A former U.S. Colonel opines in The Hill:

Ukraine can no longer win – The Hill, Feb 22 2024

 Welcome to the club, I’d say, but its nearly two years to late for that. Ukraine lost the war on February 24 2022, the day the Special Military operation had started.

There never was a chance for Ukraine to win.

I will first let the Colonel recap the established narrative to then add my observations to it:

Two years ago, the Ukrainian Armed Forces defied expectations immediately. Days before Russia’s massive combined arms incursion, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley spoke for the U.S. military when he predicted to Congress that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours.

Many military analysts similarly predicted the Russian Armed Forces would quickly rout the overmatched Ukrainians. American leaders encouraged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to leave the country, lest Russian troops assassinate him.

These projections of immediate success for Russia misread the progress Ukraine had made in capability and readiness since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. They also overestimated the Russian forces’ readiness, air superiority, and command cohesion.

That is all – somewhat – true.

There were expectations that the Russian forces would quickly conquer Kiev and overthrow the sitting government. However, the Russians never applied the necessary manpower to do so. Pacifying and holding an enemy city in modern times generally requires abound 1 soldier per 40 inhabitants. When the war started Kiev had about 3 million inhabitants. Taking and holding the city would have required some 75,000 troops. But the Russian forces never deployed more than 40,000 troops into the general direction of Kiev.

Thus the military aim was not to take the city. It was to apply pressure to achieve a political aim.

Immediately after the war had begun the Ukrainian government had agreed to hold peace talks. Over the next weeks these were held first in Belarus and later in Istanbul. In late March, after Ukraine had agreed during the negotiations to not join NATO, Russia made the good will gesture of pulling its troops back from the capitol. But in early April the U.S. and UK intervened and pressed Kiev to abolish negotiations.

The western political and military leadership had simply misread the Russian aim, thought its military was weak and had come to the wrong conclusions.

That also happened in the following phase:

One year ago, all signs were encouraging. Ukrainian forces had been bloodied, but they held on to territory in the east in defiance of expectations. Successful counteroffensives allowed Ukraine to regain territory in the south. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy defiantly declared the coming year one of “our invincibility.” American aid to the country offered a king’s ransom in artillery and anti-tank weapons through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and the flow seemed unceasing.

Inspired by Ukraine’s stunning success against the much larger and more advanced military, the West galvanized behind Zelensky and his troops. Tragically, all these indicators led to unrealistic expectations.

Russia has started the war with its military structured in peace-time formations. It had only used its standing forces, not any conscripts or mobilized troops, to launch the Ukraine campaign. The main organizational structure of Russian troops at that time were the Battalion Tactical Groups.

Excursus: During Soviet times the military had the classic war-time structure of Divisions with 4 to 5 Brigades each of which each had 4 to 5 Battalions each of which had four to five Companies. Such structures require lots of people.

To save money Russia did away with the Division layer. The Motorized Infantry Brigades, consisting of one tank Battalion, two motorized infantry Battalions and two artillery Battalions, were shrunken into Battalion Tactical Groups.

About a third of the artillery and tanks formations were eliminated as well as half of infantry. Instead of some 4.000-4.500 soldiers in a Brigade formations the Battalion Tactical Groups had each kept only 2,000 men. The no longer manned and needed equipment was put into storage.

The peace construct of a Battalion Tactical Group was a lot cheaper than the people intensive Brigade structure but still had about 2/3rd of the original fire power. The idea had always been that, should a war happen, the BTG structure would be re-filled with mobilized men and restored equipment to again become a full-sized brigade. – End Excursus

It was not until August 2022, after the failure of another round of negotiations, that the Russian leadership decided to go on war footage. A mobilization was launched, equipment was pulled from storage and peacetime BTG formations were revived into full Brigade structures. The Division command layer was reestablished. All this required time and retraining. The war industry had to be set up to support a longer fight.

There is a saying: “The Russians are slow to saddle but ride fast.” It can be applied here.

During 2022 to early 2023 the sparse Russian forces were required to use economy of force. Positions of less value were guarded by a minimum of forces (Kharkiv, Kherson). When those forces came under pressure the positions were simply given up. Defensive lines were build to guard more valuable ground.

By spring to summer 2023 the Russian forces had (re-)grown to full war power. The systematic destruction of the Ukrainian forces could finally begin.

As soon as the Ukrainian forces tried to challenge the revived Russian formations, most famously in their failed ‘counter offensive, the got beaten the hell out of themselves. Pressed to produced more gains the political leadership of Ukraine demanded that its troops attack everywhere and never retreat.

That fitted the political Russian aim of demilitarizing Ukraine. Defending from well dug positions and with an increasing advantage of artillery and air power the Russian forces decimated attacking Ukrainian forces.

At the end of last year the Ukrainian military started to change its tactic. For a lack of forces and material it had to go into a defensive mode. The Russian forces, now fully equipped and battle ready, started their offensive campaign:

Today, the situation is grim. The fighting has slowed to a cruel slog that works to Russia’s favor. Ukraine runs low on troops and munitions, while Russia maintains both in plenty. The long-planned, high-risk, months-long Ukrainian spring 2023 counteroffensive failed, with Ukraine unable to regain territory seized by Russia. Support for Zelensky in Ukraine and the West has finally slipped. American aid is logjammed in Congress, and the U.S. seems tired of funding the war.

Over much of the past two years, following those predictions of immediate Russian victory, analysts and policymakers have gone in the other direction with a new set of misjudgments: that the Russian Army is a paper tiger; that the generals will turn on Putin; that Ukraine will bleed Russia out in Donbass.

The reality, two years in, is that there is no path to victory for Ukraine, at least not in the sense of pushing Russian troops back to 2021 lines of control. After Ukrainian troops abandoned Avdiivka following some of the war’s heaviest fighting — the most significant loss or gain by either side in nine months — almost all advantages accrue to Russia.

War, as seen by the Russians, is a slow process that requires that all elements, political, civilian and military, are synchronized. In that view winning this or that battle does not matter much. It is the long term approach that makes the difference. It takes time to achieve the steady state that over time creates victory. Only when that state is achieved can the real destruction of the enemy begin.

Russian forces are currently attacking in all directions. The Ukrainian forces lack personnel as well as munitions. It is only a question of time until the Ukraine has to give up and to seek peace under whatever unfavorable condition.

There never really was, and is no longer a way, to change that path.

The $60 billion aid package held up in Congress will not significantly change the future. This fight is a long haul one that will require additional aid. The spigot will close at some point — perhaps soon — turning off aid and sealing Ukraine’s fate.

The endgame in Ukraine is approaching fast. It may indeed come much sooner than many are today willing to admit.

Vir: Moon of Alabama