QatarEnergy je razglasil “višjo silo”, torej da začasno ne more izpolnjevati pogodbenih obveznosti zaradi izrednih okoliščin, ki jih ne more nadzorovati. To je pravni institut, ki omogoča podjetju, da začasno prekine dobavo ali izpolnjevanje pogodbe in da ne nosi pogodbenih kazni, dokler trajajo nepredvidljive okoliščine. To v praksi pomeni, da dokler traja vojna v regiji in zaprtje Hormuške ožine, katarska družba ne more začeti z utekočinjanjem plina in nato še 4 tedne, preden lahko začne dobavljati plin na svojem terminalu. Glede nato, da je QatarEnergy največji dobavitelj plina v Aziji, to pomeni energetsko krizo za večino Azije. No, za Rusijo oziroma za ruski utekočinjeni plin je to seveda odlična novica.

QatarEnergy just declared Force Majeure.

Three words that mean: we cannot deliver, and legally, we do not have to.

This is no longer a supply disruption. This is a contract collapse.

Force Majeure is not a precaution. It is a formal legal declaration that an unforeseeable event beyond QatarEnergy’s control has made fulfillment impossible. Every affected buyer just had their contract voided. The gas they were counting on is gone, and they have no legal recourse to get it back.

82% of Qatar’s LNG goes to Asia.

China relies on Qatar for 30% of its LNG imports. India 42 to 52%. South Korea 14 to 19%. Taiwan 25%. Japan is already rationing to spot markets.

Asian benchmark prices jumped 39% the day production stopped.

Force Majeure just made that permanent until further notice.

Indian companies have already cut gas supplies to industry by 10 to 30%. That is not a market adjustment. That is factories running at reduced capacity today, across the world’s most populous continent, because Iran sent drones into Ras Laffan.

Here is the number the market still has not fully absorbed.

Two weeks to restart a liquefaction train after a full cold shutdown. Then two more weeks to reach full capacity. That is a minimum of four weeks at zero, assuming no further strikes, no security complications, no inspection delays.

The war is still running.

There is no security guarantee. There is no restart timeline. There is no floor.

Every LNG contract in Asia just became a spot market problem. Every spot market problem just became an inflation problem. Every inflation problem just became a central bank problem.

This started as a war in the Middle East.

It is now inside every factory, every power plant, and every gas bill across Asia.

Samo nekaj fragmentov:

In the first Iraq War in 1990, the US had 1900+ aircrafts, 6 aircraft carriers, and 38 allies;

In the Second Iraq War in 2003, the US had 863 aircrafts, 5 aircraft carriers, and 16 allies;

In the 2026 Iran War, the US had 300+ aircrafts, 2 aircraft carriers, and only 1 ally.

Retired Turkish Admiral Cem Gurdeniz:

American ships cannot go to Bahrain to resupply ammunition. There isn’t a single US warship in the Gulf right now.

Where will they go to load missiles? To Diego Garcia. How much does it take to go there and back from the Arabian Sea? 7 days…

The US has the capacity to produce serious, expensive missiles between 800 and 1000 per year.

The other side (Iran) has 40,000 missiles and says, “We will not negotiate with the Americans.”

Zanimiva razlaga s pomočjo (ekonomske) logike teorije iger, ki upošteva dejavnike, o katerih večina ne razmišlja, ko razmišlja o tej vojni. Če je Hormuška ožina zaprta: kaj bo preostali svet brez 20 % ponudbe nafte in plina in kaj bodo zalivske države brez dostopa do hrane in vode? In do problema geografske trdnjave Irana in njegovih zalog raket in dronov ter mozaične decentralizirane geografske strukture iranske obrambe še prišli nismo.

Večina aktualnih zemljevidov kaže lokacije zračnih udarov po Iranu (vključno s Teheranom), ne pa kopenskih poti. Klasičen kopenski napad na Teheran je vojaško izjemno težaven scenarij zaradi:

• goratega reliefa kot naravne bariere (Elburz na severu, gore Zagros na zahodu/jugu)
• oddaljenosti od morebitnih izhodišč (Irak 500–700 km, Perzijski zaliv 1000+ km, Turčija/Azerbajdžan še dlje)
• iranskih obrambnih linij, minskih polj, IRGC enot in urbane obrambe v samem Teheranu (prebivalstvo 9+ milijonov)

Najverjetnejše hipotetične smeri (če bi prišlo do kopenske operacije).

Na podlagi geografske lege in starejših vojaških analiz bi bile možne glavne osi približevanja:

1. Iz smeri Iraka (zahod/jugozahod)
   • Najkrajša in najpogosteje omenjana v starih scenarijih (npr. preko Kermanshaha – Hamadana – Qoma proti Teheranu)
   • Avtocesta 48 / cesta 5 proti vzhodu. To je edina realistična ravninska pot od zahoda, a zelo dolga in izpostavljena.
2. Iz smeri Perzijskega zaliva (jug)
   • Izstop iz območja Bandar Abbasa / Bushehra → proti Shirazu → Isfahanu → Qomu → Teheranu
   • Glavna avtocesta 7: Zelo dolga (1000 km), puščavsko-gorsko območje, logistično nočna mora.
3. Iz smeri severa (Azerbajdžan ali Kaspijsko jezero)
   • Preko Tabriza / Ardabila proti Teheranu: Močno gorsko, ozek koridor, logistično težko in politično problematično.
4. Iz smeri vzhoda (Afganistan/Turkmenistan): Skoraj nerealen scenarij zaradi razdalje in logističnih težav.

Viri iz zadnjih dni kažejo, da se Trumpova administracija sicer ni izključila možnosti kopenskih enot, a trenutno ni nobenih znakov dejanske kopenske ofenzive – vse ostaja pri zračnih udarih.

