Dobro je redno brati Foreign Affairs, ki je nekakšen outlet elite ameriških zunanjepolitičnih analitikov. In če ste to počeli vsaj od februarja lani, ste lahko spremljali evolucijo razmišljanja washingtonske zunanjepolitične intelektualne elite glede vojne v Ukrajini – od tega, da je predpogoj za mir v Ukrajini, da Zahod Rusijo totalno vojaško porazi in “demokratizira” njeno vodstvo, prek tega, da bo vojna še dolga, vendar je treba vztrajati z vojaško pomočjo, dokler Ukrajina ne prežene okupatorja onstran svojih mednarodnih meja, do tega, da v tej vojni nihče ne more zmagati, da lahko traja večno in da bo imela izjemne kolateralne negativne učinke na preostali svet (od energije in hrane do jačanja rusko-kitajske naveze, zato je treba takoj začeti pogovore o zaustavitvi ognja. Vmes sicer vskoči kak kamikaza (kak ruski disident ali neocon ameriški jastreb) z bolj jastrebskimi nebulozami, ampak splošen trend oziroma evolucija v razmišljanju je takšna.

V to zadnjo skupino spada Samuel Charap iz zloglasne RAND korporacije (think tank, ki dela predvsem za Pentagon), ki je leta 2019 za Pentagon pripravila zloglasno študijo, kako je treba “izpostaviti Rusijo“, da bo denimo napadla neko državo, nakar bi jo zahodne države pod vodstvom ZDA sankcionirale in dolgoročno oslabile (o tem sem tukaj že pisal). No, Charap, ki pred tem služboval v analitsko planskem oddelku na zunanjem ministrstvu v Obamovi administraciji, je spomladi s kolegico Mirando Priebe objavil RAND analizo “Avoiding a Long War” (tudi o njej sem tukaj takrat pisal), katerega poanta je, da je optimalno za ZDA, da se čimprej umaknejo iz te vojne in se fokusirajo na druge prioritete. Tale Charapov članek v Foreign Affairs pa gre še bistveno naprej glede sklepov. Nekaj ključnih poant članka:

1. Čeprav je bil članek objavljen 5. junija, torej pred začetkom ukrajinske kontraofenzive in čeprav članek nekaj upanja daje možnemu uspehu te kontraofenzive, ki pa se je, nasprotno, zaletela v neprebojni ruski zid, pa Charap pravi, da tudi uspešna ukrajinska protiofenziva ne more spremeniti “strukturnih dejstev”, torej da nobena stran v tej vojni ne more dokončno zmagati in da bosta obe strani tudi v naprej in v nedogled sposobni napadati cilje v nasprotni državi.
2. Obeta se torej dolgotrajna vojna izčrpavanja, ki lahko traja v nedogled, pri čemer pa bo (ob uničenju življenj in celotne infrastrukture) povsem uničila ukrajinske perspektive preživetja in razvoja ter imela negativne koalteralne posledice za preostali svet.
3. Washington mora začeti z diplomatskimi akcijami in z rusko stranjo doseči dogovor o čimprejšnji diplomatski rešitvi vojne.
4. Charap predlaga “začasno” zaustavitev ognja korejskega tipa z demilitariziranim območjem med obema sprtima stranema, ki bi sčasoma postal trajen. Korejski sporazum, kot pravi Charap, sicer ni bil highlight za ameriško administracijo (ni bil veličasten uspeh) in ni trajno rešil ozemlejskega problema, je pa omogočil 7 desetletij miru na korejskem polotoku.
5. Ta sporazum o “zaustavitvi ognja” bi, kot pravi Charap, pomenil, da bi Rusija “začasno” obdržala zasedena ozemlja, dokler se ne najde trajna rešitev problema, uvedel bi se vmesni demilitarizirani pas do zahodnega dela Ukrajine, zahodni del Ukrajine pa bi postal nevtralno ozemlje (brez Natovih vojaških baz) z varnostnimi garancijami ZDA (oziroma Nato držav).
6. In še najbolj tricky del: kako Rusijo spraviti za pogajalsko mizo in kako jo prisiliti, da bi se držala sporazuma? Charap pravi, da je Rusijo treba spraviti za pogajalsko mizo s “korenčkom” v obliki pogojne omilitve sankcij ter jo prisiliti k spoštovanju sporazuma s “palico” v obliki ponovne uvedbe sankcij, grožnje z vojaškim posredovanjem itd., podobno kot v izraelsko-egiptovskem sporazumu.
   

