Video spot o delovanju politike varčevanja

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Knjiga Marka Blytha – Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (2013) – spada med mojih 5 najljubših ekonomskih knjig letošnjega leta. Kopica knjig je bila napisana o vzrokih in evoluciji sedanje finančne in gospodarske krize v razvitih državah, ki so jih napisali priznani ekonomisti, toda potrebovali smo politologa oziroma natančneje profesorja politične ekonomije, da pronicljivo ugotovi in brutalno jasno pove nekaj ključnih resnic o sedanji krizi. In ko jih obelodani, postanejo tudi rešitve za krizo samoumevne in povsem drugačne od aktualnih načinov. Prva in ključna resnica je, da v primeru sedanje krize ne gre primarno za dolžniško krizo držav, pač pa za tipično bančno krizo. Zato plačevanje za orgijo finančnih trgov ne more in ne sme biti preloženo na davkoplačevalce (v obliki politike strogega varčevanja), ki krize niso povzročili. Natančneje, rezanje socialne države z namenom zmanjšanja proračunskih deficitov, ki so nastali zaradi reševanja bank in ne zaradi preveč razsipne socialne države, ni upravičeno in iz demokratičnega vidika ter vidika politične ekonomije ni vzdržno. Druga resnica pa je, da tudi če se države tega lotijo na tak način, ne more uspeti – kadar vse države hkrati varčujejo, nobena ne more rasti. Nadaljujte z branjem→

Economic theory, history, and the recent experience all call for a principled debt restructuring mechanism as an integral element of the euro area’s design. Sovereign debt should be recognised as equity (a residual claim on the sovereign), operationalised by the automatic lowering of the debt burden upon the breach of contractually-specified thresholds. Making debt more equity-like is also the way forward for speedy private deleveraging. This debt-equity swap principle is a needed shock absorber for the future but will also serve as the principle to deal with the overhang of ‘legacy’ debt. Nadaljujte z branjem→

Ta debata je sicer dokaj irelevantna za te kraje, čeprav imamo tudi tukaj precej ljubiteljev prve ali druge šole. Bistveno bolj je relevantna za ZDA, kjer je free-market fundamentalizem “avstrijske šole” zasedel ideološko platformo republikancev, nato pa so jo republikanski ideologi premešali še z monetaristično šolo Miltona Friedmana in pri tem spregledali, da se (sicer tudi free-market fundamentalist) Friedman globoko ni strinjal z Avstrijanci glede potrebnosti ekonomske politike. V Evropi te debate ni, ker je prisotno manj ideologije v ekonomski politiki, seveda če zanemarimo nemško pragmatično ideologijo varčevanja, ki pa ima svojo podlago bolj v pragmatičnih razlogih (Nemci bi imeli prosto trgovino in skupno valuto, nočejo pa plačevati za dolgove drugih držav, ki so v veliki meri nastali prav zaradi te slabo dizajnirane skupne monetarne unije) kot pa v zaresnih niansah med eno ali drugo strujo free-market fundamentalizma. Nadaljujte z branjem→

Nekaj branja o uspešnosti nove japonske ekonomsko-politične paradigme, imenovane ‘abenomika’, po izboru Bruegla. Nadaljujte z branjem→

V četrtek sta dve majhni ameriški podjetji, ponudnika elektronske pošte, nenadoma zaprla vrata in uničila serverje. Lavabit zato, ker je dobil uradni tajni nalog za preiskavo, Secret Circle pa, ker je pričakoval, da ga bo dobil. Obe podjetji sta se odločili, da raje uničita svoje podjetje, kot da bi razkrili zasebno pošto njunih uporabnikov ameriški vladi. To je nekaj, kar si velika podjetja, kot so Facebook, Microsoft ali Google, ne morejo privoščiti, zato raje sodelujejo z NSA. Kar seveda pomeni, da si danes nihče, podjetja ali posamezniki, ne more privoščiti, da bi zaupal svoje komunikacije in druge podatke serverjem podjetij, ki zapadejo pod ameriške zakone. Nadaljujte z branjem→

Glej, no glej, nemški Der Spiegel je objavil prispevek Jürgena Habermasa, nemškega filozofa in sociologa ter enega izmed največjih še živečih intelektualcev v svetovnem merilu, o zablodeli nemški evropski politiki. Habermas (1929) je dovolj star, da se spomni travmatične in krvave evropske kalvarije iz prve polovice 20. stoletja. Krvave kalvarije, ki so jo povzročile nemške hegemonistične težnje, ko je bila Nemčija “”too weak to dominate the Continent but too strong to bring itself into line” (Ludwig Dehios). Nadaljujte z branjem→

So what happened to Milton Friedman?

Think of it this way: Friedman was an avid free-market advocate, who insisted that the market, left to itself, could solve almost any problem. Yet he was also a macroeconomic realist, who recognized that the market definitely did not solve the problem of recessions and depressions. So he tried to wall off macroeconomics from everything else, and make it as inoffensive to laissez-faire sensibilities as possible. Yes, he in effect admitted, we do need stabilization policy — but we can minimize the government’s role by relying only on monetary policy, none of that nasty fiscal stuff, and then not even allowing the monetary authority any discretion. Nadaljujte z branjem→

The top 1 percent income share has more than doubled in the United States over the last 30 years, drawing much public attention in recent years. While other English-speaking countries have also experienced sharp increases in the top 1 percent income share, many high-income countries such as Japan, France, or Germany have seen much less increase in top income shares. Hence, the explanation cannot rely solely on forces common to advanced countries, such as the impact of new technologies and globalization on the supply and demand for skills. Moreover, the explanations have to accommodate the falls in top income shares earlier in the twentieth century experienced in virtually all high-income countries. Nadaljujte z branjem→

Imagine a society with perfect economic equality. Then, one day, this egalitarian utopia is disturbed by an entrepreneur with an idea for a new product. Think of the entrepreneur as Steve Jobs as he develops the iPod, J. K. Rowling as she writes her Harry Potter books, or Steven Spielberg as he directs his blockbuster movies. The new product makes the entrepreneur much richer than everyone else. How should the entrepreneurial disturbance in this formerly egalitarian outcome alter public policy? Should public policy remain the same, because the situation was initially acceptable and the entrepreneur improved it for everyone? Or should government policymakers deplore the resulting inequality and use their powers to tax and transfer to spread the gains more equally? In my view, this thought experiment captures, in an extreme and stylized way, what has happened to US society over the past several decades. Since the 1970s, average incomes have grown, but the growth has not been uniform across the income distribution. The incomes at the top, especially in the top 1 percent, have grown much faster than average. These high earners have made significant economic contributions, but they have also reaped large gains. The question for public policy is what, if anything, to do about it. Nadaljujte z branjem→