Za uvod in lažje razumevanje preberite najprej Metanje denarja iz helikopterja.
Each of the policy options I have discussed so far involves the Fed’s acting on its own. In practice, the effectiveness of anti-deflation policy could be significantly enhanced by cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. A broad-based tax cut, for example, accommodated by a program of open-market purchases to alleviate any tendency for interest rates to increase, would almost certainly be an effective stimulant to consumption and hence to prices. Even if households decided not to increase consumption but instead re-balanced their portfolios by using their extra cash to acquire real and financial assets, the resulting increase in asset values would lower the cost of capital and improve the balance sheet positions of potential borrowers. A money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman’s famous “helicopter drop” of money.
Vir: Ben Bernanke, Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here (2002)
I think most economists would agree that a large enough helicopter drop must raise the price level. Suppose it did not, so that the price level remained unchanged. Then the real wealth of the population would grow without bound, as they are flooded with gifts of money from the government—-another variant of the arbitrage argument made earlier. Surely at some point the public would attempt to convert its increased real wealth into goods and services, spending that would increase aggregate demand and prices. Conversion of the public’s money wealth into other assets would also be beneficial, if it raised the prices of other assets.
The only counter-argument I can imagine is that the public might fear a future lump-sum tax on wealth equal to the per capita money transfer, inducing them to hold rather than spend the extra balances. But the government has no incentive to take such an action in the future, and hence the public has no reason to expect it. The newly circulated cash bears no interest and thus has no budgetary implications for the government if prices remain unchanged. If instead prices rise, as we anticipate, the government will face higher nominal spending requirements but will also enjoy higher nominal tax receipts and a reduction in the real value of outstanding nominal government debt. To a first approximation then the helicopter drops will not erode the financial position of the government and thus will not induce a need for extraordinary future taxes.
Vir: Ben Bernanke, Japanese monetary policy: a case of self-induced paralysis? (1999)