Prvih pet točk je po moje “no brainer”, edina logična rešitev, če nočemo +10-letne vojne v Ukrajini in njenega popolnega uničenja, pač pa ji pomagati, da začne čimprej okrevati in se morda razvije podobno kot Južna Koreja. V šesti točki pa ima Charapovo razmišljanje, po mojem mnenju, največjo luknjo. ZDA, ki so sprovocirale to vojno, jo financirajo in podaljšujejo, ne za Putina in ne za preostale tri četrtine sveta niso več faktor.

Prvič, ZDA ne morejo Rusije gospodarsko prizadeti. Čeprav so totalne, najhujše v zgodovini, pa sankcije Rusije ne prizadenejo, ker jih tri četrtine sveta ignorira (ne spoštujejo pa jih tudi evropske države, le skrite obvode so naredile).

Drugič, ZDA ne morejo Rusije politično izolirati. ZDA so v Bidenovem mandatu (v rekordnem času dveh let) proti sebi obrnile večino sveta, svet se je politično povsem prestrukturiral in nov leader je Kitajska, h kateri tri četrtine sveta pogleduje in pričakuje rešitev. ZDA sicer lahko nadaljujejo s financiranjem vojne, dokler se ne utrudijo in dokler ne bo Zelenski “potrošil” zadnjega mladega ukrajinskega fanta, vendar s tem (ob Ukrajini in Evropi) uničujejo le sebe in svoj ugled.

In tretjič, ZDA tudi ne morejo Rusije vojaško kaznovati. Putin ve, da lahko nekontrolirano napada cilje v Ukrajini, pa ZDA ne bodo naredile nič, ker se bojijo jedrskega spopada. Ameriško “čudežno orožje” (Patriot, HIMARS, Bradley itd.) se je slabo obneslo v Ukrajini, v bistvu sta ga ruska vojaška tehnika in inteligenten način uporabe osmešila. Pri čemer pa ima Rusija orožje (supersonične balistične rakete), za katerega zahodne države nimajo obrambe in lahko varnostno ogrozi samo jedro zahodnih držav. Torej?

Torej, ZDA so out. ZDA Rusije ne morejo spraviti za pogajalsko mizo in ne morejo je sankcionirati, če se ne bi držala sporazuma. To lahko naredi samo Kitajska. Samo Kitajska ima, če sem (se opravičujem) vulgaren, “v rokah Putinova jajca“. Samo Kitajska lahko Rusijo spravi na kolena, tako da neha kupovati njene energente in ji neha dobavljati dobrine in tako da v to prepriča preostalo polovico sveta. Samo Kitajska ima to moč. In Kitajska ima največji interes za mir, da lahko še naprej gospodarsko prosperira in dokončno zavzame dominantno vlogo v svetu. Kitajska ima interes za mir v Ukrajini. Zato bo znala Putina prepričati k “začasni, vendar trajni prekinitvi ognja“.

In čimprej se to zgodi, tem prej bo mir in tem prej bo Ukrajina lahko začela živeti, ZDA pa rešile svoj obraz. Če je slednje seveda sploh še mogoče.

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Charapov članek je božjastno dolg in v njem se večkrat ponavlja (da “utrdi materijo” pri ciljni publiki), zato objavljam samo nekaj ključnih odstavkov.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a moment of clarity for the United States and its allies. An urgent mission was before them: to assist Ukraine as it countered Russian aggression and to punish Moscow for its transgressions. While the Western response was clear from the start, the objective—the endgame of this war—has been nebulous.

