Sedanje visoke cene energije in posledična panika so seveda posledica številnih dejavnikov – od hitre rasti povpraševanja po energentih po post-covidnem odprtju gospodarstev, nizkih zalog energentov zaradi uspavanosti energetskih podjetij z nizkim povpraševanjem v preteklem covidnem letu, zgrešene deregulacije trga in stave na tržne mehanizme, mnogo prenizkih investicij v nizkoogljične vire energije, do zgrešene energetske politike mnogih držav, ki so preveč stavile na nizko izdatne in nestabilne obnovljive vire sonca in vetra ter prehitro zaprle stabilne vire, kot je jedrska. Dejansko je sedanja energetska kriza dober pokazatelj tega, kaj nas čaka v zeleni dobi. Če se je bomo seveda lotevali na tak način, kot se je sedaj – ad hoc, brez treznega premisleka, s sledenjem zgolj eni strategiji (nemški), ki se je na žalost izkazala kot zgrešena. Ta kriza je pokazala, da je večina nacionalnih energetsko podnebnih načrtov (NEPNov), ki so jih pripravile EU države po nareku Bruslja, za v smeti. Niso pripravljeni niti na zaresno tranzicijo v zeleno dobo, niti na šoke v zeleni dobi – ne na povpraševalne in ne na ponudbene.

Ključna zmota NEPNov je, da bomo do leta 2050 lepo zlagoma prišli na ničelne emisije CO2 v proizvodnji energije, da se bomo vozili z električnimi avti ali avti na vodik, vse naše za večkratnik povečane potrebe po energiji v bolj toplem in sušnem podnebju pa bomo proizvedli s soncem, vetrom in vodo, energijo iz poletnega sonca prihranili za zimo, nekaj v baterijah, nekaj v vodiku (kjer v procesu sicer ponikne polovica energije),…, in da ne bo nobenih simetričnih (mednarodnih) šokov, kot ga doživljamo danes ter da bomo vse manjke energije v vsakem trenutku lahko po ugodni ceni uvozili iz sosednjih držav.

Pravljica. Pravljica za starce.

Če kaj, nas mora sedanji energetski šok naučiti,

(1) da mora vsaka država stremeti k energetski samozadostnosti, saj so energetske krize simetričen šok in ne moremo računati na ugoden uvoz elektrike, ko nas hkrati z ostalimi doleti ta šok,

(2) da so električni avti in obnovljivi viri energije sonca, vetra in vode kot stabilen in zadosten vir energije za naše povečane bodoče potrebe po energiji pravljica,

(3) da bomo tudi po letu 2050 še vedno v veliki meri odvisni od fosilnih virov (predvsem od plina, ki ima za polovico manj škodljivih emisij od premoga), in

(4) da mora vsaka država najti svoj lasten miks energetskih virov, pri čemer bo jedrska energija eden ključnih stebrov stabilnosti nacionalnih elektroenergetskih sistemov.

Za Slovenijo to seveda pomeni, da je (politična) pravljica, da bomo leta 2033 lahko zaprli TEŠ 6 (in bog ve, da TEŠ 6 ni visoko na listi mojih priljubljenih subjektov), saj ne bomo imeli zamenjave za tretjino energije, ki je proizvede. In za nas to pomeni, da moramo sprejeti novo strategijo in doseči družbeno soglasje, da bomo lahko močno pospešili priprave na gradnjo NEK2, na gradnjo hidro elektrarn na srednji Savi in Muri, na gradnjo črpalnih elektrarn in velikih baterij, finančno spodbujali energetsko sanacijo vseh stavb, pospešili zeleno tranzicijo industrije in (javnega!) prometa, gradili sončne elektrarne (ki so sicer bolj folkornega pomena iz vidika deleža v skupni proizvodnji energije) skupaj z baterijami v vsakem gospodinjstvu ter pospešili nadgradnjo distribucijskega omrežja in njihove pametne regulacije.

Vsaj dvema pametnima osebama, ki ju poznam, je to danes kristalno jasno. Mnogo premalo. Zato je ta prva energetska kriza zelene dobe prišla prav, da nas strezni.

Spodaj je odličen članek v zadnjem The Economistu na to temo. Naslov sem si sposodil od tam.

