Kaj bi vključitev francoske vojske v vojno Ukrajini lahko prinesla?

»Udeležba« francoske vojske v Ukrajini ne bi prinesla velikih sprememb. Usoda francoskih vojakov bi bila na fronti podobna usodi ukrajinskih vojakov. Če bi se francoska vojska namestila na zahodu in jugu okrog Odesse, bi to morda sprostilo 20-30 tisoč ukrajinskih vojakov, ki bi lahko bili poslani neposredno na fronto. Vendar bi po sedanjem tempu izgub človeške sile ta novi kontigent ukrajinskih vojakov zadostoval zgolj za 1-2 meseca vojne na fronti.

What could a french deployment of troops in Ukraine result in the Russo-ukrainian war? There has been much talk lately from Macro about French troop deployments to Ukraine. The risks are high, but possibilities for this to happen are slim. But if it happened how could such a deployment look like and what would the consequences be?

There would of course be a heightened risk for an all out war between France and Russia, but most probably eventual fighting would be kept in Ukraine. As long as that would be the case NATO involvement could probably be avoided. Theoretically naval warfare could occur in the Oceans but that could be a border case with article 5.

Risk for a nuclear war would probably not increase much. France would not attack Russia with nuclear weapons if its expeditionary Corps in Ukraine, and invite assured annihilation, Russia in it’s turn would have no need to use nuclear weapons since a French engagement would have a scant influence on the Russo-ukrainian war. Russia would only use nuclear weapons if they saw an existential threat to their core interests.

What could France do? I assume a maximalist scenario. They could of course do anything less than this scenario. France lacks both large resources of ammunition, missiles, heavy equipment and manpower. The French military equipment are of high quality but expensive due to small production series. Its armed forces are also mainly prepared for policing operation in the Global South and not for high intensity or industrial warfare. There are also a severe shortage of armaments production capacity to replace lost equipment.

A French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) consisting of 20-30 000 men with a large part of remaining French heavy equipment could be sent to Ukraine. Maybe a quarter of French combat aircrafts could also be sent, that’s around 50 combat aircrafts, equipped with for example some of the remaining Scalp missiles.

Theoretically 50 fighter aircrafts could strengthen Ukrainian air power a lot, as well as the same number of F-16:s,  but they would have the same drawbacks. It would be hard to deploy the aircrafts to Ukrainian air fields since these are hard pressed by Russian attacks. One of the most significant positive things for Ukraine with French fighter aircrafts would be that they can fire Scalp missiles and also maybe Storm Shadows, with only slight modifications.

Ukraine has probably at most around 10 remaining Su-24:s capable of delivering Scalp or Storm Shadow missiles. If France could get more Storm Shadows from the UK, which the UK hasn’t in abundance, it would increase Ukrainian deep strike capability significantly at least 3-6 months. France must though be ready to loose at least half of the aircrafts sent.

If the FEC was put at the frontline it would, according to French sources, be able to defend a frontline 80 km long for half a week in high intensity warfare. A better option would probably be to defend 30-40 km during a couple of weeks. If we look at losses we can assume that French losses would be proportional to their number at the front. Since the FEC would be about 5 percent of the frontline troops they would have the same losses.

Depending on the real Ukrainian losses, that would mean 500-1500 casualities (KIA/WIA) every month. In six months that would mean 3-9 000 French casualities. The units in the FEC would probably have to be withdrawn after 6 months and I doubt there are enough French manpower or military equipment to replace them. After a short while in Ukraine the FEC would probably also depend on Ukrainian supply of ammunition, due to French shortage in that area.

The best option for France would probably place French troops far from the front, freeing Ukrainian troops for the front. But if Ukraine could free 20 000 men those would be used up in 1-2  months. Ukraine would gain a couple of months by a French involvement, maybe a bit more with heavy French losses.

Vir: Mikael Valtersson

Zakaj se torej francoski predsednik Macron tako repenči glede Rusije? Odgovor se najbrž skriva v domačih političnih potrebah. Macronovo stranko je v anketah pred evropskimi volitvami močno prehitela nacionalistična stranka Marie LePen (31 %), medtem ko celotno Macronovo zaveznštvo zaostaja za 13 odstotnih točk. Macron si z močno antirusko retoriko najbrž prizadeva popraviti ratinge, vendar so možnosti za to pičle. Sploh če se bo izkazalo, da blefira, torej, da so ga samo besede.

Macron sounded very warlike tonight, but he really didn’t say anything new. He just sounded more warlike. France will not do anything without the support of other major powers, especially the US. Promises of support from the minuscule armed forces of the Baltic states will not change that.

The main reason for Macron’s belligerence is the upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections. Macron’s approval ratings are at a record low level. Support for his party is also at record low levels. Many polls give them about 15% in the upcoming elections. This would be a massive blow to his party and bode ominously for their future in french politics.

There is really no hurry for Macron, since no elections will be held in France until the municipal elections in 2026 and regional, national and presidential elections in 2027. But a bad result in the EP-elections in june would be a huge psychological blow to Macron and his party. His party is also a new party with little party loyalty. If the future prospects look bleak, many representatives might leave the party to join other parties with better prospects. That could result in a crisis of government and early elections. Elections that probably would eliminate Macron’s party and make him into a lame duck.

Macron has tested almost everything, but still kept falling in the polls. His last chance is to play the other enemy card and try to rally the population, and especially the electorate, behind him. His blustering attacks on Russia will probably not have the effect he hopes. He will not be able to turn the 70% of the population that are negative towards him. They already mistrust all he say and do.

But we will probably see an angry war of words between Putin/Medvedev and Macron for a while.

Vir: Mikael Valtersson

Sicer pa je bila francoska vojska v Odessi pred 105 leti že poražena in se je morala “taktično” umakniti.