Draghi: ECB brez pomoči fiskalne politike ne more rešiti evropskega gospodarstva

Ta konec tedna so bile oči svetovne javnosti uprte v tradicionalno letno konferenco kanzaškega Fed v Jackson Hole, katere nosilna tema letos je bila dinamika trga dela. Najbolj od vsega so bile oči uprte v uvodni nagovor predsednice Fed Janet Yellen in nagovor predsednika ECB Maria Draghija ob petkovem kosilu. Glede Yellenove je bila ključna dilema ali bo še naprej “golobica” ali postala bolj “jastreb” glede denarne politike. In Yellenova je nakazala, da glede na izboljšanje situacije na ameriškem trgu dela utegne Fed v perspektivi zmanjšati stopnjo ekspanzivnosti monetarne politike.

Glede Draghija so bila pričakovanja nekoliko manjša, saj so njegove roke formalno zvezane. Za razliko od Fed nima mandata, da bi lahko poskušal vplivati na zaposlenost, čeprav se že nekaj časa kuha “solistična” akcija ECB glede začetka kvantitativnega sproščanja. Tega Draghi sicer ni napovedal, toda kljub temu so bile njegove besede za predsednika ECB tokrat zelo jasne.

Draghi je za razliko od dosedanjih komunikejev in nastopov predsednikov ECB tokrat izpustil oziroma minimiziral poudarek na fiskalno konsolidacijo in strukturne reforme kot ključnih ukrepov ekonomske politike. Draghi je bil tokrat zelo jasen, rekoč troje:

Prvič, da druga recesija v evro območju in pospešitev brezposelnosti nakazujeta, da ne moremo več govoriti, da gre za ciklična prilagajanja, ampak da gre za problem prenizkega agregatnega povpraševanja.

Drugič, da so ukrepi na strani stimuliranja agregatnega povpraševanja v času prevladujoče negotovosti ključni, saj to negotovost glede nadaljevanja krize zmanjšujejo.

In tretjič, da ne ECB z monetarno politiko in ne strukturne reforme članic evro območja same po sebi ne morejo rešiti problema nizke gospodarske aktivnosti in visoke ter še naraščajoče brezposelnosti, pač pa so potrebni ukrepi tako na strani povpraševanja kot ponudbe. Potreben je koherenten miks treh politik: fiskalnega stimuliranja, monetarnega stimuliranja in strukturnih reform. Če tega ne bo, se bo depresija razširila in kratkoročna brezposelnost bo postala strukturna (in s tem nerešljiva). Tokrat ni nevarnosti, da bi politika “naredila preveč”, pač pa da bo “naredila premalo”.

Draghi:

The only conclusion we can safely draw, in my view, is that we need action on both sides of the economy: aggregate demand policies have to be accompanied by national structural policies.

Demand side policies are not only justified by the significant cyclical component in unemployment. They are also relevant because, given prevailing uncertainty, they help insure against the risk that a weak economy is contributing to hysteresis effects. Indeed, while in normal conditions uncertainty would imply a higher degree of caution for fear of over-shooting, at present the situation is different. The risks of “doing too little” – i.e. that cyclical unemployment becomes structural – outweigh those of “doing too much” – that is, excessive upward wage and price pressures.

Unemployment in the euro area is a complex phenomenon, but the solution is not overly complicated to understand. A coherent strategy to reduce unemployment has to involve both demand and supply side policies, at both the euro area and the national levels. And only if the strategy is truly coherent can it be successful.

Without higher aggregate demand, we risk higher structural unemployment, and governments that introduce structural reforms could end up running just to stand still. But without determined structural reforms, aggregate demand measures will quickly run out of steam and may ultimately become less effective. The way back to higher employment, in other words, is a policy mix that combines monetary, fiscal and structural measures at the union level and at the national level. This will allow each member of our union to achieve a sustainably high level of employment.

