Septembra lani sem predstavil ameriški načrt, kako “prekomerno izpostaviti in spraviti iz ravnotežja Rusijo” (Overextending and Unbalancing Russia) (celoten dokument na 354 straneh), ki je nastal aprila 2019 v RAND korporaciji (RAND je vojaško-strateški think-tank, ki ga tričetrtinsko financira ameriška vlada, in ki po naročilu dela strateške študije za ameriško vlado; znan pa je po svoji “jastrebski usmerjenosti” ter velikih napakah v preteklosti glede strateških usmeritev, ki so vodile do velikih ameriški fiaskov, denimo glede vojne  v Vietnamu ter ameriških “operacij” v Laosu in Tajski). V tistem načrtu je bilo predlagano, da je treba Rusijo nekako izzvati in jo tako prisiliti, da se izpostavi in izčrpa. Optimalna predlagana kombinacija, ki bi prekomerno izpostavila Rusijo in imela najmanjše stroške za ZDA, je predvidevala “kombinacijo povečanja proizvodnje energije v ZDA in sankcij, ki pa morajo biti multilateralne“. Poročilo je zelo eksplicitno v tem pogledu, saj pravi, da so glede sankcij proti Rusij ključne predvsem evropske države, ki bi zmanjšale uvoz energentov iz Rusije in s tem slednji povzročile največjo škodo. In kot smo lahko videli, je Bidenova administracija sledila tem strateškim usmeritvam študije.

No, manj kot 4 leta kasneje in 11 mesecev po ruskem napadu na Ukrajino so na podlagi zadnjih dejstev iz Ukrajine v RAND korporaciji obrnili ploščo in naredili novo študijo z naslovom “Avoiding a long war“. Študija pravi, da bi bilo v največjem interesu ZDA preprečiti dolgotrajno vojno. V študiji ugotavljajo, da dolgotrajna vojna preveč izčrpava ZDA, saj se v Washingtonu preveč fokusirajo zgolj na to točko (tako glede vloženih sredstev kot politično) in zanemarjajo strateško bolj pomembne cilje (mišljena je Kitajska). Dolgotrajna vojna bi ob nevarnosti eskalacije na ozemlja držav članic Nata lahko Rusijo tudi preveč potisnila v zavezništvo Kitajske. Študija se zato fokusira na to, kako čim hitreje končati vojno. Pri tem avtorje (tako kot ameriško administracijo) eksplicitno zanimajo izključno ameriški interesi (ne ukrajinski ali interesi evropskih partnerjev), zato v študiji ne dajejo velike teže ozemeljski celovitosti Ukrajine, saj bi to zgolj podaljševalo vojno, in se fokusirajo na elemente, ki bi lahko pospešili sporazumni konec vojne. Gre za štiri ključne elemente, med njimi na eni strani komunikacija načrta za bodočo podporo Ukrajini in določene varnostne garancije (“commitments”), na drugi strani pa zagotovila Rusiji glede nevtralnosti Ukrajine ter omilitve sankcij.

Povzetek:

The authors argue that, in addition to minimizing the risks of major escalation, U.S. interests would be best served by avoiding a protracted conflict. The costs and risks of a long war in Ukraine are significant and outweigh the possible benefits of such a trajectory for the United States. Although Washington cannot by itself determine the war’s duration, it can take steps that make an eventual negotiated end to the conflict more likely. Drawing on the literature on war termination, the authors identify key impediments to Russia-Ukraine talks, such as mutual optimism about the future of the war and mutual pessimism about the implications of peace. The Perspective highlights four policy instruments the United States could use to mitigate these impediments: clarifying plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine’s security, issuing assurances regarding the country’s neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia.

Zgolj nekaj odlomkov iz študije, ki kažejo, kako v Washingtonu strateško gledajo na scenarije nadaljevanja vojne ter ključne cilje ZDA pri tem.

