A former U.S. Colonel opines in The Hill:

Ukraine can no longer win – The Hill, Feb 22 2024

 Welcome to the club, I’d say, but its nearly two years to late for that. Ukraine lost the war on February 24 2022, the day the Special Military operation had started.

There never was a chance for Ukraine to win.

I will first let the Colonel recap the established narrative to then add my observations to it:

Two years ago, the Ukrainian Armed Forces defied expectations immediately. Days before Russia’s massive combined arms incursion, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley spoke for the U.S. military when he predicted to Congress that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours.

Many military analysts similarly predicted the Russian Armed Forces would quickly rout the overmatched Ukrainians. American leaders encouraged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to leave the country, lest Russian troops assassinate him.

These projections of immediate success for Russia misread the progress Ukraine had made in capability and readiness since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. They also overestimated the Russian forces’ readiness, air superiority, and command cohesion.

That is all – somewhat – true.

There were expectations that the Russian forces would quickly conquer Kiev and overthrow the sitting government. However, the Russians never applied the necessary manpower to do so. Pacifying and holding an enemy city in modern times generally requires abound 1 soldier per 40 inhabitants. When the war started Kiev had about 3 million inhabitants. Taking and holding the city would have required some 75,000 troops. But the Russian forces never deployed more than 40,000 troops into the general direction of Kiev.

Thus the military aim was not to take the city. It was to apply pressure to achieve a political aim.

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Maks Tajnikar, kot najbolj kvalificirani ekonomist za področje zdravstva pri nas in na osnovi številnih strokovnih analiz, je pripravil – po mojem mnenju – odličen program sanacije slovenskega zdravstva (na primarni, sekundarni in terciarni ravni). Program, ki omogoča hkrati ureditev razmer v zdravstvu in da zdravstvo ostane javno.

V nadaljevanju poobjavljam prvi del, ki se nanaša na sanacijo razmer v primarnem zdravstvu, preostali del programa pa lahko preberete na Tajnikarjevem blogu.

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Slovensko zdravstvo potrebuje sanacijski program v smislu podjetniškega preobrata. Z njim ne spreminjamo glavnih sistemskih lastnosti in zdravstvenega sistema tudi ne opredeljujemo na novo. S takim sanacijskim programom zgolj »popravljamo« tiste dela organiziranja slovenskega zdravstva, ki so bili v zadnjih letih nesistematično spremenjeni in ki jih je potrebno posodobiti glede na spremenjeno transakcijsko in kontekstualno okolje zdravstva v Sloveniji. Tak sanacijski program omogoča tudi opredelitev iztočnic za strateški načrt razvoja slovenskega zdravstva, v praksi pa vzpostavlja red, ki omogoča realizacijo strategij.

Gre za naslednje ukrepe, ki so v celoti organizacijske oziroma poslovne narave. Prvi del ukrepov se nanaša na organiziranje primarne ravni.

Prvič, timi splošne in druge medicine na primarni ravni (ne glede na lastnino izvajalcev) morajo zajemati 1700 uporabnikov (opredeljenih). Normo 1400 opredeljenih iz leta 2019 je potrebno v celoti opustiti. Nova norma bi restavrirala stanje iz leta 2019, ko je bilo 1100 timov splošne medicine (okoli 350 zasebnikov – koncesionarjev) ob 2,1 milijona prebivalcev.

Drugič, tim splošnih zdravnikov je treba razširiti iz 1 zdravnika in 1,2 medicinske sestre na še enega administratorja z vsaj srednjo ekonomsko diplomo, ki mora biti obvezni element tima. S tem bi razbremenili zdravstveno osebje administrativnega dela.

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Dober komentar Davida Goldmana. Čeprav je pretirano optimističen glede možnosti, da lahko ZDA še zmagajo v tehnološki in industrijski vojni s Kitajsko. V vojni glede obroževanja so ZDA že izgubile.

Whether it was right for America to go abroad seeking monsters to destroy in Moscow and Beijing, the way we went about it was abominably stupid. “If an injury has to be done to a man it should be so severe that his vengeance need not be feared,” Machiavelli advised. Washington has wounded Russia and China but not disabled them, setting in motion a tragic sequence of responses that in the worst case will lead to war, but more likely will leave the United States with vastly diminished strategic standing.