This ambiguity has been more a feature than a bug of U.S. policy. As National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan put it in June 2022, “We have in fact refrained from laying out what we see as an endgame. . . . We have been focused on what we can do today, tomorrow, next week to strengthen the Ukrainians’ hand to the maximum extent possible, first on the battlefield and then ultimately at the negotiating table.” This approach made sense in the initial months of the conflict. The trajectory of the war was far from clear at that point. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was still talking about his readiness to meet his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and the West had yet to supply Kyiv with sophisticated ground-based rocket systems, let alone tanks and long-range missiles as it does today. Plus, it will always be difficult for the United States to speak about its view on the objective of a war that its forces are not fighting. The Ukrainians are the ones dying for their country, so they ultimately get to decide when to stop—regardless of what Washington might want.

But it is now time that the United States develop a vision for how the war ends. Fifteen months of fighting has made clear that neither side has the capacity—even with external help—to achieve a decisive military victory over the other. Regardless of how much territory Ukrainian forces can liberate, Russia will maintain the capability to pose a permanent threat to Ukraine. The Ukrainian military will also have the capacity to hold at risk any areas of the country occupied by Russian forces—and to impose costs on military and civilian targets within Russia itself.

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These factors could lead to a devastating, years-long conflict that does not produce a definitive outcome. The United States and its allies thus face a choice about their future strategy. They could begin to try to steer the war toward a negotiated end in the coming months. Or they could do so years from now. If they decide to wait, the fundamentals of the conflict will likely be the same, but the costs of the war—human, financial, and otherwise—will have multiplied. An effective strategy for what has become the most consequential international crisis in at least a generation therefore requires the United States and its allies to shift their focus and start facilitating an endgame.

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Western policymakers’ attention is primarily devoted to delivering the military hardware, intelligence, and training necessary to make that happen. With so much seemingly in flux on the battlefield, some might argue that now is not the time for the West to start discussions on the endgame. After all, the task of giving the Ukrainians a chance at a successful offensive campaign is already straining the resources of Western governments. But even if it goes well, a counteroffensive will not produce a militarily decisive outcome. Indeed, even major movement of the frontline will not necessarily end the conflict.

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The hope in Western capitals is that Kyiv’s gains on the battlefield will then force Putin to the negotiating table. And it is possible that another tactical setback would diminish Moscow’s optimism about continued fighting. But just as losing territorial control does not equate to losing a war, neither does it necessarily induce political concessions. Putin could announce another round of mobilization, intensify his bombing campaign on Ukraine’s cities, or merely hold the line, convinced that time will work for him and against Ukraine. He might well continue fighting even if he thinks he will lose. Other states have chosen to keep fighting despite recognizing the inevitability of defeat: think, for example, of Germany in World War I. In short, gains on the battlefield will not in themselves necessarily bring about an end to the war.

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These limitations on both sides strongly suggest that neither one will achieve its stated territorial objectives by military means in the coming months or even years. For Ukraine, the objective is extremely clear: Kyiv wants control over all its internationally recognized territory, which includes Crimea and the parts of the Donbas that Russia has occupied since 2014. Russia’s position is not quite as categorical since Moscow has maintained ambiguity about the location of the borders of two of the five Ukrainian regions it claims to have annexed: Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Regardless of this ambiguity, the bottom line is that neither Ukraine nor Russia will likely establish control over what they consider their own territory. (This is not to suggest that both parties’ claims should be accorded equal legitimacy. But the manifest illegitimacy of the Russian position does not appear to deter Moscow from holding it.) Put differently, the war will end without a resolution to the territorial dispute. Either Russia or Ukraine, or, more likely, both, will have to settle for a de facto line of control that neither recognizes as an international border.

These largely immutable factors could well produce a drawn-out hot war between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, history suggests that is the most likely outcome. A study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, using data from 1946 to 2021 compiled by Uppsala University, found that 26 percent of interstate wars end in less than a month and another 25 percent within a year. But the study also found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.” Even those that last fewer than ten years can be exceptionally destructive. The Iran-Iraq war, for example, lasted for nearly eight years, from 1980 to 1988, and resulted in almost half a million combat fatalities and roughly as many wounded. After all its sacrifices, Ukraine deserves to avoid such a fate.

