Finančne krize vodijo v vzpon skrajne desnice

Nova študija Funke,  Schularick & Trebesch (2015) “The political aftermath of financial crises: Going to extremes” kaže, da finančne krize, za razliko od običajnih recesij, bolj pogosto vodijo do vzpona skrajne desnice. Razlog je seveda v tem, da je učinke finančnih kriz mogoče primerjati z najhujšimi naravnimi katastrofami (glejte tukaj), ki za seboj potegnejo drmatičen upad BDP in masivno brezposelnost ter posledično privedejo do socialnih nemirov. Zato je, kot pravijo avtorji, velika odgovornost na finančnih regulatorjih in centralnih bankah, da preprečijo nastanek finančnih kriz.

Toda avtorji pozabljajo na ključno dejstvo, in sicer, da je ključna vloga vlade v času, ko se kriza že zgodi, da s kombinacijo hitrih in učinkovitih ukrepov gospodarstvo čim prej vrne na pot stabilne rasti. Podaljševanje krize vodi v poglobitev socialnih napetosti in posledično do političnih prevratov. V desno seveda. Čeprav je, ko se združita populizem in socializem v nacionalsocializem, težko objektivno presojati politični predznak takšnih godelj.

Recent events in Europe provide ample evidence that the political aftershocks of financial crises can be severe. This column uses a new dataset that covers elections and crises in 20 advanced economies going back to 1870 to systematically study the political aftermath of financial crises. Far-right parties are the biggest beneficiaries of financial crises, while the fractionalisation of parliaments complicates post-crisis governance. These effects are not observed following normal recessions or severe non-financial macroeconomic shocks.

How do the political effects of financial crises compare to the aftermath of other economic downturns (i.e. those not involving a financial crash)? To shed light on this question, we compare our main results to two alternative ‘treatments’. Specifically, we compare the aftermath of ‘financial crisis recessions’ (associated with a financial crisis), to that of ‘normal recessions’ (not associated with a financial crisis), and episodes with particularly severe GDP declines but no financial crisis (which we term ‘non-financial macro disasters’). The bottom line is that financial crises stand out. They are followed by significantly more political instability than other types of economic crises.

The typical political reaction to financial crises is as follows: votes for far-right parties increase strongly, government majorities shrink, the fractionalisation of parliaments rises and the overall number of parties represented in parliament jumps. These developments likely hinder crisis resolution and contribute to political gridlock. The resulting policy uncertainty may contribute to the much-debated slow economic recoveries from financial crises.

In the light of modern history, political radicalisation, declining government majorities and increasing street protests appear to be the hallmark of financial crises. As a consequence, regulators and central bankers carry a big responsibility for political stability when overseeing financial markets. Preventing financial crises also means reducing the probability of a political disaster.

Vir: Funke, Schularick & Trebesch (2015)

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