Gideon Rachman je v Financial Timesu podal eno najbolj pritlehnih, da ne rečem zavržnih, argumentacij glede “izstopne klavzule” ZDA in drugih zahodnih držav iz sicer zavezujočih pravil mednarodnega pravnega reda. Njegovo stališče je, da lahko ZDA in druge zahodne države kadarkoli odstopijo od “globalnih pravil“, saj s svojimi dejanji po definiciji zgolj “branijo svobodni svet“. In tega jih (dobesedno) ni treba biti nič sram.

Rachman svoj komentar lepo začne z opisom očitnega kršenja mednarodnih pravil s strani ZDA:

As an organising principle for western foreign policy, the “rules-based international order” has long suffered from some disastrous flaws. It is a phrase that means nothing to a normal person. As a result, it is a deeply uninspiring concept. People might go to war to defend freedom or the motherland. Nobody is going to fight and die for the RBIO.

Nonetheless, senior western policymakers seem to be in love with the concept. Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state, is fond of appealing to the rules-based international order when he visits China. Rishi Sunak, Britain’s prime minister, has put the RBIO at the centre of UK foreign policy. His likely successor, Sir Keir Starmer, a former lawyer, will be just as committed to the idea.

In opposing Russian aggression, Blinken argues that the US is standing up for a world based on rules rather than raw power. That is an attractive idea. But rules are meant to be consistent. And America’s own actions are undermining vital parts of the rules-based order.

The past fortnight has brutally exposed these contradictions. The 100 per cent tariffs that the Biden administration has imposed on Chinese electric vehicles are virtually impossible to reconcile with international rules on trade. As a paper for Bruegel, a think-tank, puts it: “The tariffs . . . quash any notion that the US intends to abide by World Trade Organization rules.”

America’s response to the prospect that the International Criminal Court will bring war crimes charges against Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, was also telling. Rather than supporting the court’s effort to enforce international law, Blinken told the US Congress that the administration would consider imposing sanctions on the ICC.

No, po tem lepem uvodu, s katerim se zaradi njegove evidentnosti v praksi lahko strinja celotna svetovna populacija, pa Rachman nato zaide v iskanje »escape clause«, torej v iskanje opravičila, zakaj naj bi bile ZDA upravičene v kršenje »globalnih pravil«, ki so jih same postavile in jih tako rade zagovarjajo nasproti tretjim državam … ko jim to ustreza. In to opravičilo Rachman najde v tem, da naj se ZDA namesto na »mednarodni red« oziroma »globalna pravila« v svojem ravnanju raje sklicujejo na to, da »branijo svobodni svet«:

So what can be salvaged from this mess? One answer is for Blinken and co to talk less about the rules-based international order and more about defending the free world. That is a more accurate and comprehensible description of what western foreign policy is actually about.

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Spodaj je dobra recenzija kontroverzne knjige Ruchirja Sharme, ki krizo zaupanja v ameriški kapitalziem pripisuje “veliki vladi” (“razbohotenju” javnih izdatkov), porastu monopolov in potuhi velikim podjetjem, da jih bo država reševala, če zabredejo:

Ruchir Sharma has a book out called What went wrong with capitalism?Ruchir Sharma is an investor, author, fund manager and columnist for the Financial Times. He is the head of Rockefeller Capital Management‘s international business, and was an emerging markets investor at Morgan Stanley Investment Management.

With those credentials of being ‘inside the beast’ or even ‘one of the beasts’, he ought to know the answer to his question.  In a review of his book in the Financial Times, Sharma outlines his argument.  First, he tells us that “I worry about where the US is leading the world now. Faith in American capitalism, which was built on limited government that leaves room for individual freedom and initiative, has plummeted.”  He notes that now most Americans don’t expect to be “better off in five years” — a record low since the Edelman Trust Barometer first asked this question more than two decades ago. Four in five doubt that life will be better for their children’s generation than it has been for theirs, also a new low. And according to the latest Pew polls, support for capitalism has fallen among all Americans, particularly Democrats and the young. In fact, among Democrats under 30, 58 per cent now have a “positive impression” of socialism; only 29 per cent say the same thing of capitalism.

