War isn’t a 100-meter dash; it’s a marathon.

Months ago, as with Bakhmut, Avdiivka fell after intense fighting, but one thing remains common: the Russians can be delayed, but they never cease their advance. The fall of Avdiivka signifies that even in defensive positions and within strong fortifications, the Ukrainian army can at most delay the Russian progression. Now, only a few more such fortresses, perhaps 4 or 5, constructed years ago by Ukrainian forces, stand in the Russian path.

As I have reported for months, the Ukrainian army lacks a variety of resources—from personal equipment to ammunition, vehicles, and anti-air missiles. To be realistic, the Ukrainian army has not yet collapsed solely due to the heroism of some commanders and their men.

With an average age of 45, the Ukrainian army is now fighting a losing war, where there is an eminent risk of the Russians opening two new fronts, further complicating the already chaotic situation for Ukrainian forces.

These last remaining fortresses will delay the Russian advances, but what prospects does Ukraine have after the allies cease weapon deliveries? Essentially none.

Once the Russians pass these remaining defenses, they will have an open route to the center and north, with major cities in their path. This is where the war could become a real disaster for civilians.

The new Ukrainian commander, whether Zelensky or anyone else, lacks the courage to call for a 10th mobilization. People are reluctant to fight, especially because they hear firsthand reports from friends who have been on the front lines. Meanwhile, we have been largely fed unrealistic, positive news about Ukraine’s situation.

Though the Russians have lost a considerable number of tanks in Ukraine, they currently have deployed more tanks there than the total number possessed by all European countries’ armies—not counting Russian reserves, just the units deployed.

The prognosis is even bleaker. After resolving the electronics bottleneck, opening a new engine factory, and expanding gun barrel factories, the Russians have now opened a new transmission factory. They are preparing for a prolonged war, with a production curve that sharply contrasts with that of the Ukrainian forces. This doesn’t even account for North Korean support.

NATO’s logistics have been one of the weak points of this conflict.

Approximately 70 percent of military equipment transferred from the United States and Sweden arrives with spare parts, from the UK—up to 40 percent. From other countries—up to 10 percent, and countries like Poland and Slovenia provide no spare parts at all.

The Leopard 2A6 tanks must be repaired in Lithuania, and only now are the 2A4s starting to be serviced in Poland.

The Ukrainian T-64s theoretically could be repaired at VOP CZ in the Czech Republic, but not a single tank has reached any of their workshops.

I have been analyzing several aspects of both armies for several months, ever since the provision of weapons began to compromise Ukrainian forces.

Is there any possible shift in this balance that could favor Ukraine?

Highly unlikely would be the answer, but time will tell.

Vir: Patricia Marins

After gaining control of Avdiivka, the Russians are now targeting Kramatorsk, Slavyansk and Chasiv Yar, three of the four remaining fortifications intended to delay the Russian advance.

Over the last few hours, both cities have been heavily attacked by MLRS, ballistic missiles, drones, and Kh-22 cruise missiles launched by strategic bombers. The Russians are attempting to target areas where Ukrainians have reserves and are regrouping. The Ukrainian army fighting in this region hasn’t rotated for three months, and most of the soldiers are exhausted.

Even in these conditions, the Ukrainians will stand and offer solid resistance due to the fortifications, but the situation is expected to be even more intense than it was months ago, especially considering the increased activity of the Russian air force over the front due to the lack of anti-aircraft defenses from Ukrainian units.

Why is the situation so serious for the Ukrainian army at this stage of the war?

The entire front is facing numerous shortages, and the Russians are increasing the pressure. The question is not if the Russians will open new fronts, but when they will do so.

Discussing peace at this moment isn’t easy. Putin has an advantage, and I don’t see anyone able to prevent Ukraine from being divided.

Specifically regarding peace, Putin will also demand full demilitarization of Ukraine. I don’t see him winning a war and allowing NATO troops on this part of the border. The West still has seized reserves, sanctions, and a few other things to bring to the negotiating table with Putin, but a divided Ukraine and demilitarization, at least for me, seem to be unavoidable terms.

The West won’t accept a defeat in Ukraine, and the more time that passes, the fewer territories the Ukrainians can retain. Yes, it’s a humiliation for 40 countries to be defeated, but the sooner they negotiate, the more land the Ukrainians can keep.

Vir: Patricia Marin