Trenutno pa vojaški analitiki ocenjujejo, da polna kopenska invazija na Teheran ni realistična brez desetletja priprav in več sto tisoč vojakov – kar v 2026 ni na obzorju.

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John Mearsheimer:

Iranu ni treba zmagati, mora samo zdržati in se ne pustiti pokoriti Izraelu in ZDA.

On 3 March 2026, I was on “Judging Freedom” talking about the Iran war. I told the Judge that the Trump administration was dragged into this war by Israel and its enormously powerful lobby in the US. Both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and House Speaker Mike Johnson have admitted as much and it is clear from listening to and reading the discourse on the internet that many Americans understand that this is another war for Israel. Iran was no threat to the US and there was no reason for Trump to attack it.

I also emphasized that it is almost impossible for me to see how Israel and the US win this war. It seems that victory for this aggressive tag team requires not only regime change in Iran, but replacing the regime with new leaders who are subservient to Israeli and American wishes. If those two things do not happen, Iran will surely keep its nuclear enrichment capability; keep building ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, & long-range drones; and keep supporting Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah. The likelihood of this war producing an Iranian regime that is subservient to Israel and the US is close to zero in my estimation.

For Iran to win, all it has to do is survive and not end up as a pawn of Israel and the US. Even if its missile inventory is greatly diminished, its nuclear enrichment capability is crippled, and its infrastructure is badly damaged, it matters little if the regime survives or is replaced by a regime that refuses to kowtow to the tag team. Remember that in the Vietnam War, the US won virtually every battle and lost the war.

Kot sem že nekajkrat povedal: Ameriški napad na Irak v 2023 je (s posledičnim dramatičnim dvigom cen nafte in plina) Rusijo potegnil iz bankrota in jo znova vrnil med velesile.

Tokratni ameriški napad na Iran bo ruskemu gospodarstvu letos dal pospešek in dodatno geopolitično moč – Indija in Kitajska bosta plačevali več za rusko nafto, ker bo ta edina dosegljiva. Rusija bo nehote največji zmagovalec te vojne.  Kateri pametnjakovič je bil arhitekt tega norega napada na Irak?

(če še ne veste: Iranci so danes v Savdski Arabiji napadli največji izvozni naftni terminal na svetu in če se bodo v vojno proti Iranu vključile zalivske države, jim bodo Iranci potolkli vsa ključna nahajališča, terminale in skladišča nafte; izgubili bodo tudi svoje, toda Iranci borijo bitko za svoje preživetje).

Jože P. Damijan, Drago Babič

Slovenija se v evropskih in mednarodnih primerjavah še vedno uvršča med države z razmeroma visoko kakovostjo življenja. Po kazalnikih socialne varnosti, dostopnosti javnih storitev, nizke dohodkovne neenakosti in splošnega zadovoljstva prebivalstva praviloma presega povprečje Evropske unije. Ta rezultat ni naključen. Je posledica zgodovinsko ugodnega institucionalnega razvoja, relativno uspešne tranzicije, razmeroma uravnoteženega socialno-ekonomskega modela, vključitve v skupni evropski trg relativno stabilnega makroekonomskega okvira.

Toda Poročilo o razvoju 2025 temu uspehu nastavlja natančno in neprijetno ogledalo. Ključna ugotovitev poročila ni v tem, da bi Slovenija danes živela slabo, temveč v tem, da se Slovenija po letu 2010 vse bolj oddaljuje od razvojne dinamike, ki bi takšno raven blaginje lahko dolgoročno vzdrževala. Rast produktivnosti dela v Sloveniji že več kot desetletje zaostaja za povprečjem EU in še izraziteje za vodilnimi inovacijskimi gospodarstvi. Po letu 2020 se proces realne konvergence v BDP na prebivalca praktično ustavlja.

Slovenija je obstala v režimu nizke investicijske intenzivnosti. Podatki iz Poročila o razvoju 2025 kažejo, da so poslovne investicije v Sloveniji po krizi ostale trajno nižje kot v primerljivih državah, zlasti investicije v neoprijemljivi kapital – raziskave in razvoj, digitalizacijo, organizacijske inovacije in razvoj kadrov. Delež vlaganj v raziskave in razvoj sicer ni zanemarljiv, vendar je struktura teh vlaganj neuravnotežena: preveč sredstev ostaja ujetih v raziskovalni sferi, premalo pa jih preide v faze prototipiranja, pilotnih linij in komercializacije. Še izrazitejši je zaostanek pri vlaganjih v digitalizacijo procesov, razvoj kadrov in organizacijske inovacije v podjetjih – torej v tiste elemente, ki neposredno vplivajo na produktivnost.

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Andrew Korybko

The goal is to obtain proxy control over Iran’s enormous oil and gas reserves so that they can be weaponized as leverage against China for coercing it into a lopsided trade deal that would derail its superpower rise and therefore restore US-led unipolarity.

Trump claimed that the US’ military campaign against Iran is to “defend the American people”, while many critics have alleged (whether in jest or not) that it’s to distract from the Epstein Files, but few observers realize that it’s actually all about China. It was explained here that Trump 2.0 “decided to gradually deprive China of access to markets and resources, ideally through a series of trade deals, in order to imbue the US with the indirect leverage required to peacefully derail China’s superpower rise.”

To elaborate, “The US’ trade deals with the EU and India could ultimately result in them curtailing China’s access to their markets under pain of punitive tariffs if they refuse. In parallel, the US’ special operation in Venezuela, pressure on Iran, and simultaneous attempts to subordinate Nigeria and other leading energy producers could curtail China’s access to the resources required for fueling its superpower rise.” The resource dimension that’s relevant to Iran is a major part of the US’ “Strategy of Denial”.

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