Robert A. Pape:

My recent Foreign Affairs article, “Iran and the New Rules of Global Power,” argues that the Iran war has fundamentally changed America’s strategic position in the Middle East.

On Thursday evening, I want to take the next step—and address the question the article leaves open.

What if the Iran war did not simply expose a weakness in American strategy?

What if it marked the end of the geopolitical model the United States has relied on since the 1991 Gulf War?

For more than three decades, American power rested on four assumptions: forward bases could safely project power, air superiority would dominate the battlefield, precision strike would produce rapid victories, and overwhelming technology would allow the United States to defeat regional adversaries quickly and at relatively low cost.

The Iran war challenges every one of those assumptions.

The United States has demonstrated overwhelming military superiority. Yet it has struggled to achieve the political objective that matters most: restoring secure commercial access to the world’s most important maritime corridors. At the same time, relatively inexpensive missiles and mass-produced drones have placed American bases, allies, and critical energy infrastructure under sustained pressure.

If that assessment is correct, then the question is no longer simply whether the United States wins in Iran. It is whether the military model on which Washington now spends roughly $1 trillion each year—and is preparing to spend substantially more—still produces the strategic outcomes it was designed to achieve. If not, this is no longer just a military debate. It could become one of the defining strategic, budgetary, and political questions heading into the midterm elections.

What if the Iran war is revealing not that America needs to spend more—but that it has been investing in the wrong theory of military power?

Has the second precision revolution fundamentally changed the relationship between military technology and military power?

Has precision warfare spread far enough that second-tier powers can now deny the United States the kind of rapid, decisive victories that defined the post-Cold War era?

And if the post-1991 model has broken, what replaces it?

Those are the questions I’ll examine Thursday evening—including why I believe the answers extend far beyond Iran and will shape American strategy in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and every region where forward-deployed U.S. forces remain central to deterrence.

Prof Pape Live Briefing

Thursday, July 30 • 7:00 PM ET