Kot rečeno, ozemeljska celovitost Ukrajine se avtorjem študije ne zdi zelo pomembna (zgolj pomembna ali manj pomembna), saj zadnja vojaško potegnjena črta iz decembra 2022 naj ne bi “prikrajšala Kijeva za gospodarsko pomembna območja, ki bi dramatično vplivala na sposobnost preživetja države“. Bi pa ohranjevanje ozemeljske celovitosti prineslo tveganje za podaljšanje vojne in morebitno jedrsko eskalacijo.

Koristi od ozemeljske celovitosti Ukrajine za ZDA:

In sum, greater Ukrainian territorial control is important to the United States for humanitarian reasons, to reinforce international norms, and to foster Ukraine’s future economic growth. However, the significance of the two latter benefits are debatable. Russia’s violations of international norms long predate the current conflict and are likely to persist after the fighting ends. Moreover, the United States and its allies have imposed many other types of costs on Russia for its aggression—costs that have already sent a signal to other would-be aggressors. And the line of control as of December 2022 does not deprive Kyiv of economically vital areas that would dramatically affect the country’s viability.

Stroški zaradi ohranjanja ozemeljske celovitosti Ukrajine za ZDA:

In addition to these benefits, greater Ukrainian territorial control also poses potential costs and risks for the United States (Table 2). First, given the slowing pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensives in December 2022, restoring the pre-February 2022 line of control—let alone the pre-2014 territorial status quo—will take months and perhaps years to achieve. Russia has built substantial defensive fortifications along the line of control, and its military mobilization has rectified the manpower deficit that enabled Ukraine’s success in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. A long war is likely to be necessary to allow Kyiv the time it would need to restore control over significantly more land. As we describe in the following section, a long war could entail major costs for the United States. Furthermore, if Ukraine does push beyond the pre-February 2022 line of control and manages to retake areas that Russia has occupied since 2014 (particularly Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based), the risks of escalation—either nuclear use or an attack on NATO—will spike.

Podaljševanje vojne po tej študiji ni v interesu Washingtona oziroma “stroški zaradi tega daleč presegajo koristi“. Če povzamem glavne poante študije: (1) evropske države so se itak “odvezale” od ruskih energenrtov, (2) Rusija bi v nadaljevanju vojne lahko zasedla še več ozemlja in povzročila še večjo humanitarno škodo in porušila še več infrastrukture, (3) nadaljevanje vojne bi imelo podaljšan negativni vpliv na svetovne cene energentov in hrane, (4) zahodne države bi morale nadaljevati s finančno podporo Ukrajini, (5) zahodne države bi morale nadaljevati z vojaško podporo Ukrajino, pri čemer se soočajo z izpraznjenimi skladišči, (6) v dolgoročnem interesu Washingtona je, da se Moskva še bolj ne naveže na Kitajsko in ne postane popolnoma podrejena Pekingu, in (7) nadaljevanje vojne bi preprečilo sodelovanje ZDA z Rusijo na multilaterealni in bilatralni ravni glede globalno pomembnih zadev (jedrski sporazum START, sodelovanje v Varnostnem svetu OZN, iranski jedrski program).

Koristi od dolgotrajne vojne za ZDA:

A long war would also maintain pressure on European governments to continue to reduce energy dependence on Russia and spend more on their defense, possibly lessening the U.S. defense burden in Europe over the long run. Here too, however, it is likely that European countries will maintain these policies regardless of how much longer the war lasts.

Stroški dolgotrajne vojne za ZDA:

Yet there are significant downsides of a long war for U.S. interests (Table 4). A longer war will lead to further loss of life, displacement, and suffering for Ukrainian civilians; minimizing these humanitarian consequences for Ukraine is a U.S. interest. Continued conflict also leaves open the possibility that Russia will reverse Ukrainian battlefield gains made in fall 2022. Moscow’s mobilization might stabilize the lines as of December 2022 and allow Russia to launch offensives in 2023. The intensity of the military assistance effort could also become unsustainable after a certain period. Already, European and some U.S. stocks of weapons are reportedly running low.