This is bad news for Sharma as a strong supporter of capitalism.  What has gone wrong?  Sharma says that it’s the rise of big government, monopoly power and easy money to bail out the big boys.  This has led to stagnation, low productivity growth and rising inequality.

…

You see, capitalists, if left alone to exploit the labour force, and freed of the burden of regulations and for having to pay for welfare spending, will naturally flourish. “The real sciences explain life as a cycle of transformation, ashes to ashes, yet political leaders still listen to advisers claiming they know how to generate constant growth. Their overconfidence needs to be contained before it does more damage.”  So, according to Sharma, capitalism will be fine again, if we let the capitalist cycles of boom and slump play out naturally and not try to manage them. 

“Capitalism is still the best hope for human progress, but only if it has enough room to work.” Well, capitalism has had plenty of room to work for over 250 years with its booms and slumps; its rising inequalities globally; and now its environmental threat to the planet; and the increasing risk of geopolitical conflict.  No wonder 58% of young Democrats in the US would prefer socialism.

What went wrong with capitalism?

Jure Kotar

George Lakoff je ugledni profesor kognitivne znanosti in jezikoslovja na Univerzi Kalifornije v Berkeleyu, kjer poučuje od leta 1972. Je avtor mnogih knjig, ampak znan je predvsem po uspešnici “Don’t Think of an Elephant!” (Ne razmišljaj o slonu!). Zaradi naslova knjige in pohval, ki jih je prejela, sem malo okleval glede branja tega dela. Zvenelo je, kot da gre za eno tistih pop ekonomskih knjig, ki vsake toliko časa paradirajo naokoli (npr. Freakonomics, Armchair Economist, Why Nations Fail…). Ampak moram reči, da me je knjiga osvojila in mi dala precej drugačen pogled na področje politične razprave, kakršnega bi lahko podal le nadarjen jezikoslovec.

Eden od ključnih problemov, ki jih avtor izpostavi, je v tako imenovanem okvirjanju debate. Vsaka beseda naj bi aktivirala okvir, znotraj katerega potem razmišljamo. Po tem je knjiga tudi dobila ime, saj bo vsak, ko sliši “Ne razmišljaj o slonu”, pomislil na slona. Lahko v obliki slike ali pa drugih asociacij (sloni so gromozanski, sivi in imajo rilce…). Ko zanikamo okvir, ga vseeno izzovemo v mislih naših poslušalcev.

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This week, after Spain, Norway, and Ireland recognized an independent Palestinian state, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman called their action the “latest brick in the wall of rejection being built around Israel’s current far-right government.” Friedman also highlighted one cause of the rejection: Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, he wrote, is “asking the world to let it destroy Hamas in Gaza while refusing to work on a new future with non-Hamas Palestinians.”

The day before, Friedman had drawn a more detailed picture of what Netanyahu is up to. The more you think about this picture, the more unsettling it gets—especially if you think about its implications for three, six, nine months down the road.

Netanyahu, Friedman explained, is insisting that there is no moral difference between Hamas and the more moderate Palestinian Authority, which performs some governmental functions in parts of the West Bank. This claim, however implausible, allows Netanyahu to insist that there’s no Palestinian entity that can be trusted to play a role in governing post-war Gaza. And this position gratifies his far-right coalition partners—“Jewish supremacists,” Friedman calls them—because they want Israel to reoccupy Gaza and annex it. Netanyahu is determined to keep them happy, since their continued support “can keep him in office and out of jail if he is convicted in his corruption trials.” 

