Ken Rogoff tokrat res ni imel sreče, njegova kolumna v Financial Timesu je naletela na burne odzive med ekonomisti. Zadnji v seriji je britanski Economist, ki se sprašuje, kakšnemu dizastru se je Britanija izognila, ker se je spustila v varčevalno avanturo v skladu z ex ante in ex post argumenti Rogoffa:
Many of the arguments made in favour of austerity, circa 2010, no longer look particularly compelling. The suggestion that growth might slow sharply once the ratio of public debt to output tops a particular threshold is out of vogue. And recent experience has shown that “expansionary austerity”, while perhaps a possibility under certain circumstances, is very unlikely to materialise when economies are operating below potential and interest rates are at very low levels.
But there is still some potency to one of the chief arguments for British austerity: that if the British government had not turned toward fiscal consolidation in 2010 markets might have lost their appetite for British government debt, leading to a fiscal crisis. Last week Kenneth Rogoff wrote that from the perspective of 2010 a turn toward consolidation made an awful lot of sense as an insurance policy against disaster.
So in Britain in 2010 one might have reasonably concluded that austerity would deliver very little fiscal improvement for the economic pain. But in a world in which lost confidence in the British sovereign led to rising interest rates and a falling currency one could expect quite a lot of fiscal gain at little economic pain from budget cuts.
Should Britain have been completely unconcerned about its borrowing? No; it would have been sensible to have a plan to stabilise public debt over the medium term: say ten years or so. But it is hard to see that Britain had much to fear from a sudden loss of market confidence. It had plenty to fear from a euro-zone break-up, by contrast, but little reason to think that a quick turn toward fiscal consolidation in the year or two before the blow-up would deliver any net benefits.
Vir: The Economist
Hja, glavni problem je, kaj zdaj z ekonomsko politiko predvsem v EU, ko se je pokazalo, da so nauki o koristnosti pre-emptive varčevanja izkazali kot intelektualno zgrešeni? Koliko časa mora preteči in koliko krvi morajo izgubiti ljudje, ki so po nepotrebnem izgubili službe zaradi te bedaste politike Evropske komisije pod taktirko Nemčije, da Bruselj spremeni politiko?