Francija je iz Odesse enkrat že pobegnila

The French president Emmanuel Macron has gone a bit crazy:

Europe’s credibility will be destroyed if Russia is allowed to win in Ukraine, Emmanuel Macron has warned, as he defended his refusal to rule out sending troops to the country.
…
The war in Ukraine is “existential for our Europe and for France”, Mr Macron said in the interview on France 2 and TF1.“Do you think that the Poles, the Lithuanians, the Estonians, the Romanians and the Bulgarians could remain at peace for a second [in the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine]?” he asked. “If Russia wins this war, Europe’s credibility would be reduced to zero.”

Micron fails to recognize that Europe does not have any credibility it could lose. Just ask those ~150 countries who have not sanctioned Russia. They know very well that the 2014 U.S./EU coup in Kiev started the mess and that the failure, especially of France and Germany, to force Kiev to implement the Minsk agreements led to its escalation.

Failing as the guarantor of agreements without any attempts to enforce them leaves one’s credibility behind.

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Kaj bi vključitev francoske vojske v vojno Ukrajini lahko prinesla?

»Udeležba« francoske vojske v Ukrajini ne bi prinesla velikih sprememb. Usoda francoskih vojakov bi bila na fronti podobna usodi ukrajinskih vojakov. Če bi se francoska vojska namestila na zahodu in jugu okrog Odesse, bi to morda sprostilo 20-30 tisoč ukrajinskih vojakov, ki bi lahko bili poslani neposredno na fronto. Vendar bi po sedanjem tempu izgub človeške sile ta novi kontigent ukrajinskih vojakov zadostoval zgolj za 1-2 meseca vojne na fronti.

What could a french deployment of troops in Ukraine result in the Russo-ukrainian war? There has been much talk lately from Macro about French troop deployments to Ukraine. The risks are high, but possibilities for this to happen are slim. But if it happened how could such a deployment look like and what would the consequences be?

There would of course be a heightened risk for an all out war between France and Russia, but most probably eventual fighting would be kept in Ukraine. As long as that would be the case NATO involvement could probably be avoided. Theoretically naval warfare could occur in the Oceans but that could be a border case with article 5.

Risk for a nuclear war would probably not increase much. France would not attack Russia with nuclear weapons if its expeditionary Corps in Ukraine, and invite assured annihilation, Russia in it’s turn would have no need to use nuclear weapons since a French engagement would have a scant influence on the Russo-ukrainian war. Russia would only use nuclear weapons if they saw an existential threat to their core interests.

What could France do? I assume a maximalist scenario. They could of course do anything less than this scenario. France lacks both large resources of ammunition, missiles, heavy equipment and manpower. The French military equipment are of high quality but expensive due to small production series. Its armed forces are also mainly prepared for policing operation in the Global South and not for high intensity or industrial warfare. There are also a severe shortage of armaments production capacity to replace lost equipment.

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Zakaj levosredinske vlade ne znajo vladati?

Že dvajset let nobeni levosredinski vladi ni uspelo končati mandata. Vse levosredinske koalicije po letu 2004 so implodirale v brezidejnosti in nekompetentnosti ter notranjih koalicijskih spopadih. In pravkar gledamo razpad pri živem telesu zadnje levosredinske vladne inkarnacije. Zakaj levosredinske vlade ne znajo vladati?

Za tehten odogovor bi bil potreben daljši esej o fenomenologiji slovenske kulture in volilnega telesa. Vendar bi v grobem lahko izpostavili predvsem dva razloga. Prvi razlog je v pomanjkanju močnega ideološkega naboja med potencialnimi volilci levosredinskih strank in posledični promiskuitetnosti volilcev. Glede na izide volitev po letu 1991 je slovensko volilno telo polarizirano – približno 40 % se uvršča med volilce desnice in strank desno od sredine (desna sredina) in 60 % med volilce levice in strank levo od sredine (leva sredina). Med obema poloma je zelo malo prehajanja. Volilci strank desne sredine so diciplinirani glede volilne udeležbe, na levi sredini se potencialni volilci v primeru slabe izbire raje umaknejo v volilno abstinenco, kot da bi volili za stranke desne sredine.