Draghi je bil tokrat po eni strani zelo kritičen do tega, da ECB za razliko od drugih držav v času krize ni smela pomagati fiskalni politiki in s tem omejevati rasti brezposelnosti, po drugi strani pa zelo jasen, da tokrat potrebuje krepko pomoč – ekspanzivne – fiskalne politike. Šel je še korak naprej in naštel štiri načine, kako lahko postane fiskalna politika stimulativna tudi znotraj obstoječega institucionalnega ustroja evro območja (znotraj okvirja Pakta o stabilnosti in rasti), in sicer:

  1. Večja fleksibilnost znotraj pravil,
  2. Prilagoditve znotraj nacionalnih fiskalnih politik, da bi s kombinacijo ukrepov postale bolj “rasti prijazne”,
  3. Sprememba stališča znotraj evro območja do fiskalne politike in koordinacija ukrepov med državami (z drugimi besedami, države, ki jim situacija dopušča, bi morale povečati javno trošenje), in
  4. Nujna uvedba programa javnih investicij na ravni celotne EU.

Draghi:

Turning to fiscal policy, since 2010 the euro area has suffered from fiscal policy being less available and effective, especially compared with other large advanced economies. This is not so much a consequence of high initial debt ratios – public debt is in aggregate not higher in the euro area than in the US or Japan. It reflects the fact that the central bank in those countries could act and has acted as a backstop for government funding. This is an important reason why markets spared their fiscal authorities the loss of confidence that constrained many euro area governments’ market access. This has in turn allowed fiscal consolidation in the US and Japan to be more backloaded.

Thus, it would be helpful for the overall stance of policy if fiscal policy could play a greater role alongside monetary policy, and I believe there is scope for this, while taking into account our specific initial conditions and legal constraints. These initial conditions include levels of government expenditure and taxation in the euro area that are, in relation to GDP, already among the highest in the world. And we are operating within a set of fiscal rules – the Stability and Growth Pact – which acts as an anchor for confidence and that would be self-defeating to break.

Let me in this context emphasise four elements.

First, the existing flexibility within the rules could be used to better address the weak recovery and to make room for the cost of needed structural reforms.

Second, there is leeway to achieve a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. As a start, it should be possible to lower the tax burden in a budget-neutral way. [14] This strategy could have positive effects even in the short-term if taxes are lowered in those areas where the short-term fiscal multiplier is higher, and expenditures cut in unproductive areas where the multiplier is lower. Research suggests positive second-round effects on business confidence and private investment could also be achieved in the short-term. [15]

Third, in parallel it may be useful to have a discussion on the overall fiscal stance of the euro area. Unlike in other major advanced economies, our fiscal stance is not based on a single budget voted for by a single parliament, but on the aggregation of eighteen national budgets and the EU budget. Stronger coordination among the different national fiscal stances should in principle allow us to achieve a more growth-friendly overall fiscal stance for the euro area.

Fourth, complementary action at the EU level would also seem to be necessary to ensure both an appropriate aggregate position and a large public investment programme – which is consistent with proposals by the incoming President of the European Commission.

Mario Draghi je s petkovim govorom v Jackson Hole evropskim voditeljem ne samo jasno pokazal, kaj so v zadnjih letih naredili narobe in da je EU zaradi teh napak zapadla v deflacijsko depresijo z visoko brezposelnostjo, pač pa jim je pokazal tudi jasno pot za izhod iz krize. Problem Draghija pa je, prvič, da za razliko od Yellenove nima mandata, da bi karkoli sam naredil, in drugič, da je evro območje sestavljeno iz 18 članic in da je divergentnost njihovih interesov prevelika, da bi bilo mogoče narediti odločen korak v smeri reševanja krize.

Nemčija je kot dominantna članica evrske skupine tista, ki bi morala iniciirati ta korak, vendar ga ne bo. Kajti sama bi morala povečati javno trošenje in hkrati tudi ostalim članicam dovoliti, da ga povečajo. Oboje se trenutno zdi znanstvena fantastika.

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