Ključ za razumevanje nemške ekonomske duše: Ordoliberalizem

Če želite razumeti nemško ekonomsko filozofijo po drugi svetovni vojni ter nemško aktualno stališče in politiko glede reševanja sedanje evrske krize, ni dovolj zgolj poznati njihov prastrah pred hiperinflacijo, ki je Nemčijo pestila v letih 1923-24 (deset let pred gospodarsko krizo in Hitlerjem), pač pa filozofijo ordoliberalizma, ki se je razvila iz Freiburške šole (Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm itd.). Ordoliberalizem je nemški odgovor na klasični liberalizem, ki pa za razliko od slednjega ne zahteva minimalne države, pač pa zahteva državo, ki vzpostavi institucionalno okolje za normalno delovanje konkurence v gospodarstvu. Iz njega se je silom prilike po drugi svetovni vojni razvilo nemško socialno-tržno gospodarstvo.

Izjemno dobro in ekstenzivno razpravo o nemški verziji liberalizma lahko najdete v 5. poglavju knjige Marka Blytha (2013) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Blyth odlično opiše intelektualno podstat povojnega nemškega gospodarskega vzpona in evolucijo “urejenega” liberalizma v socialno tržno gospodarstvo. Nekaj kratkih odlomkov:

Rather, the state needed to be strong enough only to provide an “order,” an Ordo, and a consequent Ordnungspolitik, an “order-based policy,” whereby the legal framework governing action both by firms and the state together forms the economic constitution critical, according to the Freiburgers, to any successful economy.

Ordoliberals argued that the correct economic constitution cannot simply be deduced from theory and imposed by the state. It must be actively supported by members of the community to which it applies, and crucially, its implementation must be based upon a reciprocal duty of those members to act in the terms laid out in the constitution. In short, everyone needs to follow the rules, and everyone doing so reconstitutes and legitimates those rules.

To make this happen, the appropriate state policy was not to set the conditions of investment or to manipulate the level of prices via monetary stimulus, as the Keynesians argued. Instead, given its concern with limiting private power, competition policy, supported by the monetary policy of a politically independent central bank, formed the institutional core of the economic constitution. A dedicated monopoly office would ensure that the economy as a whole conformed to the meta-rules of competition, while an independent monetary authority would play the supporting role of keeping prices stable. Both institutions would be separate from and would not directly answer to the parliamentary state.

By attacking concentration and cartels while keeping prices stable, ordoliberals hoped to generate growth by enhancing the competitiveness of German firms and the attractiveness of their products. The policy objective of these institutions was therefore the encouragement of “achievement competition” rather than “impediment competition,” whereby the quality of products manufactured would create the demand for them, in a modern supply-side restatement of Say’s law.

Germany’s economic profile as a late developer has always been export-oriented manufacturing; so it was natural for Germany’s postwar economic elites to focus on the reconstruction of export capacities and the recovery of export markets as a way to achieve the rapid growth they sought. Ordoliberals may have sought to preserve small- and middle-sized firms and feared cartels, but they had no problem with large firms per se, especially those that were able to produce export-led growth. But export-led growth requires a strict policy of cost competitiveness, which in turn requires wage control through the restriction of consumption and a strong anti-inflationary stance. This further strengthened the hand of the monetary authority over the fiscal authority, as controlling inflation became the monetary complement to ensuring competition.

Under such institutional conditions the benefits of rapid growth would flow to all members of society.

… ordoliberals keenly appreciated that the “stability and security [of] the working class was prerequisite to securing the market economy. … “the social market economy,” a “system of legal rules which can satisfy the general feeling of justice,” which would tie citizens to the economic constitution as they realized its benefits. … As a consequence, although the ordoliberals really did not want the economic constitution to be tied to a welfare state, circumstances and politics dictated otherwise: the market economy had to become social.

Povzetek razprave na blogosferi o vplivu nemškega ordoliberalizma na evrsko krizo pa je prejšnji teden objavil tudi bruseljski think-tank Bruegel. Zgolj dva fragmenta te razprave:

Stephen Silvia writes that there is a gulf in the accepted wisdoms of the economics profession in Germany and the United States. Spend a little time in the academic circles of each country and it soon becomes clear that Americans are from Keynes, Germans are from Hayek. To be sure, America has its Chicago School “freshwater economists and Keynesian “salt water” economists. But the economics profession is much less ideologically diverse in Germany than in the United States. The default setting is a combination of neomonetarism and the free market ideology of the Freiburg school of “ordoliberalism,” which in turn draws on influence from the Austrian school of economics.

Jan-Werner Müller writes in the London Review of Books that ordoliberalism is what Angela Merkel wants for the Eurozone as a whole: rigid rules and legal frameworks beyond the reach of democratic decision-making. Brigitte Young writes that Ordoliberal ideas have been an important agenda setter and veto player in Euro crisis resolution and that Merkel has been consistent in pushing for measures, which reflect the ideas of Ordnungspolitik.

Seveda je nemški ordoliberalizem bistveno boljša ekonomska filozofija, prvič, ker naj bi z zagotavljanjem konkurence preprečevala razvoj monopolov, in drugič, ker ima ustrezno socialno komponento, ki jo legitimira pred državljani. Nemški ordoliberalizem (v njegovi sklepni fazi) načeloma zagotavlja kapitalizem s človeškim obrazom.

In s tem ordoliberalizmom načeloma ni nič narobe. Nasprotno. Jaz ga absolutno podpiram. Predpostavljam tudi, da bi se velika večina Slovencev podpisala pod tovrstno družbeno pogodbo – red, socialna država, dobro plačilo za delo in dostojno življenje. Problem je le, če ga poskuša Nemčija uveljavljati v evro območju, preden so vzpostavljeni vsi sistemski pogoji za njegovo učinkovito delovanje. Preden je v evro območju vzpostavljena fiskalna in transferna unija. Namreč tudi Nemčija je transferna unija med zveznimi deželami, ki zagotavlja, da denimo tiste dežele, ki občasno ne morejo slediti hitri dinamiki rasti neke Bavarske, iz zveznega proračuna dobivajo kompenzacije v obliki socialnih transferjev in nadomestil za brezposelnost. Liberalizem brez aktivne socialne komponente kot maziva in kot korektiva pač ne more optimalno delovati.

One response

  1. Eden izmed najpomembnejših dejavnikov nemškega gospodarskega čudeža po 2. svetovni vojni je bil povsem eksterne narave. Nemcem so kljub temu, da so Evropo in svet spravili v nepopisno bedo, po 2. svetovni vojni odpisali ogromno dolgov.

    “Under the London Debts Agreement of 1953, the repayable amount was reduced by 50% to about 15 billion marks and stretched out over 30 years, and compared to the fast-growing German economy were of minor impact.[2]
    The agreement significantly contributed to the growth of the post-war German economy and reemergence of Germany as a world economic power. It allowed Germany to enter international economic institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization.”

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreement_on_German_External_Debts

    Zato Angelca nima kaj govoriti o kakršnemkoli “redu v Evropi”, dokler so gospodarstva hkratno zadušena z dolgovi in nesmiselnim rezanjem v državno porabo. Noben “ordung” ne bo pomagal in pripeljal nikamor dokler bo tako. Iz takih izjav že na daleč voham neo-kolonializem, češ “mi dobri Nemci in “severnjaki” vam prinašamo red in zakon, od vas južnjakov pa nič ni”. Seveda, da ne, če ni porihtana niti osnovna ekonomska logika, da bi iz tega kaj nastalo.

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