Mnoge je zavedla nekaj let trajajoča konjunktura v EU, ki pa se je sesula v trenutku, ko je upadlo zunanje povpraševanje. Zanimiva sta dva dejavnika. Prvi je, da kljub solidni konjunkturi nobeni izmed centralnih bank v razvitih držav ni uspelo v tem času zategniti monetarne politike in se odlepiti od ničelne vodilne obrestne mere. In drugi je, da je rast v EU ključno odvisna od zunanjega povpraševanja oziroma da države EU niso v stanju zagotoviti dovolj domačega povpraševanja. Kar je seveda ključni dejavnik ranljivosti evropskih gospodarstev. Za tiste bolj skeptične oziroma tiste, ki živijo v učbenikih za prvi letnik ekonomije, naj samo navedem lep povzetek in komentar Martina Sandbuja v Financial Timesu včerajšnje odločitve ECB, da bo spet sprostila monetarno politiko, preden jo je sploh začela zategovati:
Depending on how you count, the past eight years have seen three or four aborted tightening turns by the world’s two biggest central banks. In 2011 the Trichet interest rate rises helped send the eurozone into a second, self-inflicted recession. In 2015 the US Federal Reserve lifted its policy rate by a quarter-point — and then had to delay its plans for further increases. Since late 2018, the Fed has again had to moderate its tightening plan, vowing flexibility both on lifting rates and reducing its balance sheet. And this does not include similar developments at smaller central banks.
All these decisions, like the ECB’s today, have been reasonable. In the jargon, they have been “data dependent”: central banks have responded to turns for the worse in either markets or the real economy or both. But taken together, they indicate something bigger and more worrying.
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