Trump just turned on Netanyahu, and Alex Jones argues the shift is real, but the reasons behind it are darker and more dangerous than almost anyone is saying…

In this conversation, Alex makes his case that Trump was manipulated into the war with false intelligence promising the Iranian regime would collapse in 4 days, and that once it backfired on the economy and his midterm numbers, he started hunting for an exit ramp that Israel keeps blocking.

He points to JD Vance, Tulsi Gabbard, and Joe Kent warning against the war from the start, and to the 2027 NDAA provision merging the US and Israeli militaries as the line that finally snapped.

The part that will get the most attention is his theory on the leverage.

Alex doesn’t think Trump is simply blackmailed over Epstein.

His more provocative claim is that Trump tied himself into that network for power and survival, and is now enraged that the people he partnered with refuse to take orders.

He also gets into Ben-Gvir’s “all of Lebanon must burn” rhetoric, the positioning of Marco Rubio as the next pro-Israel favorite, and his fear of a major provocation designed to keep America in the war.

His warning is one I keep hearing: a cornered Likud is at its most dangerous, and Israel is gambling everything on keeping the US in this fight.

A magnificent interview by Emmanuel Todt

Every day I pray that the Russians will not get nervous.

I highly recommend it!

Europe has chosen war. This is a curious, partly imaginary war, that is, it will not die, but will provide the Ukrainians with everything they need to kill as many Russians as possible. It seems that Europe and the USA have decided to fight to the last Ukrainian. Every day I pray that the Russians will not get nervous. I think the Russians are intelligent, I think the Iranians are intelligent, I think the Chinese are intelligent, and I think they have understood the rules of the game they have to play. So logically they should play for the collapse of the enemy’s system in order to be calm, says the French historian, demographer and anthropologist Emmanuel Todt.

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Ukraine is finished. This is a country that will not exist. Ukraine is a country that will disappear in the long term. The big difference between Westerners and Russians is that they do not have the same concept of time. That is, Russians think long-term, like historians of long time. Now Russians are expecting the final crisis of the European Union. And from the moment the European Union enters into a crisis – it could be a crisis from country to country or within different societies, the Ukrainian regime will be left to itself, it will collapse and that will be the end of Ukraine, of Ukraine as we know it.

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Noah Smith, ki se je odpovedal akademski karieri (na Brown University), ker je ocenil, da ima večji vpliv na javni diskurz kot bloger, kot pa bi jo imel kot profesor ekonomije, v zadnjem komentarju lamentira o zmanjevšanju vpliva blogerjev oziroma sebe na javno mnenje. Navaja tri razloge. Prvi je porast političnega populizma, ki inherentno ne mara objektivne analize, diskusije in eksaktnih podatkov. Drugi je množičen prehod blogerjev na platformo Substack, ki omogoča finančno lukrativno monetizacijo avgtorskih prispevkov in blogerje nevidno sili v hiperprodukcijo, da bi zadovoljili razpršene naročnike. Tretji razlog pa je razrast uporabe umetne inteligence, ki omogoča relativno dobro (čeprav močno filtrirano) informiranje zainteresirane radovedne javnosti prek povzemanja množice javno izraženih mnenj ekspertov, kar pa seveda zmanjša interes za branje specifičnih oziroma “relevantnih” blogerjev in vpliv njihovih mnenj. V dobi UI so lahko vsa mnenja enakovredna, čeprav objektivno seveda niso.

Spodaj je nekaj odstavkov iz zapisa Smitha na to temo. Naj pred tem omenim, da sem Smitha kot blogerja vednp cenil zaradi odličnega znanja ekonomije in sposobnosti koncizne analize. Vendar sem Smitha “izgubil” kakšnih 5 let nazaj zaradi njegove izrazite ideološke obremenjenosti s Kitajsko, Rusijo in nasploh z nezahodnim svetom, kar Smithu v mojih očeh jemlje sposobnost objektivnega razmišljanja o naravi stvari, ki tangirajo polje geopolitike. Ampak to seveda ne vpliva na to, da se mi njegovo mnenje o tej konkretni – apolitični – temi ne bi zdelo zanimivo.

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Moj intervju v novi reviji Avto Fokus glede ekonomskih vidikov hitrih sprememb avtomobilskega sveta, glede bodoče vloge kitajskih in usode evropskih proizvajalcev.

Evropska avtomobilska industrija je desetletja veljala za tehnološko vodilno silo. Ali je z zamudo pri elektrifikaciji zapravila to prednost?

Prav gotovo. Evropska avtomobilska industrija je zamudila ključni tehnološki preskok, povezan z razogljičenjem in prehodom na električno mobilnost. Evropska unija je sicer postavila ambiciozne politične cilje glede opuščanja motorjev z notranjim zgorevanjem do leta 2035, vendar evropska avtomobilska industrija na takšno transformacijo ni bila dovolj pripravljena.

