Za manjšo mobilnost dela krivo povpraševanje, ne hiperregulacija

Še en desničarski mit je bil nedavno razbit: Mike Konczal in Marshall Steinbaum (iz levičarskega Roosevelt inštituta) sta v še vroči študiji pokazala, da za padajočo mobilnost dela v ZDA v zadnjem desetletju ni kriva hiperregulacija države na trgu dela (regulacija poklicev) ali trgu najema stanovanj, pač pa nizko povpraševanje po delu. Preprosteje rečeno, za to, da ljudje manj pogosto menjujejo službe, ni krivo to, ker bi bil vstop na trg onemogočen z različnimi delovnimi dovoljenji ali ker ne morejo dobiti stanovanja, pač pa preprosto zato, ker podjetja manj povprašujejo po zaposlenih in ker se zaposleni zaradi slabe situacije oklepajo obstoječih delovnih mest.

Originalni članek in povzetek članka Konczala in Steinbauma lahko preberete tukaj.

Zanimivo pa je, da je konzervativni Wall Street Journal včeraj objavil zelo dober povzetek te študije, ki ruši (njihov) desničarski mit o “ponudbenih”, tj. regulatornih  razlogih za manjšo mobilnost dela. Spodaj je nekaj ključnih odstavkov.

Recent research exploring the causes of this declining labor-market dynamism has focused on supply restrictions, such as state-based occupational licensing regimes, which make it harder for licensed workers to relocate across state borders, or prohibitively high rents in job-rich cities, which impede mobility. A drop in labor-market fluidity reduces overall employment rates, affecting younger and less-educated workers most of all, research by economists Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger shows. White House economist Jason Furman has also cited occupational licensing as a barrier to job fluidity.

A new paper says the problem is not supply. It’s that firms just don’t have enough demand for labor.

The authors arrive at that conclusion by looking at the correlation between earnings growth and changes in mobility for 741 metropolitan areas between 2000 and 2015. If factors like housing restrictions—picture a San Francisco one-bedroom now going for $4,000 a month—were responsible for declining mobility, we would expect San Franciscans to have seen their mobility plummet, and earnings rise in response to scarcity. Instead, San Francisco’s healthy job market has kept mobility and earnings high, thanks to strong demand for workers. Other areas with high demand for workers—think fracking hubs like Williston, N.D.—also had high mobility and high earnings growth over the period studied.

There, labor mobility declined—but so did earnings. In fact, that pattern held across the board: Declining mobility was correlated to declining earnings growth. To Mssrs. Steinbaum and Konczal, that makes it difficult to argue over-regulation of housing, for example, is the key factor weighing on labor dynamism, because ordinarily a scarcity of workers would lead to higher pay.

It’s an explanation that’s been suggested before by other economists and policymakers. In a June report, Mr. Furman also suggested that male workers, especially less-educated ones, were facing declining demand for their labor.

The Roosevelt authors say a key factor is the concentration of resources in the hands of managers and owners of large corporations—think of CEOs who are compensated largely in shares of the firms they oversee. This ownership encourages them to skimp on labor costs to further enrich themselves, in their analysis. That shrinking demand for labor then helps depress job-market dynamism. It also contributes to broader secular stagnation, since wealthier people tend to save more of their incomes.

They also note that fewer firms are entering the market, and smaller firms employ fewer people than in 2000. By contrast, large companies—those with 500 or more workers—have seen their share of employment rise since 2000, according to the paper. One explanation, endorsed by Mr. Furman, is that this decrease in competition raises the barriers to entry for new firm.

Vir: Anna Louie Sussman, Wall Street Journal

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