Tole sem hotel objaviti že prejšnji teden, pa sem pozabil. Michael Lewis (avtor “Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game“ in še sveže “Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt“) je napovedal objavo 47½ ur tajnih posnetkov pogovorov sestankov med uslužbenci Feda kot regulatorjev in menedžerjev Goldman Sachsa (pogovore in transkripte lahko najdete na This American Life). Skriti posnetki, ki so uslužbenko Feda Carmen Segarra stali službe in kariere ter doživljenjskih tožb, razkrivajo, kako je po eni strani Fed načrtno gledal stran pred krizo in kako tudi po krizi kot regulator vztrajno gleda stran in sledi navodilom s strani velikih bank – lastnikov Feda.
Nič, česar sami pri sebi sicer ne bi že vedeli, toda posneti pogovori to de facto potrjujejo.
Škoda, da ne moremo slišati tovrstnih posnetkov sej Sveta Banke Slovenije v letih 2006 do 2008, ko je Svet BS obravnaval tudi različne odmevne kredite poslovnih bank. Denimo tisto o zaupanju kot temelju bančnega posla, ko so se dajali krediti na dobro ime ali o tem, kaj bi se zgodilo, če bi, hipotetično, “B.K. povozil avto“. Mnogi veleugledni strokovnjaki ali profesorji bi morda morali celo malce zardeti.
In škoda, ker BS nikoli ni naročila neodvisnega pregleda svojega delovanja pred krizo. Fed je takšno analizo naročil pri profesorju Davidu Beimu s Columbia Business School. Njegovo poročilo o sistemskih tveganjih iz avgusta 2009 razkriva natanko to, kar je odkrila tudi Segarra: Fedu ni primanjkovalo sredstev za učinkovito regulacijo bank, pač pa njegovi uslužbenci niso smeli izvajati regulacije.
Nekaj odlomkov iz zapisa Lewisa:
In early 2012, Segarra was assigned to regulate Goldman Sachs, and so was installed inside Goldman. (The people who regulate banks for the Fed are physically stationed inside the banks.)
The job right from the start seems to have been different from what she had imagined: In meetings, Fed employees would defer to the Goldman people; if one of the Goldman people said something revealing or even alarming, the other Fed employees in the meeting would either ignore or downplay it. For instance, in one meeting a Goldman employee expressed the view that “once clients are wealthy enough certain consumer laws don’t apply to them.” After that meeting, Segarra turned to a fellow Fed regulator and said how surprised she was by that statement — to which the regulator replied, “You didn’t hear that.”
This sort of thing occurred often enough — Fed regulators denying what had been said in meetings, Fed managers asking her to alter minutes of meetings after the fact — that Segarra decided she needed to record what actually had been said. So she went to the Spy Store and bought a tiny tape recorder, then began to record her meetings at Goldman Sachs, until she was fired.
(How Segarra got herself fired by the Fed is interesting. In 2012, Goldman was rebuked by a Delaware judge for its behavior during a corporate acquisition. Goldman had advised one energy company, El Paso Corp., as it sold itself to another energy company, Kinder Morgan, in which Goldman actually owned a $4 billion stake, and a Goldman banker had a big personal investment. The incident forced the Fed to ask Goldman to see its conflict of interest policy. It turned out that Goldman had no conflict of interest policy — but when Segarra insisted on saying as much in her report, her bosses tried to get her to change her report. Under pressure, she finally agreed to change the language in her report, but she couldn’t resist telling her boss that she wouldn’t be changing her mind. Shortly after that encounter, she was fired.)
Vir: Michael Lewis, BloombergView