Tehnološki nacionalizem na fronti s Kitajsko se še zaostruje

If you want to gauge the state of relations between Beijing and Washington at year’s end, look at Chinese technology stocks.

Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Tech Index had a wild ride today, heading for the lowest close since its launch in 2020 before rallying. It’s still down 30% this year. That followed a third consecutive day of declines for shares of Chinese companies listed in the U.S., many of which are tech stocks.

The reason for the volatility is simple: renewed friction between the U.S. and China along the key fault-line of technology.

Key Reading

When Joe Biden assumed the White House in January, the expectation was that he’d dial down the tension after the Trump administration imposed sanctions on China.

But while the rhetoric has moderated, actions on both sides have served to deepen their standoff, with China snuffing out democracy in Hong Kong and showing aggression toward Taiwan.

The Biden administration is now considering tightening restrictions on China’s largest chipmaker as part of its efforts to limit Beijing’s access to leading technology.

Separately, the U.S. is adding drone maker DJI and AI giant Megvii Technology to a blacklist over the alleged oppression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the Financial Times reported.

Meanwhile, the U.S. securities watchdog has announced rules that may force Chinese companies to delist.

It’s a concerted push that will inevitably accelerate Chinese efforts to become more self-sufficient: Chinese smartphone maker Oppo this week unveiled a self-designed chip that delivers sharper images.

Japan and Europe, too, are pressing ahead with their own plans to secure the supply of semiconductors to avoid getting further caught up in the conflict.

Analysts refer to the geopolitical moves as “techno-nationalism.” It’s a term we’re likely to hear more of in 2022.

Vir: Bloomberg

One response

  1. Globalizem, ekonomski liberalizem, odprti trgi so super, dokler v teh pogojih zmaguješ. Takrat se najde tudi ekonomska teorija, ki to zelo lepo utemelji.

    Ko ne moreš več konkurirati, kot je slučaj zahoda v primerjavi s Kitajsko, je situacija seveda drugačna. Najprej se seveda obtoži konkurenta za vse mogoče politične in ekonomske prestopke, mic po mic bo sledila prej ali slej tudi ekonomska teorija.

    Pri tem pa zahod pozablja, kot je lepo opozoril bivši obrambni minister (in predhodno šef NSA) ZDA Gates, da je zahod svojo presežke vlagal primarno v neproduktivne finančne špekulacije in ne v povečanje produktivnega potenciala družbe in predvsem znanosti.

    Zdaj je seveda pozno, zelo verjetno prepozno. Kitajska je prva industrijska sila sveta, znanost napreduje strahovito hitro, ne samo zato ker država načrtno vlaga vanjo, temveč predvsem zato ker Kitajska producira bistveno več diplomantov, doktorantov tehničnih in naravoslovnih ved (STEM) kot ves zahod skupaj. Da ne omenjamo delavne motivacije teh kadrov.

    Uvesti sankcije je lahko, spremeniti gospodarsko politike družbe bistveno težje, povečati število STEM diplomantov pa je dolgoročni proces. Še težje je spreminjati na kratki rok naravnano hedonistično kulturo zahoda in pa desetletja vbijano ortodoksijo ekonomskega liberalizma.

    Bojim se da se zahod prepozno prepočasi in premalo odločno odziva na konkurenčni izziv Kitajske. Težko bo.

    Najslabša opcija bi bila (žal se že dogaja) ponovna delitev sveta, češ: ” če že ne moremo zagotoviti globalne dominacije, potem si ogradimo svoj (čim večji del) sveta, kjer lahko vzdržujemo svoj primat”

    Vprašanje je samo, ali lahko svet to preživi.

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