A long war between Russia and Ukraine will also be highly problematic for the United States and its allies, as a recent RAND study I co-authored with the political scientist Miranda Priebe shows. A protracted conflict would keep the risk of possible escalation—either to Russian nuclear use or to a Russian-NATO war—at its current elevated level. Ukraine would be on near-total economic and military life support from the West, which will eventually cause budgetary challenges for Western countries and readiness problems for their militaries. The global economic fallout of the war, including the volatility in grain and energy prices, would persist. The United States would be unable to focus its resources on other priorities, and Russian dependence on China would deepen. Although a long war would also further weaken Russia, that benefit does not outweigh these costs.

While Western governments should continue to do all they can to help Ukraine prepare for the counteroffensive, they also need to adopt a strategy for war termination—a vision for an endgame that is plausible under these far-from-ideal circumstances. Because a decisive military victory is highly unlikely, certain endgames are no longer plausible. Given the persistence of fundamental differences between Moscow and Kyiv on core issues such as borders, as well as intense grievances after so many casualties and civilian deaths, a peace treaty or comprehensive political settlement that normalizes relations between Russia and Ukraine seems impossible, too. The two countries will be enemies long after the hot war ends.

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For Western governments and Kyiv, ending the war without any negotiations might seem preferable to talking to the representatives of a government that committed an unprovoked act of aggression and horrific war crimes. But interstate wars that have reached this level of intensity do not tend to simply peter out without negotiations. If the war persists, it will also be extremely difficult to transform it back into a low-intensity localized conflict like the one that took place in the Donbas from 2014 to 2022. During that period, the war had a relatively minimal impact on life outside the conflict zone in Ukraine. The sheer length of the current frontline (over 600 miles), the strikes on cities and other targets far beyond the line, and the mobilization underway in both countries (partial in Russia, total in Ukraine) will have systemic—perhaps even near-existential—effects on the two belligerents. For example, it is difficult to imagine how the Ukrainian economy can recover if its airspace remains closed, its ports remain largely blockaded, its cities under fire, its men of working age fighting at the front, and millions of refugees unwilling to return to the country. We are past the point when the impact of this war can be confined to a particular geography.

Since talks will be needed but a settlement is out of the question, the most plausible ending is an armistice agreement. An armistice—essentially a durable cease-fire agreement that does not bridge political divides—would end the hot war between Russia and Ukraine but not their broader conflict. The archetypal case is the 1953 Korean armistice, which dealt exclusively with the mechanics of maintaining a cease-fire and left all political issues off the table. Although North and South Korea are still technically at war, and both claim the entirety of the peninsula as their sovereign territory, the armistice has largely held. Such an unsatisfactory outcome is the most likely way this war will end.

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Yet even while acknowledging that Kyiv will ultimately make its own decisions, the United States and its allies, in close consultation with Ukraine, can begin to discuss and put forward their vision for the endgame. To some extent, they have already been doing so for months: U.S. President Joe Biden’s May 2022 op-ed in The New York Times made clear that his administration sees this war ending at the negotiating table. His senior officials have regularly repeated this view ever since, although the language of helping Ukraine for “as long as it takes” often garners more attention. But Washington has steadfastly avoided providing any further details. Moreover, there do not appear to be any ongoing efforts either within the U.S. government or among Washington, its allies, and Kyiv to think through the practicalities and substance of eventual negotiations. Compared with the efforts to provide resources for the counteroffensive, practically nothing is being done to shape what comes next. The Biden administration should begin to fill that gap.

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And waiting to set the stage for negotiations has its costs. The longer the allies and Ukraine go without developing a diplomatic strategy, the harder it will be to do so. As the months go by, the political price of taking the first step will go up. Already, any move that the United States and its allies make to open the diplomatic track—even with Ukraine’s support—would have to be delicately managed lest it be portrayed as a policy reversal or an abandonment of Western support for Kyiv.

Starting preparations now makes sense also because conflict diplomacy will not yield results overnight. Indeed, it will take weeks or perhaps months to get the allies and Ukraine on the same page about a negotiating strategy—and even longer to come to an agreement with Russia when the talks begin. In the case of the Korean armistice, 575 meetings were required over two years to finalize the nearly 40 pages of the agreement. In other words, even if a negotiation platform were set up tomorrow, months would elapse before the guns fell silent (if the talks were to succeed, which is far from a given).