The rise of China and the resilience of Russia have persisted through serried waves of tech restrictions, $125 billion of NATO support for Ukraine, and an unprecedented sanctions regime against Russia, including the seizure of $300 billion in reserves, among other measures.

The Black Legend propounded by the Blob states that China is on the verge of invading Taiwan because its Communist leaders hate democracy, and because it wants to distract its citizens from their economic misery. It claims that Vladimir Putin wants to revive the Russian Empire and invaded Ukraine because it “is a country that for decades has enjoyed freedom and democracy and the right to choose its own destiny.”

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Enter Syrsky, who had been ground commander under Zaluzhny and was now put in charge of all Ukrainian military forces. Syrsky is the same guy whose tactics led to the collapse of Bakhmut and very heavy casualties, earning that city the name “meat grinder.”

Syrsky immediately called up three or four brigades to save Avdiivka from collapse. But his planned rescue operation almost immediately got into serious trouble.

Some of Syrsky’s brigades were being assembled and organized in a small town around 15 kilometers from Avdiivka, called Selydove. The Russians discovered the Ukrainian army operations in Selydove and attacked with Iskander missiles and cluster weapons.

According to Russian sources blogging on various media networks (Telegram and X, for example), the Russian attack all but wiped out an entire brigade with heavy Ukrainian casualties.

Ukraine’s propaganda mill went into high gear, alleging that the Russian attack was aimed at a hospital’s maternity ward in Selydov. But the reality was that Ukraine lost around 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers.

Most western news sources parroted the Ukrainian line.

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Smrt Alekseja Navalnega, najbolj znanega ruskega političnega zapornika, je seveda izjemno tragičen in žalosten dogodek. Nasploh dejstvo, da obstajajo politični zaporniki, je nezdružljivo s funkcionalno demokracijo. Zahodni politiki so skorajda brez izjeme, sploh pa takšne politične karikature, kot je Lindsey Graham, izkoristili smrt Navalnega za (bolj ali manj) upravičen napad na ruski režim in njegovega predsednika (in to kljub temu, da vzrok smrti še ni bil potrjen in da smrt Navalnega v oddaljenem arktičnem zaporu, pred katerim je bilo še skoraj dve desetletji prestajanja zaporne kazni, piarovsko Putinu nikakor ne koristi). Pri tem so tako zahodni politiki kot mediji predvsem potencirali pomen Navalnega za rusko demokracijo in dejstvo, da je bil politični zapornik.

In tukaj pridemo do hipokrizije z velikimi začetnicami. Prvič, Navalni že nekaj časa ni bil zelo priljubljen v zahodnih medijih, ker ti niso mogli spregledati nekaterih njegovih javno izraženih političnih pogledov, ki so bili izjemno nacionalistični in rasistični (sovražni do Arabcev in imigrantov, zavzemanje za njihovo deportacijo) in so mejili na fašistične. Drugič, Navalni je bil (podobno kot nesojeni “opozicijski predsednik Venezuele”, katerega ime smo že pozabili) politična marioneta zahodnih varnostnih služb. Ujet naj bi bil v video prisluhih, kjer agentu britanske varnostne službe ponuja organizacijo oranžne revolucije v Rusiji v zameno za letna financiranja v višini 15-20 milijonov dolarjev. Predstavljajte si, da v kateri izmed najbolj demokratičnih držav na svetu ujamejo domačega opozicijskega politika v prisluhih, ko denimo ruskim agentom ponuja organizacijo oranžne revolucije proti domačemu demokratično izvoljenemu vodstvu. Tak agent tujih varnostnih služb se ne bi izvlekel samo z 19 leti zapora, pač pa bi ga čakal dosmrtni zapor zaradi veleizdaje.

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War isn’t a 100-meter dash; it’s a marathon.

Months ago, as with Bakhmut, Avdiivka fell after intense fighting, but one thing remains common: the Russians can be delayed, but they never cease their advance. The fall of Avdiivka signifies that even in defensive positions and within strong fortifications, the Ukrainian army can at most delay the Russian progression. Now, only a few more such fortresses, perhaps 4 or 5, constructed years ago by Ukrainian forces, stand in the Russian path.

As I have reported for months, the Ukrainian army lacks a variety of resources—from personal equipment to ammunition, vehicles, and anti-air missiles. To be realistic, the Ukrainian army has not yet collapsed solely due to the heroism of some commanders and their men.

