Bradford DeLong in Laura D. Tyson (2013) razpravljata o tem, kaj se je spremenilo od leta 2007, da centralne banke kličejo na pomoč fiskalno politiko. Kako je prišlo do odmika od Taylorjevega argumenta (iz 2000), da je uravnavanje agregatnega povpraševanja skoraj izključno v domeni centralnih bank. Kaj je povzročilo ta miselni preobrat?
Six years ago, there was near-consensus, among economists and policymakers alike, in support of John Taylor’s (2000) argument that aggregate demand management was the near-exclusive province of central banks and monetary policy.2 There was also near-consensus that the expansionary stabilization policy tool of choice was the conventional open-market operation: buying short-term government bonds for cash in order to expand the money supply, and so induce an increase in the pace of nominal spending.
Today central bankers like Federal Reserve Chair Bernanke (2013) are actively asking for help by fiscal authorities. What caused this shift? In part, the course of interest rates has made the costs of discretionary expansionary fiscal policy lower than anyone would have believed. In part, the benefits via Keynesian multiplier processes appear to have been much larger than was presumed. And in large part monetary policy has proven inadequate to the task without undertaking risky and untried non-standard policy measures at a scale that has so far proven too large for central banks to risk. Against this shift in the benefit-cost calculus toward use of discretionary expansionary fiscal policy in the current conjuncture we must set uncertain long-run costs of debt accumulation. These costs, however, remain especially hard to analyze, as they seem to substantially consist of “unknown unknowns”.
Celotna razprava DeLong in Tyson (2013) je dosegljiva tukaj.