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Ameriški predsednik Joseph Biden je prejšnji teden ponosno objavil, da je pravkar nabil carine na nekatere ključne izdelke iz Kitajske: 25 % na jeklo in aluminij, 50 % na polprevodnike, 100 % na električna vozila in 50 % na sončne celice. Ter dodal, da bo s tem zagotovil, da bodo ZDA »vodile svet« v teh panogah. Gre za patetično gesto iz obupa, ki je obsojena na neuspeh.

Poglejmo, zakaj. Poglejmo sedanje tržne deleže Kitajske v primerjavi z ZDA pri teh izdelkih. jeklo: Kitajska 54 %, ZDA 4,3 %; aluminij: Kitajska 55 %, ZDA 1,5 %; električni avti: Kitajska 60 %, ZDA 8 %; solarni paneli: Kitajska 78 %, ZDA 2 %; polprevodniki: Kitajska 7 %, ZDA 48 %. Z drugimi besedami, razen pri polprevodnikih, imajo ZDA skoraj nič možnosti, da bi “vodile svet” v kateri koli od teh industrij, glede na to, da jih Kitajska že popolnoma obvladuje.

Poglejmo patetičnost učinka ameriških carin pri sončnih panelih. ZDA imajo carine na kitajske panele že od leta 2012, vendar niso bile učinkovite. Prvič, carine so sicer res znatno zmanjšale neposredni uvoz sončnih panelov iz Kitajske (za 86 % v obdobju 2012–2020). Vendar so kitajski paneli vendarle prišli v ZDA posredno prek tretjih držav, kamor so kitajska podjetja prenesla njihovo proizvodnjo – iz Kambodže, Malezije, Tajske in Vietnama, ki predstavljajo 84 % ameriškega uvoza sončnih panelov. In drugič, carine niso nič vplivale na oživitev proizvodnje panelov v ZDA, saj imajo kljub milijardam dolarjev subvencij ZDA zanemarljiv 2 % delež na svetovnem trgu, Kitajska pa 78 %.

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Drago Babič

Jedrska elektrarna je toplotni stroj, ki pretvarja toplotno energijo v mehansko in nato v električno energijo. Po fizikalnem načinu delovanja se ne razlikuje bistveno od termoelektrarn na premog, le proizvodnja toplote je drugačna. Pri klasični termoelektrarni je vir toplote izgorevanje premoga ali drugih fosilnih goriv in biomase, pri jedrski pa je vir toplote razpad jeder uranovega izotopa z atomsko maso 235, ki se nahaja v jedru reaktorja. Potem, ko je toplotna energija proizvedena, so nadaljnji postopki pretvorbe toplote v električno energijo praktično enaki. Toplota iz kotla oziroma reaktorja proizvede vodno paro, ta žene turbino, ki je povezana z generatorjem, ki proizvaja električno energijo. Na koncu procesa vodna para s pomočjo zunanjega hladila (vode ali zraka) kondenzira v vodo, ki se vrača v proces.

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Hm, kdo bo odločal o tem, kaj so dezinformacije in kaj so “pravilne” informacije?

Kot je zapisal eden izmed komentatorjev, bi moral biti roman “1984” Georgea Orwella opozorilo pred nevarnostmi totalitarizma in režimske cenzure, ne pa navodila za uporabo. Le kdo bi si mislil, da bo najvišji evropski politik invociral cenzuro v letu 2024. In to kot del svojega promocijskega programa za ponovno imenovanje. Zmešani časi.

Klasika, kar se tiče gospodarskega okrevanja, ki jo lahko spremljamo že od finančne krize iz 2008 naprej. Po veliki krizi (finančna in Covid) v ZDA sicer utrpijo abolutni upad BDP, vendar se nato vedno vrnejo nazaj na staro trajektorijo (trend) rasti. V evro območju pa je najprej upad v krizi precej večji, po začetku okrevanja pa se upočasni tudi trend rasti glede na predkriznega. Drugače rečeno, po krizi evro območje nikoli povsem ne okreva in gospodarska rast je nato vedno šibkejša. To pa seveda pomeni vedno večje zaostajanje za ZDA in ostalimi državami.