The costs for the United States and the European Union of keeping the Ukrainian state economically solvent will multiply over time as conflict inhibits investment and production; Ukrainian refugees remain unable to return; and, as a result, tax revenue and economic activity drop dramatically lower than before the war. Russia’s campaign of destruction of Ukrainian critical infrastructure will create major long-term challenges for sustaining the war effort and for economic recovery and has also substantially increased Kyiv’s projections for the economic support it will need from the United States and its allies.

The outbreak of war caused a sharp increase in energy prices that has in turn contributed to inflation and slowing economic growth globally. These trends are expected to hit Europe hardest. The increase in energy prices alone is likely to lead to nearly 150,000 excess deaths (4.8 percent more than average) in Europe in the winter of 2022–2023. The war has also contributed to rising food insecurity globally. Ukraine’s exports of grains and oilseeds dropped to 50 to 70 percent of their prewar levels between March and November 2022, partly because of Russia’s naval blockade and attacks on energy infrastructure. Russia has also restricted its own exports of fertilizer, of which it is the largest global producer. The result has been a large increase in food and fertilizer prices globally.

…

Beyond the potential for Russian gains and the economic consequences for Ukraine, Europe, and the world, a long war would also have consequences for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. ability to focus on its other global priorities—particularly, competition with China—will remain constrained as long as the war is absorbing senior policymakers’ time and U.S. military resources. Bilateral or multilateral interaction—let alone cooperation—with Russia on key U.S. interests is unlikely. For example, the prospects for negotiating a follow-on to the New START strategic arms control treaty, which expires in February 2026, will remain dim as long as the war continues. Globally, persistent sky-high tensions with Russia would continue to cripple the work of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and limit the capacity for collective responses to shared challenges. Russia’s deepening military cooperation with Iran during this war—at a time when Iran is reneging on its commitments to restrain its nuclear program—suggests that Moscow could play the spoiler on such issues as nonproliferation.

And although Russia will be more dependent on China regardless of when the war ends, Washington does have a long-term interest in ensuring that Moscow does not become completely subordinated to Beijing. A longer war that increases Russia’s dependence could provide China advantages in its competition with the United States.

V tem strateškem dokumentu favorizirajo mirovni sporazum pred sporazumom o zaustavitvi spopadov. Ker prvi prinaša bolj trajno mirovno rešitev in ker prvi ne pomeni, da je treba takoj rešiti vsa vprašanja.

Since an absolute victory is highly unlikely, there will probably be a negotiated end to the Russia-Ukraine war at some point.

…

A political settlement or peace treaty would involve both a durable cease-fire and a resolution of at least some of the disputes that sparked the war or emerged during it. Since 1946, peace treaties have been less common than armistice agreements, but they tend to produce a durable end to fighting and reduction in tensions.

…

In the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, a settlement would entail negotiated compromises on some of the core political issues at stake for the two sides. For Russia, codifying Ukraine’s nonalignment would likely be central. Ukraine would want reinforced Western commitments to its security since it does not trust Russia to comply with any agreement. A settlement could cover a host of other issues, such as a reconstruction fund, bilateral trade, cultural matters and freedom of movement, and conditions for relief of Western sanctions on Russia.

…

Therefore, other things being equal, U.S. interests are better served by a political settlement that might bring a more durable peace than an armistice. Additionally, a political settlement could be a first step toward addressing broader regional issues and reducing the chance of a Russia-NATO crisis in the future. If the intensity of competition in Europe is more manageable and the risk of war recurrence in Ukraine is lower, the United States can shift resources in line with U.S. strategic priorities and Ukraine can recover economically with less outside support.41 However, the level of hostility as of December 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and the West, make a political settlement seem much less probable than an armistice.

