Moj intervju v novi reviji Avto Fokus glede ekonomskih vidikov hitrih sprememb avtomobilskega sveta, glede bodoče vloge kitajskih in usode evropskih proizvajalcev.

Evropska avtomobilska industrija je desetletja veljala za tehnološko vodilno silo. Ali je z zamudo pri elektrifikaciji zapravila to prednost?

Prav gotovo. Evropska avtomobilska industrija je zamudila ključni tehnološki preskok, povezan z razogljičenjem in prehodom na električno mobilnost. Evropska unija je sicer postavila ambiciozne politične cilje glede opuščanja motorjev z notranjim zgorevanjem do leta 2035, vendar evropska avtomobilska industrija na takšno transformacijo ni bila dovolj pripravljena.

Zakaj je Kitajcem uspel takšen preskok?

Kitajska je bila v povsem drugačnem položaju. Ker ni bila obremenjena z dolgo tradicijo proizvodnje klasičnih avtomobilov, je lahko praktično iz nič zgradila celotno verigo za proizvodnjo električnih vozil – od baterij do drugih ključnih komponent. Baterije danes predstavljajo od 35 do 40 odstotkov vrednosti električnega avtomobila. Evropa medtem ni pravočasno razvila primerljive proizvodne infrastrukture, saj je predvsem ščitila obstoječo industrijsko strukturo, vezano na tradicionalna vozila z motorji z notranjim zgorevanjem.

Kaj je šlo narobe?

Razkorak med regulatornimi zahtevami in dejanskimi interesi in sposobnostmi evropskih proizvajalcev je bil prevelik. Po eni strani je nekoga, ki je 120 let proizvajal avte z motorji z notranjim izgorevanjem, težko prepričati v kompletno spremembo filozofije in tehnologije. Na drugi strani pa bi bilo potrebno izgraditi povsem nove dobaviteljske verige za proizvodnjo povsem drugačnih komponent. Tudi zato je Evropska komisija lani omilila prvotne načrte in namesto popolne prepovedi motorjev z notranjim zgorevanjem poudarila cilj 90-odstotnega zmanjšanja izpustov CO₂ do leta 2035, kar dopušča uporabo različnih tehnologij. To je bila nujna korekcija, saj bi sicer evropsko avtomobilsko industrijo postavili v izjemno težak položaj. Kljub temu pa je tehnološki preboj na področju električnih vozil že nastopil in evropski proizvajalci danes na tem področju ne morejo enakovredno tekmovati s kitajskimi.

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Pedro Santa Clara v članku “Make Europe a Continent of Owners” zagovarja radikalno reformo evropskega pokojninskega in kapitalskega sistema, ki bi evropske varčevalce spremenila v lastnike produktivnega kapitala. Po njegovem mnenju Evropa ne trpi zaradi pomanjkanja kapitala, saj gospodinjstva letno privarčujejo okoli 1,4 bilijona evrov, kar je celo več kot v ZDA. Težava je v institucionalni zasnovi: evropski prihranki so večinoma parkirani v nizko donosnih bančnih vlogah ali pa se prek sprotnega financiranja pokojnin (pay-as-you-go) sploh ne pretvorijo v finančno premoženje. Sedanja generacija delavcev tako ne gradi lastnega kapitala, temveč pridobi zgolj obljubo, da bodo njihove pokojnine nekoč financirali prihodnji davkoplačevalci – model, ki postaja zaradi staranja prebivalstva vse manj vzdržen.

Santa Clara evropski model primerja z ameriškim sistemom pokojninskega varčevanja prek skladov 401(k) in individualnih pokojninskih računov, kjer so prihranki prebivalcev v veliki meri vloženi v delniške trge. Tako so ameriški državljani prek svojih pokojnin posredno lastniki velikega dela gospodarstva, kar je ustvarilo globoke kapitalske trge, močan sektor tveganega kapitala in sposobnost financiranja inovativnih podjetij. Po njegovih besedah ameriški pokojninski sistem pretvarja prihranke običajnih ljudi v lastništvo produktivnega gospodarstva, medtem ko evropski sistem ustvarja predvsem terjatve do države. Gre za dve različni institucionalni arhitekturi, ki sta oblikovali tudi dve različni obliki kapitalizma.