Zakaj je Kitajcem uspel takšen preskok?

Kitajska je bila v povsem drugačnem položaju. Ker ni bila obremenjena z dolgo tradicijo proizvodnje klasičnih avtomobilov, je lahko praktično iz nič zgradila celotno verigo za proizvodnjo električnih vozil – od baterij do drugih ključnih komponent. Baterije danes predstavljajo od 35 do 40 odstotkov vrednosti električnega avtomobila. Evropa medtem ni pravočasno razvila primerljive proizvodne infrastrukture, saj je predvsem ščitila obstoječo industrijsko strukturo, vezano na tradicionalna vozila z motorji z notranjim zgorevanjem.

Kaj je šlo narobe?

Razkorak med regulatornimi zahtevami in dejanskimi interesi in sposobnostmi evropskih proizvajalcev je bil prevelik. Po eni strani je nekoga, ki je 120 let proizvajal avte z motorji z notranjim izgorevanjem, težko prepričati v kompletno spremembo filozofije in tehnologije. Na drugi strani pa bi bilo potrebno izgraditi povsem nove dobaviteljske verige za proizvodnjo povsem drugačnih komponent. Tudi zato je Evropska komisija lani omilila prvotne načrte in namesto popolne prepovedi motorjev z notranjim zgorevanjem poudarila cilj 90-odstotnega zmanjšanja izpustov CO₂ do leta 2035, kar dopušča uporabo različnih tehnologij. To je bila nujna korekcija, saj bi sicer evropsko avtomobilsko industrijo postavili v izjemno težak položaj. Kljub temu pa je tehnološki preboj na področju električnih vozil že nastopil in evropski proizvajalci danes na tem področju ne morejo enakovredno tekmovati s kitajskimi.

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Pedro Santa Clara v članku “Make Europe a Continent of Owners” zagovarja radikalno reformo evropskega pokojninskega in kapitalskega sistema, ki bi evropske varčevalce spremenila v lastnike produktivnega kapitala. Po njegovem mnenju Evropa ne trpi zaradi pomanjkanja kapitala, saj gospodinjstva letno privarčujejo okoli 1,4 bilijona evrov, kar je celo več kot v ZDA. Težava je v institucionalni zasnovi: evropski prihranki so večinoma parkirani v nizko donosnih bančnih vlogah ali pa se prek sprotnega financiranja pokojnin (pay-as-you-go) sploh ne pretvorijo v finančno premoženje. Sedanja generacija delavcev tako ne gradi lastnega kapitala, temveč pridobi zgolj obljubo, da bodo njihove pokojnine nekoč financirali prihodnji davkoplačevalci – model, ki postaja zaradi staranja prebivalstva vse manj vzdržen.

Santa Clara evropski model primerja z ameriškim sistemom pokojninskega varčevanja prek skladov 401(k) in individualnih pokojninskih računov, kjer so prihranki prebivalcev v veliki meri vloženi v delniške trge. Tako so ameriški državljani prek svojih pokojnin posredno lastniki velikega dela gospodarstva, kar je ustvarilo globoke kapitalske trge, močan sektor tveganega kapitala in sposobnost financiranja inovativnih podjetij. Po njegovih besedah ameriški pokojninski sistem pretvarja prihranke običajnih ljudi v lastništvo produktivnega gospodarstva, medtem ko evropski sistem ustvarja predvsem terjatve do države. Gre za dve različni institucionalni arhitekturi, ki sta oblikovali tudi dve različni obliki kapitalizma.

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Back in March I wrote that Iran was winning, and not only strategically but tactically too, but I genuinely didn’t expect it would eventually lead – 3 months later – to a complete US surrender.

Because, make no mistake, this is what the “deal” that was just signed is: a complete US surrender, the likes of which it has never signed in its entire history.

Let’s compare it with the 2 other most famous US capitulation agreements: the Paris Peace Accords with Vietnam in 1973 and the Doha Agreement with Afghanistan in 2020.

The most significant difference is that both the Vietnam and Afghanistan deals, despite being documents in which the US effectively conceded defeat, contained at least some face-saving provisions for the US.

For instance, in the Vietnam deal, North Vietnam accepted the continued existence of the South Vietnamese government, promised peaceful reunification, agreed to maintain the 17th parallel as a dividing line, and accepted international supervision. These were real (if ultimately unenforceable and unenforced) concessions.

Same thing with the Taliban: they guaranteed Afghan soil would never again be used to attack America, and agreed to negotiate a political settlement with the then Kabul government. The latter commitment was never seriously pursued – but both existed and gave the US a narrative: at least it could claim its post-9/11 objective had been secured on paper.

The deal with Iran is completely different: it doesn’t contain a single meaningful concession from Iran. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is merely the reversal of a wartime measure they took in response to the US-Israeli attack. And the “reaffirmation” that Iran won’t build nuclear weapons is just this: a reaffirmation of a position Tehran has had for decades.

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