Toda ker je mirovni sporazum trenutno manj verjeten od premirja, bi morale ZDA za maksimiranje svojih interesov prepričati tako Ukrajino in Rusijo kot zaveznice v Natu, da je mirovni sporazum najboljša opcija. To pa pomeni, da bi morale ZDA začeti z akcijo prepričevanja ter pripravo elementov za mirovni sporazum. Ti elementi pa vsebujejo na eni strani načrt za bodočo podporo Ukrajini in določene varnostne garancije (“commitments”), na drugi strani pa zagotovila Rusiji glede nevtralnosti Ukrajine ter omilitve sankcij. 

The debate in Washington and other Western capitals over the future of the Russia-Ukraine war privileges the issue of territorial control. Hawkish voices argue for using increased military assistance to facilitate the Ukrainian military’s reconquest of the entirety of the country’s territory.  

…

Our analysis suggests that this debate is too narrowly focused on one dimension of the war’s trajectory. Territorial control, although immensely important to Ukraine, is not the most important dimension of the war’s future for the United States. We conclude that, in addition to averting possible escalation to a Russia-NATO war or Russian nuclear use, avoiding a long war is also a higher priority for the United States than facilitating significantly more Ukrainian territorial control. Furthermore, the U.S. ability to micromanage where the line is ultimately drawn is highly constrained since the U.S. military is not directly involved in the fighting. Enabling Ukraine’s territorial control is also far from the only instrument available to the United States to affect the trajectory of the war. We have highlighted several other tools—potentially more potent ones—that Washington can use to steer the war toward a trajectory that better promotes U.S. interests. Whereas the United States cannot determine the territorial outcome of the war directly, it will have direct control over these policies.

President Biden has said that this war will end at the negotiating table. But the administration has not yet made any moves to push the parties toward talks. Although it is far from certain that a change in U.S. policy can spark negotiations, adopting one or more of the policies described in this Perspective could make talks more likely. We identify reasons why Russia and Ukraine may have mutual optimism about war and pessimism about peace. The literature on war termination suggests that such perceptions can lead to protracted conflict. Therefore, we highlight four options the United States has for shifting these dynamics: clarifying its plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine’s security, issuing assurances regarding the country’s neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia.

A dramatic, overnight shift in U.S. policy is politically impossible—both domestically and with allies—and would be unwise in any case. But developing these instruments now and socializing them with Ukraine and with U.S. allies might help catalyze the eventual start of a process that could bring this war to a negotiated end in a time frame that would serve U.S. interests. The alternative is a long war that poses major challenges for the United States, Ukraine, and the rest of the world.

Sklep

Če sklenemo, so analitiki v Washingtonu spoznali, da s sprovociranjem Rusije v napad na Ukrajino niso uspeli Rusije izčrpati, niti ne kaže, da bi Rusijo sankcije kakorkoli prizadele ter da podaljšanje vojne škoduje predvsem ameriškim interesom, zato se želijo iz tega konflikta čimprej umakniti. Washingtona ne moti, da je Ukrajina v tej ameriški strateški igrici izgubila petino ozemlja (najbolj plodnega in s ključnimi naravnimi viri ter največjo jedrsko elektrarno v Evropi), da je padlo okrog 150,000 ukrajinskih vojakov, da je ukrajinska vojska potolčena, da je iz države pobegnilo okrog 12 milijonov ljudi, da je Ukrajina infrastrukturno in gospodarsko povsem uničena (BDP se je zmanjšal za polovico, izvoz žitaric za 50 do 70%) in da bo ostala najbolj revna in korumpirana država v Evropi.

Je bila pač še ena ameriška strateška igrica, no hard feelings, ki se pač ni povsem izšla po prvotnih načrtih. So pa uspeli (začasno) evropske države odklopiti od ruskega plina in ga nadomestiti s prodajo svojega plina ter evropskim državam prodati ogromne količine orožja. Odlično za ameriške strateške in gospodarske interese.

Where to invade next?