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Back in March I wrote that Iran was winning, and not only strategically but tactically too, but I genuinely didn’t expect it would eventually lead – 3 months later – to a complete US surrender.

Because, make no mistake, this is what the “deal” that was just signed is: a complete US surrender, the likes of which it has never signed in its entire history.

Let’s compare it with the 2 other most famous US capitulation agreements: the Paris Peace Accords with Vietnam in 1973 and the Doha Agreement with Afghanistan in 2020.

The most significant difference is that both the Vietnam and Afghanistan deals, despite being documents in which the US effectively conceded defeat, contained at least some face-saving provisions for the US.

For instance, in the Vietnam deal, North Vietnam accepted the continued existence of the South Vietnamese government, promised peaceful reunification, agreed to maintain the 17th parallel as a dividing line, and accepted international supervision. These were real (if ultimately unenforceable and unenforced) concessions.

Same thing with the Taliban: they guaranteed Afghan soil would never again be used to attack America, and agreed to negotiate a political settlement with the then Kabul government. The latter commitment was never seriously pursued – but both existed and gave the US a narrative: at least it could claim its post-9/11 objective had been secured on paper.

The deal with Iran is completely different: it doesn’t contain a single meaningful concession from Iran. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is merely the reversal of a wartime measure they took in response to the US-Israeli attack. And the “reaffirmation” that Iran won’t build nuclear weapons is just this: a reaffirmation of a position Tehran has had for decades.

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“Strateške naftne rezerve so bile na minimumu, v štirih tednih bi zmanjkalo nafte, svet bi padel v ekonomsko katastrofo”

“To ni naš denar, to je njihov denar. In mi smo ga zamrznili. In v nekem trenutku ga bomo po vsej verjetnosti morali vrniti.”

Drago Babič

Uvod

Evropa se je ponovno znašla v krizi v oskrbi z energijo. Pred štirimi leti zaradi vojne v Ukrajini in prekinitve dobav energentov iz Rusije, sedaj zaradi vojne Izraela in ZDA z Iranom. Ta vojna je zaprla Hormuško ožino in tako prekinila dobave petine svetovne porabe nafte in plina, kar je povzročilo podražitev svetovnih cen nafte in plina za polovico. Evropa dosedaj ni kupovala veliko energentov na Bližnjem vzhodu, okoli 10% vsega uvoza, vendar je pri nafti in plinu pretežno uvozno odvisna (94% odvisnost). Zato nas vsesplošno povečanje svetovnih cen energentov ekonomsko hudo prizadene.

Po besedah predsednice Evropske komisije Ursule Von der Leyen (VDL), od izbruha vojne na Bližnjem vzhodu evropski račun za uvoz fosilnih goriv povečal za približno 500 milijonov evrov na dan ob količinsko istih dobavah. Ob tem je poudarila, da bi bil povratek k ruskim fosilnim gorivom (od koder je pred vojno v Ukrajini prihajala večina fosilnih goriv), napaka, saj EU zdaj z novimi uredbami (REPowerEU) načrtuje popolno in trajno opustitev uvoza ruskega utekočinjenega zemeljskega plina (LNG) še v letu 2026. Njen edini praktični napotek je bil varčevanje z energijo v slogu izjave »najcenejša energija je tista, ki je ne porabimo«.

Da to ni bila le populistična floskula, pričajo dejanski podatki o porabi energije v Evropi, ki se od prejšnje krize pospešeno zmanjšuje. Po podatkih Eurostat se je v EU dobavljena (primarna) energija od leta 2021 do leta 2025 zmanjšala za 8 % na 1358 Mtoe (milijon ton naftnega ekvivalenta), uvoz energije pa za 13 % na 642 Mtoe. Za tak količinsko zmanjšani uvoz smo lani plačali 385 milijard evrov, to je 140 milijard oziroma 57 % več kot leta 2021. V kolikor bodo na Bližnjem vzhodu še trajale take razmere in z njimi visoke cene, lahko pričakujemo še višje stroške za letni uvoz energije, okoli 500 milijard evrov, oziroma 100 % več, kot pred prvo energetsko krizo leta 2021 in skoraj toliko, kot med prvo krizo, ki jo je povzročila vojna v Ukrajini, ko je bil letni strošek uvoza energentov 640 milijard evrov.