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US economy: Saved by immigrants

A key factor that has gone mostly unnoticed is that the pickup in US growth last year came from a sharp rise in net immigration. In simple terms, more workers generate more goods and services. A larger number of people earning paychecks means more consumer spending. And more people paying income tax on earnings boosts tax revenues. Last year, the US population rose by 0.9% in 2023, much faster than the US Census Bureau forecast of 0.5%. And the prime-age workforce participation rate—ie 25- to 54-year-olds—reached 83.5% in February, matching highs that hadn’t been seen since the early 2000s. Much of this is due to immigration. The US economy is outperforming in GDP terms mainly because of net immigration, twice as fast as in the Eurozone and three times as fast as Japan.

US economy: saved by immigrants

Scenariji razvoja vojne v Ukrajini

Tudi če imate drugačne poglede, se splača prebrati.

Pope Francis and many others want negotiations to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. But there will be no negotiations now. Both Russia and Ukraine want to improve their positions before negotiations. Russia to get more concessions from Ukraine and Ukraine to avoid too many concessions. But how will the war finally end?

Scenariji konca vojne

I will paint with broad strokes a picture of a probable way to end the war. There will be no detailed discussions about offensives and other military matters. I said that there will be no negotiated peace for now, even though it would probably be the best alternative for Ukraine. The best alternative would of course have been a negotiated settlement during the spring of 2022, but that ship has already sailed.

What would an acceptable peace agreement be today. Russia would demand the same things as in 2022. That is a bilingual Ukraine with strong guarantees for the Russian population and the Russian Orthodox Church. A small Ukrainian military, eternal neutrality and close economic ties.

End to sanctions and a return of impounded Russian assets in the West. But the main difference would be that not only Crimea but also the entire Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts would be accepted as part of Russia.

Ukraine might accept a ceasefire and freezing of the frontlines, nothing else. They don’t feel defeated and wouldn’t consider giving Russia anything Russia hasn’t taken by military force. But the Russian deal is probably the best thing Ukraine can hope to achieve. But that ship will also sail without Ukraine.

What has the future in store for the war? The war might be over in a couple of years or continue until 2030. It can also end in an resounding Russian victory or just a minor Russian  victory. We now have four different scenarios.

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Samodestruktivnost zahodnih sankcij: Sankcije kot darilo Rusiji

Poglejte video in razlago profesorja Galbraitha.

This is hands-down the best explanation I’ve heard on why sanctions on Russia backfired, and why they were never going to succeed in the first place.

By economist James K. Galbraith, professor at the University of Texas at Austin.

Best quote of his explanation: “This is a situation in which the sanctions were imposed by one important sector of the world economy which then cut itself off from resources that it needs – and that’s particularly true of Western Europe – in return for cutting Russia off from various things that Russia doesn’t really need.”

Second best quote: “If you go back to the period before the introduction of the sanctions […] the Russian economy was very heavily colonized by Western firms. That was true in automobiles, it was true in aircrafts, it was true in everything from fast food restaurants to big box stores. Western firms were present all throughout the Russian economy. A great many of them […] either chose to exit Russia or were pressured to exit Russia after early 2022. So on what terms did they leave? Well, they were required, if they were leaving permanently, to sell their capital equipment, their factories and so forth, to let’s say a Russian business which would get a loan from Russian banks or maybe have other sources of financing, at a very favorable price for the Russians. So effectively a lot of capital wealth, which was partly owned by the West, has been transferred to Russian ownership.

And you now have an economy which is moving forward and has the advantage compared to Europe of relatively low resource costs because Russia is a great producer of resources, oil and gas and fertilizer and food stuff and so forth. And so while the Europeans are paying maybe twice in Germany what they were paying for energy, the Russians are not, they’re paying perhaps less than they were paying before the war.

So again I characterize the effect of the sanctions, in fact as being in certain respects a gift to the Russian economy. And this is, I think, quite different from what the authors of the sanctions expected. […]

And the essence of the situation is this would not have happened without the sanctions. You could have had the war, and it would have gone pretty much as it has gone. But the Russian government in 2022 was in no position to force the exit of Western firms. It didn’t want to, wouldn’t have done that. It was in no position to force its oligarchs to choose between Russia and the West. It didn’t wish to do that. These choices were imposed by the West, and the results were actually, in many respects, favorable to the long-term independent development of the Russian Federation’s economy.”

Vir: Arnaud Betrand