Pred dvema desetletjema so mnogi zagovorniki liberalizacije trga električne energije napovedovali velike pozitivne učinke iz tega naslova. Ločitev dejavnosti proizvodnje, prenosa, distribucije in prodaje električne energije naj bi povečala učinkovitost celotnega procesa. Raziskovalca Severin Borenstein (UC Berkley) in James Bushnell (UC Davis) sta v še sveži raziskavi pregledala učinke deregulacije in liberalizacije trga z električno energijo v ZDA 20 let kasneje in prišla do zanimivih (in dokaj pričakovanih) ugotovitev: (a) deregulacija je bila politično motivirana v pričakovanju povečanih rent, (b) deregulacija je privedla do povečane učinkovitosti v proizvodnji, ne pa tudi do znižanih cen, (c) znižanje cen elektirične energije je bolj posledica eksogenih dejavnikov (predvsem napredka v tehnologiji proizvodnje in dinamike gibanja cen zemeljskega plina), ne pa deregulacije, in (d) podobna dinamika je razvidna tudi glede politike spodbujanja obnovljivih virov energije (predvsem fotovoltaike), ki je profitabilna za zasebnike, vendar pa zelo draga za družbo.

Prior to the 1990s, most electricity customers in the U.S. were served by regulated, vertically-integrated, monopoly utilities that handled electricity generation, transmission, local distribution and billing/collections. Regulators set retail electricity prices to allow the utility to recover its prudently incurred costs, a process known as cost-of-service regulation. During the 1990s, this model was disrupted in many states by “electricity restructuring,” a term used to describe legal changes that allowed both non-utility generators to sell electricity to utilities — displacing the utility generation function — and/or “retail service providers” to buy electricity from generators and sell to end-use customers — displacing the utility procurement and billing functions. We review the original economic arguments for electricity restructuring, the potential winners and losers from these changes, and what has actually happened in the subsequent years.

We argue that the greatest political motivation for restructuring was rent shifting, not efficiency improvements, and that this explanation is supported by observed waxing and waning of political enthusiasm for electricity reform. While electricity restructuring has brought significant efficiency improvements in generation, it has generally been viewed as a disappointment because the price-reduction promises made by some advocates were based on politically-unsustainable rent transfers. In reality, the electricity rate changes since restructuring have been driven more by exogenous factors — such as generation technology advances and natural gas price fluctuations — than by the effects of restructuring. We argue that a similar dynamic underpins the current political momentum behind distributed generation (primarily rooftop solar PV) which remains costly from a societal viewpoint, but privately economic due to the rent transfers it enables.

Vir: Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of Restructuring, NBER WP No. 21113, April 2015

V določenem delu podobne ugotovitve lahko potrdimo tudi glede deregulacije trga z električno energijo v Sloveniji po letu 2004. V raziskavi, ki smo jo naredili pred kratkim, se kaže, da je liberalizacija trga pod evropskim diktatom, ki je sicer omogočila prosto izbiro ponudnikov in ločila dejavnost proizvodnje, distribucije in prodaje električne energije, privedla do absurdne situacije: trgovska podjetja kot hčerinska podjetja distributerjev so se v tekmi za tržne deleže pognale v v trgovanje po nevzdržno nizkih maržah, ki komajda pokrivajo stroške, ne upoštevajo pa tveganj pri trgovanju. Znižanje cen za odjemalce pa je bila predvsem posledica globalnega zniževanja cen elektirčne energije, ne pa večje učinkovitosti prodajalcev. Dvig cen elektrike na evropskem trgu bi v rdeče številke nemudoma poslal večino ponudnikov. Zaradi nevzdržnosti situacije je prišlo do trenda združevanja ponudnikov, kar bo pripeljalo do koncentracije na trgu z zgolj 3-4 igralci.

Večja konkurenca, kar naj bi bil proklamiran cilj Evropske komisije, bo (paradoksalno) pripeljala do še večje koncentracije na trgu.