With an average age of 45, the Ukrainian army is now fighting a losing war, where there is an eminent risk of the Russians opening two new fronts, further complicating the already chaotic situation for Ukrainian forces.

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Branko Milanović je izpostavil zelo dobro poanto glede demokracije. Prednost demokracije pred avtokratskimi režimi je v možnosti, da imamo različna mnenja in da jih lahko tudi svobodno izražamo, medtem ko ni empirične podpore v podatkih, da bi demokracije bile bolj uspešne glede razvoja, neenakosti ali korupcije. Toda prav to – pravica imeti različno mnenje in ga svobodno izražati – se zdi, da je danes na udaru. Tako prek političnih kampanj kot prek velikih mainstream medijev potekajo poskusi uniformiranja pogleda na svet. Težko je prodreti s pogledi, ki odstopajo od uradnih ali tistih, ki jih “usmerjajo” tehnološki giganti s svojimi orodji (iskalniki) in socialnimi omrežji. Spomnite se akcije Googla ob začetku vojne v Ukrajini, ki je v dopisu medijem zelo jasno dal vedeti, da ne bo monetiziral oglasov v medijih, kjer bo narativa glede vzrokov za vojno itd. odstopala od uradne. Glejte prepoved dostopa do vsebin v ruskih medijih. Glejte način poročanja o vojni v Gazi. Glejte usmerjanje diskusije o spolnih identitetah v smeri liberalne politično korektne verzije.

Milanović je sicer skeptičen, da lahko tak poskus uniformiranja – podoben tistem v času komunizma – tudi uspe. Jaz sem manj prepričan v to. Ekonomski interes zasebnih lastnikov je običajno bistveno bolj učinkovit način zatiranja svobodnega mnenja od avtoritarnih režimov.

What do you see as the main gain from democracy, as opposed to dictatorship?

[…] When I thought of that, my answer was: the freedom to read and listen to whatever I want, and to say whatever I want. And I think this is all. I do not believe that democracy leads to higher growth, less corruption, or less inequality. No evidence for any of these things. To put it perhaps too strongly, I think democracy has no effect on any real social phenomenon, but it does allow people, on a purely personal level, to feel better by accessing more diverse information, and to express any option they have. (Note that this freedom applies only to the political sphere,  not to one’s place of work which in capitalist democracies is ruled dictatorially.)   

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This is William C. Kirby, easily one of the most knowledgeable Western experts on the topic. He is Professor of China Studies at Harvard University and Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School. He serves as Chairman of the Harvard China Fund, and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. In other words, when it comes to business and China, there are pretty much no academic figures in the West more qualified than he is.

Here the gist of what he says:

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Jeremy Rudd je tisti svetovalec boarda Federal Reserve, ki je septembra 2021, ko se je začel kuhati inflacijski šok v ZDA, objavil fenomenalno teoretično razpravo “Why Do We Think That Inflation Expectations Matter for Inflation? (And Should We?)”. Priznam, da že dolgo nisem tako užival ob branju teoretične ekonomske razprave (tukaj je moj takratni zapis “Petek, ko so ubili inflacijska (racionalna) pričakovanja“). Na kratko, Rudd je zapisal, da “je uporaba inflacijskih pričakovanj za razlago opazovane inflacijske dinamike nepotrebna in nesmiselna“. Oziroma da utemeljevanje ukrepanja monetarne politike glede inflacije na podlagi inflacijskih pričakovanj neustrezno, saj sloni na izjemno trhlih teoretičnih temeljih in empirično ni podprto, in “bi njegovo nekritično spoštovanje zlahka povzročilo resne napake politike.”

No, zdaj je tik pred objavo Ruddova knjiga “A Practical Guide to Macroeconomics“, ki napoveduje razbiti nekaj mitov v ekonomiji, predvsem pa pokazati, da je velika večina teoretičnih in empiričnih raziskav v makroekonomiji neuporabna pri snovanju makroekonomskih politik. Ker pač temeljijo na domišljijski predpostavkah o domišljijskem svetu, ki obstaja samo v glavah ene skupine ekonomistov, ki je odcepljena od kakršnihkoli značilnosti realnega sveta. Najbrž ne obstaja nič bolj nerealističnega in neuporabnega, kot so makroekonomske mainstream teoretske razprave in empirične študije.

Evo, kaj obljublja knjiga:

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