Devising measures to make the cease-fire stick will be a thorny but critical task, and Washington should ensure that it is ready to assist Kyiv in that effort. Serious work should begin now on how to avoid what Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, describe derisively as “Minsk 3,” a reference to the two failed cease-fire deals that were brokered with Russia in the Belarusian capital in 2014 and 2015, after its earlier invasions. These agreements failed to durably end the violence and included no effective mechanisms for ensuring the parties’ compliance.

Using data from conflicts between 1946 and 1997, the political scientist Virginia Page Fortna has shown that strong agreements that arrange for demilitarized zones, third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, or joint commissions for dispute resolution and contain specific (versus vague) language produced more lasting cease-fires. These mechanisms reinforce the principles of reciprocity and deterrence that allow sworn enemies to achieve peace without resolving their fundamental differences. Because these mechanisms will be challenging to adapt to the Ukraine war, governments need to work on developing them now.

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Squaring this circle will be challenging and politically fraught. One potential model is the U.S.-Israel 1975 memorandum of understanding, which was one of the key preconditions for Israel to agree to peace with Egypt. The document states that in light of the “long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel’s security or sovereignty by a world power.” It goes on to say that in the event of such a threat, the U.S. government will consult with Israel “with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.” The document also explicitly promises “remedial action by the United States” if Egypt violates the cease-fire. This is not an explicit commitment to treat an attack on Israel as an attack on the United States, but it comes close.

A similar assurance to Ukraine would give Kyiv an enhanced sense of security, encourage private-sector investment in Ukraine’s economy, and enhance deterrence of future Russian aggression. Whereas today Moscow knows for sure that the United States will not intervene militarily if it attacks Ukraine, this kind of statement would make the Kremlin think more than twice—but it would not raise the prospect of new U.S. bases on Russia’s borders. Of course, Washington would need confidence in the durability of the cease-fire so that the probability of the commitment being tested would remain low. Avoiding war with Russia should remain a priority.

When the time comes, Ukraine will need other incentives such as reconstruction aid, measures of accountability for Russia, and sustained military assistance in peacetime to help Kyiv create a credible deterrent. In addition, the United States and its allies should supplement the coercive pressure being applied to Russia with efforts to make peace a more attractive option, such as conditional sanctions relief—with snapback clauses for noncompliance—that could prompt compromise. The West should also be open to a dialogue on broader European security issues so as to minimize the chance of a similar crisis with Russia breaking out in the future.

These efforts might well fail to lead to an agreement. The odds of success are slim—and even if negotiations did produce a deal, no one would leave fully satisfied. The Korean armistice was certainly not seen as a triumph of U.S. foreign policy at the time it was signed: after all, the American public had grown accustomed to absolute victories, not bloody wars without clear resolution. But in the nearly 70 years since, there has not been another outbreak of war on the peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korea emerged from the devastation of the 1950s to become an economic powerhouse and eventually a thriving democracy. A postwar Ukraine that is similarly prosperous and democratic with a strong Western commitment to its security would represent a genuine strategic victory.

An endgame premised on an armistice would leave Ukraine—at least temporarily—without all its territory. But the country would have the opportunity to recover economically, and the death and destruction would end. It would remain locked in a conflict with Russia over the areas occupied by Moscow, but that conflict would play out in the political, cultural, and economic domains, where, with Western support, Ukraine would have advantages. The successful reunification of Germany, in 1990, another country divided by terms of peace, demonstrates that focusing on nonmilitary elements of the contestation can produce results. Meanwhile, a Russian-Ukrainian armistice would also not end the West’s confrontation with Russia, but the risks of a direct military clash would decrease dramatically, and the global consequences of the war would be mitigated.

Many commentators will continue to insist that this war must be decided only on the battlefield. But that view discounts how the war’s structural realities are unlikely to change even if the frontline shifts, an outcome that itself is far from guaranteed. The United States and its allies should be capable of helping Ukraine simultaneously on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Now is the time to start.

Vir: Samuel Charap, Foreign Affairs