Ključni problem te Trumpove “brilijantne” ideje ni samo to, da vojaška izvedba pomorske blokade iranskega naftnega terminala na otoku Kharg in vojaška zasedba Hormuške ožine tehnično (vojaško) ni možna. Pač pa v tem, da bi s pomorsko blokado Irana (da ne bi več mogel izvažati nafte) dobili dvojno blokado Hormuške ožine. Nekaj takšnega, kot če bi k eni ključavnici na vrata namestili še dodatno. Če Američani izvedejo pomorsko blokado Irana – denimo na “varni razdalji” okrog 1,000 km stran v Arabskem morju -, pač skozi Hormuz ne bo prišla niti ena ladja, Ne z iransko in ne z arabsko nafto. Ne bo LNG, ne bo gnojil, ne bo žvepla, ne bo helija, ne bo polimerov, ne bo ničesar.

S pomorsko blokado Irana bodo Američani zgolj dvojno zaklenili Hormuška vrata. Moraš res biti zelo stabilni genij, da prideš na takšno idejo.

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Trump is sharing articles floating a US naval blockade of Iran, the “Venezuela playbook,” after talks fail. Here’s what that would actually look like.

The idea is the US Navy takes control of the Strait of Hormuz and Kharg Island strangling Iran’s economy while cutting China and India off from their key oil source simultaneously.

The problem: Iran is not Venezuela.

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Štiri slike o pogovorih med ZDA in Iranom v Islamabadu. Jasno je, da pogovori niso mogli biti uspešni, kajti ameriška zahteva, da Iran ne bo več bogatil urana ali izgradil jedrske bombe, je preprosto passe. Ta vlak je odpeljal 28. februarja. 27. februarja je Iran na to še pristajal. Nato pa sta ZDA in Izrael sredi pogajanj, kjer je Iran pristal prav na tak dogovor, napadla Iran. Pomorila njegovo vodstvo in dekliško šolo v Minabu.

Iran preprosto tega ne more več dovoliti. In edino učinkovito orožje proti temu je, da ima jedrski arzenal. Drugo učinkovito orožje je nadzor nad Hormuško ožino, vendar to “orožje” deluje počasi (prek pristiska na svetovno gospodarstvo) in ne preprečuje napada na Iran.

(Mimogrede, omejitev bogatenja urana je bil del dogovora med ZDA in Iranom, ki ga je diosegel Obama leta 2015, nakar ga je Trump 3 leta kasneje enostransko odpravil. V to stanje se ni mogoče več vrniti. Nič več po dveh ameriško – izraelskih napadih na Iran in po iranski zmagi v tej vojni.

Netanyahu is openly threatening Spain:

“You are about to pay the price for this. Never forget the power outages and mysterious train accidents that happened right after Spain stood against Israel.”

What does this mean? 

He’s saying they’re going to carry out terrorist attacks within Spain. 

The world should take note of this.

And Spain’s response: 

“We’re not smearing you, we’re defining you: You are a genocidal and criminal regime. All of you will appear before the International Criminal Court.”

Ključna determinanta  v vsakih pogajanjih je pogajalska moč. To determinira veliko večino končnega izida. Pogajalske veščine so pomembna komponenta, vendar za uravnavanje fines, toda smer izida določa pogajalska moč. In Američani tokrat nimajo dobrih kart.

The Americans and the Iranians are now engaged in armed bargaining where the outside options of both sides determine their bargaining power.

Both sides now know that if Iran can be disarmed, the US has the upper hand; if it cannot, Iran does. The WSJ reported today that Iran’s missile arsenal is vastly larger than previously believed. The timing could hardly have come at a better time for Iran.

They have claimed that they have an inventory of 15,000 ballistic missiles and 45,000 drones. The Israelis claim that Iran has 1,000 MRBMs left, along with thousands of SRBMs (4,000-6,000?). JINSA reports that Iran has fired about 2,200 ballistic missiles.

The Americans concede that we’re at best half way done with the job (assuming constant rates of interception and reconstitution). Meanwhile, the US magazine depth of standoff munitions is also half gone.

We know that the Iranians have reserved their heavier and more powerful missiles for use after they had depleted the interceptor inventories. Meanwhile, the interceptor inventories are practically out in Israel and the GCC states.

So, we’re looking at Iran being in a better position to draw blood if hostilities resume. Of the US and its allies running out of interceptors and magazine depth sooner than the Iranians run out of arrows.

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Da bi Iran pristal na začetek pogajanj z ZDA v Islamabadu, so morale ZDA v principu sprejeti okvir 10-točkovnega iranskega mirovnega predloga, ki ga je Iran posredoval prek pakistanskih posrednikov. Ta načrt, ki ga je ameriška stran označila za »delovno podlago za pogajanja«, vključuje zahteve po koncu vseh sankcij proti Iranu, priznanju pravice do obogatitve urana in zagotovilu, da ZDA ne bodo ponovile vojaških napadov. Iran je jasno sporočil, da brez teh koncesij ne bo sedel za mizo – kar kaže na močan položaj Irana po vojni in krhkem začasnem premirju.

