Kenneth Payne je letos februarja objavil zanimiv članek (AI Arms and Influence: Frontier Models Exhibit Sophisticated Reasoning in Simulated Nuclear Crises) s srhljivimi ugotovitvam: če uporabimo tri vodilne modele UI za odločanje glede uporabe jedrske eskalacije, bi ti v medsebojni interakciji brez težav zrušili obstoječi jedrski tabu in uporabili jedrsko eskalacijo v strateški igri preživetja in zmage.
Povzetek članka pravi:
Here we present findings from a crisis simulation in which three frontier large language models (GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4, Gemini 3 Flash) play opposing leaders in a nuclear crisis. Our simulation has direct application for national security professionals, but also, via its insights into AI reasoning under uncertainty, has applications far beyond international crisis decision-making.
Our findings both validate and challenge central tenets of strategic theory. We find support for Schelling’s ideas about commitment, Kahn’s escalation framework, and Jervis’s work on misperception, inter alia. Yet we also find that the nuclear taboo is no impediment to nuclear escalation by our models; that strategic nuclear attack, while rare, does occur; that threats more often provoke counter-escalation than compliance; that high mutual credibility accelerated rather than deterred conflict; and that no model ever chose accommodation or withdrawal even when under acute pressure, only reduced levels of violence.
We argue that AI simulation represents a powerful tool for strategic analysis, but only if properly calibrated against known patterns of human reasoning. Understanding how frontier models do and do not imitate human strategic logic is essential preparation for a world in which AI increasingly shapes strategic outcomes.
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