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Vsako leto, v takšni posebni konstelaciji, v nekem čarobnem zalivu, pride tak dan, tak trenutek

One day while you were asleep
Who knows in what dreams
I took a long and quiet look at your face
And said maybe it is a fairytale
Maybe it is the wave that hits the shore
Maybe the ship on that wave
Maybe the pigeon on that ship
Maybe the voice of that pigeon
Maybe the sun that is reborn with my song
Maybe even beyond the sun
Maybe it is a tiny sparkle, this life
Maybe that is sufficient for us

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, together with their allies in the current war, declare upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and undertake that from now on they will not launch any hostile action against each other, and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. The final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article and the remaining Articles.
2. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
3. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.
4. Immediately upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, the United States Lift the naval blockade and prevent any interference or obstruction against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and restore traffic within a maximum of 30 days to its full capacity; the traffic of ships shall be proportional to the pre-war volume of traffic on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States also undertakes to withdraw its forces from the surrounding areas within 30 days after the final agreement.
5. Upon signing this Memorandum of Understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of ​​Oman and vice versa is resumed within 30 days to the pre-war volume, taking into account the need for the removal of technical obstacles and the neutralization of mines by Iran.
6. The United States undertakes, together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, While ensuring financing of at least $300 billion. The implementation mechanism of this plan, as part of the final agreement, will be formulated within 60 days.
7. The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, both primary and secondary.
8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have agreed that the fate of enriched material and the fate of all other mutually agreed nuclear-related issues, including Iran’s nuclear needs, will be adequately addressed in a final agreement; the final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article.
9. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that, pending a final agreement, they will maintain the status quo: Iran will maintain the status quo on its nuclear program, and the United States will not impose new sanctions on Iran or strengthen its forces in the region.
10. The United States undertakes that immediately after the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and until the date of the lifting of sanctions, the United States Treasury Department will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.
11. The United States undertakes that, in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement, frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available. These funds, whether held in the master account or transferred, will be used for any final beneficiary payment determined by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will be fully available for use. The United States undertakes to issue all necessary permits and licenses on this basis.
12. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that an implementation mechanism will be established to oversee the successful implementation of and future commitment to the Final Agreement.
13. Following the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receipt of assurances regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will enter into negotiations for a Final Agreement solely with respect to the remaining Articles.
14. The final agreement will be approved through a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.

Vir: Bloomberg

Who are you with? With Harari or with Henrich?

Joseph Heath critiques in this article the account of human evolution presented by Yuval Noah Harari in “Sapiens” for being unscientific and outdated. He contrasts it with the much more solid and current theory, according to him, of Joseph Henrich (“The Secret of Our Success”), which completely reverses the explanatory order.

Heath identifies four unique capacities that differentiate humans:

• Superior intelligence (including abstract and mathematical reasoning).
• Complex and grammatical language.
• Ultrasocial cooperation (with non-kin).
• Cumulative culture (continuous transmission and improvement of knowledge and artifacts).

Any serious theory must explain how these traits evolved in a very short evolutionary time (Homo erectus appeared about 2 million years ago or so).

Harari’s sequence follows the classic order:

Intelligence → Language → Cooperation → Culture.

But Heath sees many problems with it:

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WHY did I win my wager against @ProfessorPape?

I have great respect for him and my respect for him has grown recently. But what did he get wrong?

He believed, correctly, that US security principals faced a strong incentive to do whatever it takes to prevail. He expected them to get sucked into higher and higher levels of escalation to get their way, in a process he calls The Escalation Trap.

I told you from the start that, while this was a good model of an important dynamic at play, it suffered from a grave problem: there was nothing is the model that could ever account for deescalation—it could only explain higher and higher commitments.

So his model was theoretically incomplete in a very important way, and it was not pretty to watch him impose his theoretical priors on a dynamic reality that refused to obey the model.

I tried to think harder about the incentive structures for the two sides. I did eventually formally model the interaction as a bargaining game under asymmetric information. But the underlying logic was already clear intuitively beforehand.

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