Čeprav ameriška stran po Trumpovem obisku Kitajske javno razglaša, da se ZDA in Kitajska strinjata glede tega, da mora biti Hormuška ožina odprta za mednarodni promet, je med njima ključna razlika v podrobnostih interpretacije. Ameriška stran “odprtost” Hormuza interpretira kot prosto plovbo skozi ožino brez kakšrnihkoli pristojbin, medtem ko je kitajska stran v preteklih dveh tednih nekajkrat omenila, da ne nasprotuje pristojbinam za prehod, lahko tudi v smislu “ekoloških taks”. Če lahko pristojbine za prehod pobirajo Turčija (Dardanele in Bospor), Panama in Suez, zakaj ne bi tudi Iran in Oman? Ta razlika v interpretaciji je seveda ključna: ameriška stran želi Iranu odvzeti de facto in de iure nadzor nad Hormuško ožino, kitajska stran pa Iranu to de facto omogoča. Zaradi tega kitajska stran nasprotuje novi resoluciji o Hormuški ožini, saj bi s tem v primeru ameriške interpretacije v OZN sprejeta resolucija lahko dala ZDA legalno pokritje za vojaško akcijo.

Spodnji tekst se splača prebrati.

There is some confusion as to why China’s UN ambassador just criticized the US-Bahraini resolution on the Strait of ‌Hormuz, given that Trump officials claim that the Chinese told Trump in Beijing that they agree that the Strait must be reopened.

The confusion may be about what “open” actually means in this context.

Based on my discussions with Chinese diplomats, “open” to the Chinese means that traffic flows through the Strait. Oil, gas, and goods come in and out. Money exchanges hands. Trade prevails.

It does not mean that there cannot be a mechanism where regional states charge a fee for the transit. Even with the fee, the oil can still flow. A blockade, however, is what keeps the Starit closed – not the fee.

While their preference understandably is that there is no toll at all, proposals are floating around that the Chinese are open to. They can live, for instance, with a regional mechanism that charges an environmental management fee. That is, a toll that isn’t framed as a toll.

So can the Trump administration, incidentally, though the US wants the mechanism to be fully regionalized rather than just managed by Iran and Oman.

Other GCC states – the UAE and Bahrain in particular – are dead set against this even if they were to be included in the mechanism.

But China has other reasons to oppose the US-Bahraini resolution, which has garnered over 100 co-sponsors among UN member states.

Though the draft resolution I have reviewed does not fall under Chapter VII – the previous one that Russia and China vetoed did not use the standard formula of “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” but did include an Article 39-style determination, “Determining that Iran’s actions … constitute a threat to international peace and security” – it nevertheless does pave the way for a subsequent Chapter VII resolution that would authorize the use of force against Iran.

Read the full analysis here:

https://tritaparsi.substack.com/p/chinas-position-on-the-strait-of