The panic is a reminder that modern life needs abundant energy: without it, bills become unaffordable, homes freeze and businesses stall. The panic has also exposed deeper problems as the world shifts to a cleaner energy system, including inadequate investment in renewables and some transition fossil fuels, rising geopolitical risks and flimsy safety buffers in power markets. Without rapid reforms there will be more energy crises and, perhaps, a popular revolt against climate policies.

The idea of such a shortage seemed ridiculous in 2020 when global demand dropped by 5%, the most since the second world war, triggering cost-cutting in the energy industry. But as the world economy has cranked back up, demand has surged even as stockpiles have run dangerously low. Oil inventories are only 94% of their usual level, European gas storage 86%, and Indian and Chinese coal below 50%.

Tight markets are vulnerable to shocks and the intermittent nature of some renewable power. The list of disruptions includes routine maintenance, accidents, too little wind in Europe, droughts that have cut Latin American hydropower output, and Asian floods that have impeded coal deliveries. The world may yet escape a severe energy recession: the glitches may be resolved and Russia and OPEC may grudgingly boost oil and gas production. At a minimum, however, the cost will be higher inflation and slower growth. And more such squeezes may be on the way.

That is because three problems loom large. First, energy investment is running at half the level needed to meet the ambition to reach net zero by 2050. Spending on renewables needs to rise. And the supply and demand of dirty fossil fuels needs to be wound down in tandem, without creating dangerous mismatches. Fossil fuels satisfy 83% of primary-energy demand and this needs to fall towards zero. At the same time the mix must shift from coal and oil to gas which has less than half the emissions of coal. But legal threats, investor pressure and fear of regulations have led investment in fossil fuels to slump by 40% since 2015.

…

The second problem is geopolitics, as rich democracies quit fossil-fuel production and supply shifts to autocracies with fewer scruples and lower costs, including the one run by Mr Putin. The share of oil output from OPEC plus Russia may rise from 46% today to 50% or more by 2030. Russia is the source of 41% of Europe’s gas imports and its leverage will grow as it opens the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and develops markets in Asia. The ever-present risk is that it curtails supplies.

…

The last problem is the flawed design of energy markets. Deregulation since the 1990s has seen many countries shift from decrepit state-run energy industries to open systems in which electricity and gas prices are set by markets, supplied by competing vendors who add supply if prices spike. But these are struggling to cope with the new reality of fossil-fuel output declines, autocratic suppliers and a rising share of intermittent solar and wind power. Just as Lehman Brothers relied on overnight borrowing, so some energy firms guarantee households and businesses supplies that they buy in an unreliable spot market.

The danger is that the shock slows the pace of change. This week Li Keqiang, China’s premier, said the energy transition must be “sound and well-paced”, code for using coal for longer. Public opinion in the West, including America, supports clean energy, but could shift as high prices bite.

Governments need to respond by redesigning energy markets. Bigger safety buffers ought to absorb shortages and deal with the intermittency of renewable power. Energy suppliers should hold more reserves, just as banks carry capital. Governments can invite firms to bid for backup-energy-supply contracts. Most reserves will be in gas but eventually battery and hydrogen technologies could take over. More nuclear plants, the capture and storage of carbon dioxide, or both, are vital to supply a baseload of clean, reliable power.

A more diverse supply can weaken the grip of autocratic petrostates such as Russia. Today that means building up the LNG business. In time it will require more global trade in electricity so that distant windy or sunny countries with renewable power to spare can export it. Today only 4% of electricity in rich countries is traded across borders, compared with 24% of global gas and 46% of oil. Building subsea grids is part of the answer and converting clean energy into hydrogen and transporting it on ships could help, too.

All this will require capital spending on energy to more than double to $4trn-5trn a year. Yet from investors’ perspective, policy is baffling. Many countries have net-zero pledges but no plan of how to get there and have yet to square with the public that bills and taxes need to rise. A movable feast of subsidies for renewables, and regulatory and legal hurdles make investing in fossil-fuel projects too risky. The ideal answer is a global carbon price that relentlessly lowers emissions, helps firms judge which projects would make money, and raises tax revenues to support the energy transition’s losers. Yet pricing schemes cover only a fifth of all emissions. The message from the shock is that leaders at COP26 must move beyond pledges and tackle the fine print of how the transition will work. All the more so if they meet under light bulbs powered by coal.

Vir: The Economist