Vir: Philipp Heimberger

Ključno vprašanje je: zakaj evro območje ne uspe okrevati? Odgovor vam ne bo všeč, vendar se bo enkrat potrebno z njim soočiti. Odgovore je treba iskati v institucionalnih razlogih: evrsko področje kot konfederacija držav je omejeno s skupnimi ekonomskimi politikami, kjer je monetarna  politika skupna (in zaradi različnega položaja posameznih držav ne more nasloviti problema vseh držav, saj enim ustreza bolj restriktivna, drugim pa bolj ekspanzivna politikaa), fiskalna politika pa je omejena s fiskalnim okvirjem EU in z individualnimi preferencami posameznih držav. Slednje pomeni, da nobena država po krizi ne more uporabiti vsega “fiskalnega orožja in municije”, ki bi ga, če ne bi bila del monetarne unije, ali pa tega noče narediti zaradi nacionalnih političnih preferenc (Nemčija in ostale frugalne države). Ker se učinki fiskalnih politik zaradi močne trgovinske povezanosti med evrskimi državami prelivajo med državami (fiskalne spodbude ali pomanjkanje spodbud vplivajo na domačo gospodarsko rast, s tem pa tudi na povpraševanje po uvozu iz drugih držav), so zato fiskalne politike v evro območju manj učinkovite, okrevanje pa zato bistveno počasnejše kot v državah, ki imajo samostojne monetarne in fiskalne politike.

Vem, da ni popularno o tem niti razmišljati, toda enkrat se bo treba vprašati ali skupne evropske politike morda ne pomenijo prisilnega jopiča za evrske in ostale EU države in ali niso glavni dejavnik, ki povzroča vse večje zaostajanje EU za drugimi razvitimi državami.

Glejte spodnji intervju s Philippom Wongom, glavnim znanstvenikom pri tajvanskem proizvajalcu čipov TSMC in profesorjem elektrotehnike na univerzi Stanford. Wong pravi takole: na področju polprevodnikov so kitajski znanstveniki v zadnjem desetletju postali prevladujoči; Američani so še vedno boljši v generiranju novih idej; toda ko je enkrat ideja v obtoku, s Kitajsko ni več mogoče tekmovati in se je bolje umakniti s tega področja.

The only thing that I see… What the US is still little bit ahead is in coming up with the new ideas. What the Chinese always say: going from zero to 1. Namely starting from nowhere, nothing, and come up with this really new idea. And if I look at what I would call new idea that has not been discussed before, the US still is the principal place where these new ideas come from. But once these new ideas become known, then… I feel it in my everyday research with my students. Any new ideas that we come up, once they become known… that this is a good idea. The next week it will show up in China. It will show up in China, only that they do it better than you.

I can’t, cannot compete anymore. They have better resources, they have more students. They have more, more funding from the government. I cannot compete anymore. I have to get out of that field!”.

China is the world leader in EV production and innovation.  Chinese EVs are now better and cheaper than their Western counterparts.  Biden’s intention is to stave off Chinese competition while stimulating domestic EV supply.  But China’s EV imports are only 2% of the US market.  And all the goods that these new tariffs were slapped on constitute only about 7% of US-China trade.  What this shows is that, even the US government recognizes that the US still relies heavily on Chinese goods imports and cannot cut them all dead.

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To avoid the impact of previous US measures, Chinese firms have been rerouting their supply chains through third countries with pre-existing Free Trade Agreements with the US—Morocco, Mexico and Korea chief among them. This has enabled ‘backdoor’ access to the American market. Over 80% of solar cells imported into the US now come via Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia.

The US is now trying to break this back-door move.  In its “Foreign Entity of Concern” ruling, US automakers won’t be able to receive government tax credits if any company in their battery supply chain has 25% or more of its equity, voting rights or board seats owned by a Chinese government-linked.