Nima druge izbire, sicer ga čaka usoda Libije in Iraka. Problem je, da te eksponencialne eskalacije ni mogoče zaustaviti, saj bi v ta namen ZDA in Izrael morala priznati poraz. Tega pa ne želita ali si tega politično ne moreta privoščiti. Kar pomeni, da bo celoten svet plačal izjemno veliko ceno za ta nepremišjen in slabo pripravljen izraelsko-ameriški napad na Iran.

Očitno je, da se politiki tega ne zavedajo. Ne ameriški in ne evropski.

____________

The next phase will not just be more intense. It will be fundamentally different.

What is changing is not the level of violence. It is the nature of harm.

We are now approaching that threshold.

The Persistent Illusion of Controlled Escalation

Most observers still believe escalation is a matter of degree.

More strikes. More retaliation. More pressure.

This assumes the war is simply intensifying along a familiar path. It is not.

Escalation is not linear. It is structural – it crosses thresholds.

What appears as gradual escalation is often a transition between fundamentally different phases of conflict. Leaders believe they are calibrating force. In reality, they are moving the war across thresholds that change what strategies are available – and the level of costs they will pay.

Once those thresholds are crossed, the logic of the war changes with them.

The Escalation Trap in Deeper Focus

The escalation trap is not just that wars expand. It is that efforts to control the conflict create pressures that make major escalation across thresholds more likely.

We saw this in the opening of the Iran war.

A U.S.–Israeli leadership strike intended to produce a quick and decisive victory did not topple the regime. Instead, it triggered a response the attackers did not anticipate. Iran did not simply retaliate—it adapted, expanding the battlefield through horizontal escalation that raised costs across shipping, regional partners, and critical infrastructure.

Each move by the stronger side to “win” quickly created new incentives for the weaker side to widen and deepen the conflict.

Nadaljujte z branjem

Trump nima dobrih možnosti umika iz vojne proti Iranu. Vse so slabe ali slabše

 

When the man who wrote The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy says there’s no way out, it reads like a coroner’s report.

Piers Morgan asked John Mearsheimer the direct question. What’s the exit?

“Most of them say that President Trump should quickly declare victory and withdraw from the war. He can do this, but it will be perceived as a humiliating defeat for the US. Moreover, the Iranians may not agree to end the war. And, as I already said, the Iranians have many cards to play. They can inflict significant losses. Therefore, even if we retreat, it’s unclear whether this will solve the problem. The US will still look like it has suffered a humiliating defeat. Therefore, I think President Trump has put himself in a situation where he really doesn’t have a good exit strategy.”

This is a West Point graduate, a former Air Force officer, the scholar who spent two decades mapping exactly how America gets dragged into wars for Israel.

Stay in the war? Humiliation. Retreat? Cosmic humiliation and the eviction from most of the Middle East. Iran holds stronger cards and has only played a few.

Trump promised a generation of winning. He got a generation’s worth of losing compressed into 20 days. The Gulf on fire. The Strait closed to the West. And Bibi in a bunker hinting that maybe the Iranian regime survives after all. Of course it does, the maybe is whether is own regime survives.

Trump  got his war with Iran and history won’t care that it was on orders from Israel. Now he owns the humiliation with “no good exit strategy.”

https://twitter.com/IslanderWORLD/status/2034821348770337137

Ali ta eskalacija pomeni konec arabske ere in petrodolarja?

Izraelska eskalacija z napadom na skupno iransko-katarsko največje nahajališče plina na svetu, ki je izzvala povračilne napade Irana na naftno infrastrukturo v zalivskih državah, se zdi kot zadnji udarec pred sodnim dnem za vse vpletene strani – za Izrael, Iran in zalivske države. Vsi bodo ostali brez energetske infrastrukture, Izrael pa tudi brez države. Le še na naslednjo stopnjo eskalacije – jedrsko – je treba počakati. 

Težko je verjeti, da se je vse skupaj začelo s tistim nepremišljenim oziroma neumnim ameriško-izraelskim napadom na osnovno šolo v Iranu.

ISRAEL JUST MADE THE SINGLE MOST DANGEROUS MILITARY DECISION OF THE ENTIRE WAR. AND NOBODY UNDERSTANDS WHAT THEY JUST TRIGGERED.

Israel and the U.S. struck South Pars — the LARGEST gas field on the planet. But here’s what they either didn’t know or didn’t care about: South Pars is jointly managed by Iran AND Qatar. They didn’t just attack Iran. They attacked the energy backbone of their OWN Gulf allies.

Let that sink in.

  • The IRGC just declared ALL major energy facilities across the entire GCC as “direct and legitimate targets” — and warned strikes are coming in the “COMING HOURS.”
  • Listed targets: Qatar’s LNG complex, Saudi Aramco facilities, UAE oil terminals — EVERYTHING.
  • Saudi Aramco has already EVACUATED workers from the SAMREF refinery in Yanbu. They’re not waiting. They KNOW what’s coming.
  • Iranian hackers have ALREADY hit Aramco’s digital systems — posting images and issuing threats to PARALYZE their infrastructure.
  • Multiple EXPLOSIONS just heard in Riyadh — confirmed by Reuters, AFP, and AP. Sirens sounding in the Saudi capital.

Do you understand the scale of what’s happening?

Nadaljujte z branjem

Ekonomski učinki zaprtja Hormuške ožine za EU

S pomočjo »mučenja« štirih različnih modelov umetne inteligence sem poskušal ugotoviti, kakšni so potencialni učinki zaprtja Hormuške ožine za države EU. Naročil sem jim, naj pripravijo scenarije za 8-tedensko zaprtje ožine in za dinamiko učinkov na ključne indikatorje (cene nafte, cene goriv, cene plina, cene hrane, inflacijo, cene gnojil, borzni indeks DAX), pri čemer naj upoštevajo dejansko dogajanje do 18.3. letos in analogije s preteklimi največjimi naftnimi in plinskimi šoki (1973, 1979, 2003, 2022). Spodaj je editirana verzija »konsenza« štirih modelov UI.

Zaprtje Hormuške ožine za EU ne pomeni toliko neposrednega fizičnega pomanjkanja, pač pa predvsem vprašanje posrednih učinkov prek globalno oblikovanih cen energije, gnojil in industrijskih inputov. Skozi ožino v normalnih razmerah potuje okoli 20 % svetovne trgovine z nafto in približno 20 % svetovne trgovine z LNG, zato je že delna zapora dovolj, da premakne globalno cenovno krivuljo. Poleg energentov so ogroženi tudi tokovi amoniaka, uree in žvepla, kar je pomembno za kmetijstvo, ter helija iz Katarja, ki je ključen za polprevodnike, medicinsko opremo in kriogene procese. Pri kovinah pa motnja ne prizadene le aluminija iz Zaliva, temveč tudi posredno procesiranje niklja in kobalta, saj je to odvisno od žvepla in žveplove kisline.

Za EU to pomeni dvoje. Prvič, neposredna izpostavljenost ni zanemarljiva, vendar je posredna bistveno večja: cene nafte, plina in ladijskega zavarovanja se formirajo globalno, ne nacionalno.

Nadaljujte z branjem