Ključni pogoji, ki so prepričali Iran, so bili tudi razširitev premirja na Libanon, kjer so izraelski napadi na Libanon ogrožali krhko ravnotežje in takojšnja sprostitev zaseženih iranskih sredstev v tujih bankah v višini več milijard dolarjev. Poleg tega je Teheran zahteval ohranitev nadzora nad Hormuško ožino, umik ameriških sil iz regije in obljubo o odškodnini za vojne škode, ki se plačuje prek pristojbine za prehod ladij skozi ožino. Te koncesije so ZDA morale dati (Trump je predvsem moral umiriti Netanyahuja) v zameno za to, da se pogajanja sploh začnejo – sicer bi Iran prekinil celo začasno premirje.

S temi ameriškimi popuščanji se odpira okno za resnejši dialog v Islamabadu, a hkrati razkriva, kako zelo se je spremenila dinamika moči na Bližnjem vzhodu. Iran je demonstriral, da ni več pripravljen sprejemati enostranskih diktatov Washingtona, medtem ko ZDA pod Trumpom iščejo izhod iz izgubljene vojne. Če bodo pogajanja uspela, bi lahko to pomenilo pomemben korak k stabilnosti v regiji in stabilizaciji svetovnega gospodarstva. Če ne bodo, pa bodo uspela ena pogajanja v prihodnosti – le da bo cena za ZDA, Izrael in svetovno gospodarstvo, vključno z nami, bistveno višja.

Professor Marandi, eden izmed treh glasov Irana v času te vojne, priporoča to knjigo za razumevanje Irana.

Knjiga Going to Tehran avtorjev Flynt Leverett in Hillary Mann Leverett izhaja iz politično neprijetne teze: ameriška politika do Irana že desetletja temelji na napačnih predpostavkah o naravi iranske države in družbe. Avtorja trdita, da zahodni politični diskurz Islamsko republiko prikazuje kot iracionalno, nestabilno in zgodovinsko začasno tvorbo, čeprav empirični podatki kažejo ravno nasprotno. Iran se je izkazal kot politično vzdržljiv sistem z jasno artikuliranimi nacionalnimi interesi, ki jih je pripravljen braniti z dolgoročno strategijo.

Jedro knjige je reinterpretacija iranske revolucije iz leta 1979. Avtorja jo predstavljata kot logičen rezultat notranjih družbenih napetosti, nacionalističnega odziva na zunanje vplive in zgodovine političnega vmešavanja v Iranu. Revolucija zato po njuni interpretaciji ni zgolj ideološki prelom, temveč proces oblikovanja nove državne identitete. Islamska republika se je skozi desetletja institucionalizirala in razvila lastne politične mehanizme, kar pomeni, da je ni mogoče razumeti kot prehodni režim, ki čaka na zlom.

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When Bombs Meet Resilience: Iran’s Strategic Triumph Over the US-Israel

When the United States and Israel launched their attack on Iran on February 28, they did not expect a war that would last 40 days.

In fact, their predictions did not even include a strong Iranian reaction against the Gulf countries, let alone the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Everyone was stunned by the scale of the Iranian response, even after losing its top leaders.

The Israeli plan, which relied on decapitation strikes, a few days of bombing, and an internal uprising, turned out to be a complete fiasco.

It proved that Israeli intelligence has perfected the art of assassinations but knows very little about Iran and is incapable of accurately predicting scenarios.

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Uvodni prizor (New York Times):

The black S.U.V. carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House just before 11 a.m. on Feb. 11. The Israeli leader, who had been pressing for months for the United States to agree to a major assault on Iran, was whisked inside with little ceremony, out of view of reporters, primed for one of the most high-stakes moments in his long career.

U.S. and Israeli officials gathered first in the Cabinet Room, adjacent to the Oval Office. Then Mr. Netanyahu headed downstairs for the main event: a highly classified presentation on Iran for President Trump and his team in the White House Situation Room, which was rarely used for in-person meetings with foreign leaders.

Mr. Trump sat down, but not in his usual position at the head of the room’s mahogany conference table. Instead, the president took a seat on one side, facing the large screens mounted along the wall. Mr. Netanyahu sat on the other side, directly opposite the president.

Appearing on the screen behind the prime minister was David Barnea, the director of Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, as well as Israeli military officials. Arrayed visually behind Mr. Netanyahu, they created the image of a wartime leader surrounded by his team.

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Coercive bargaining does not stop when the weapons stop firing. It continues with threats and counter-threats, as each side tries to pressure the other side into concessions.

Iran has a great deal of leverage here. It has proven that the US cannot forcibly retake Hormuz, suppress Iranian fire across the gulf, protect its own assets, or coerce Iran into capitulation. It can close Hormuz outright to put pressure on the US, or selectively to punish specific actors (eg, UAE). It still retains weapons in reserve; above all, the Houthis.

The US can threaten to attack Iran again. But both sides now know that the US does not have a military solution here, so this is not a good outside option. So what can the US do to pressure Iran? Very hard to detect any powerful sources of leverage for the US.

We are faced, then, with the same “upside-down” asymmetry between the two great powers. The US may be vastly stronger in general, but it is Iran that has the clear upper hand in the negotiations.