Zakaj javno-zasebna partnerstva ne delujejo

V naši zadnji študiji glede tveganj zaradi neizgradnje drugega tira Koper – Divača (DK2) smo pokazali, da je komercialno financiranje infrastrukturnih projektov (torej javno-zasebno partnerstvo – JZP) nekajkrat dražje od javnega financiranja. Razloga sta, (1) da je zasebno financiran projekt dražji (ni sofinanciranja z EU sredstvi, vprašanje DDV) in (2) da so stroški zadolževanja zasebnega investitorja okrog 2-krat višji od države. Zasebno financirani projekti so zato za državo bistveno dražji, kot če bi jih sama financirala. Res je, da javno financirani projekti zaradi slabšega nadzora težijo k preseganju začetne investicijske vrednosti (za četrtino). Toda, kot je pokazala analiza JZP projektov Evropske investicijske banke (EIB), je sama začetna investicijska vrednost projekta za zasebnika za četrtino višja kot za državo. S tem se koristi od JZP (bolj učinkoviro vodenje investicije) izničijo v primerjavi z javno vodenimi projekti. Ostanejo pa seveda bistveno višji stroški financiranja investicij.

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Ideologija v ekonomiji in odprtost za nova spoznanja

Dodatek k temu, kar sem pisal prejšnji teden o tem, kaj smo se naučili po Veliki recesiji iz 2008 in kaj od tega smo ekonomisti bili pripravljeni priznati. Moj občutek na podlagi intenzivnega spremljanja dogajanja v ekonomski sferi v zadnjih letih, je, da so bolj liberalni ekonomisti (mišljeno kot progresivni) v povprečju precej bolj nagnjeni k priznavanju ekonomske realnosti in s tem k priznavanju zmot na podlagi novih dejstev in spoznanj kot pa konzervativni ekonomisti (sem spadajo pripadniki neoklasične, monetaristične in avstrijske šole). Slednji oblikujejo svoja prepričanja na podlagi a priornih verjetij, torej dogem (denimo o primatu ekonomske svobode posameznika ne glede na družbene stroške ali o superiornosti trga).

Konzervativnost tukaj seveda ne ponazarja samo večje nagnjenosti h konzervativnim (desnim) političnim idejam in politikam, temveč predvsem dogmatskost oziroma manjšo pripravljenost za sprejem novih spoznanj. Liberalni ekonomisti so bolj pripravljeni sprejemati nova spoznanja in svoja prepričanja prilagajati empiričnim izkušnjam. Vse z namenom iskanja optimalnih in nedogmatskih družbenih rešitev, ki vodijo k hitrejšemu razvoju.

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John Taylor the Republican contradicts John Taylor the economist

longandvariable

[Title amended to copy Noah Smith’s catchier tweet of this post]

I am just back from a conference on uncertainty hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.  John Taylor spoke over lunch about what he thought the causes of the crisis were, and what would improve policy now, articulating a view he has made many times now.  (For example, here).   His basic diagnosis is:  the principal cause of the crisis was interest rates being too low during the early 2000s, as indicated by deviating below what the Taylor Rule would have recommended.  He acknowledged that fiscal uncertainty was weighing against the economy, but argued that that was because of the Obama stimulus package of early 2009, which was a departure from ‘predictable’ and sound fiscal policy.  He also explained that he thought QE was creating economic uncertainty, and that the world would be better without it. …

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John Taylor on auditing all the world’s Feds.

longandvariable

This paper explains John Taylor’s view that if only central banks committed to monetary policy rules, international monetary disorder, and indeed large-scale capital flows, would be eradicated.

It’s an extension of his earlier argument that the US’ financial crisis and recession was caused, predominantly, by a departure from the Taylor Rule for monetary policy, and by fiscal uncertainty.

I didn’t find the earlier arguments convincing, and this one doesn’t persuade me either, for related reasons.

This new contribution repeats a problem with the original one, the contention that monetary policy was too loose in the early 2000s.  This was dealt with convincingly by  Bernanke in 2010.  The Fed set rates pretty close to a ‘forward-looking’ Taylor rule in which one inserts not current, but forecast inflation.  Very low rates back then was to head off forecast deflation.

The proposal amounts to assuming away one aspect of the problem. …

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Priznati zmote: Lahko nova dejstva spremenijo naša prepričanja?

Prejšnji teden je Adam Ozimek, ekonomist na Moody’s Analitics, napisal blog »Ali lahko ekonomija spremeni vaše mnenje?«, ki je v ekonomski blogosferi naletel na velik odziv. Ozimek pravi, da obstaja splošno prepričanje, da so ekonomisti in tisti, ki berejo ekonomske tekste, »zaklenjeni« v ideološko motivirana prepričanja. So bodisi liberalci bodisi konzervativci in pač poberejo katerokoli empirično dejstvo, da podkrepijo svoja siceršnja prepričanja. Ozimek se s tem ne strinja in pravi, da solidne ekonomske raziskave lahko spremenijo mnogo mnenj. Lahko res? *

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Vikend branje

 

Mind changes

V povezavi z mojim komentarjem Lahko nova dejstva spremenijo naša prepričanja?, kjer navajam izkušnje oziroma “priznanja” vrste ekonomistov in inštitucij, ki so po začetku Velike recesije konec 2008 spremenili/e mnoga svoja ekonomska stališča oziroma poglede, je tukaj še zadnji zapis Tonyja Yatesa.

longandvariable

It’s fashionable now to get out there what you’ve changed your mind on.  The calculation being, perhaps, that unless you do, you will get nowhere arguing hard for your other, unalterable priors.

In that spirit, here are a few thing I changed my mind on.

  1.  The importance of financial ‘plumbing’.  I, like most macro people I talked to, used to think banking in macro was cluttering up models for the sake of it.
  2.  The lack of any effect of minimum wages on employment.
  3.  The minor effects on wages of immigration.
  4.  How sticky price DSGE models are not, clearly, realistic enough to take seriously as devices on which to perform quantitatively relevant optimal control exercises.  For example, I used to admire what the Norges Bank and Riksbank did and thought we at the BoE were well behind the curve.
  5. The usefulness of atheoretical empirical macro.  I used to think we were…

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