Lepe in mirne božične praznike vsem.

Javier Vinós, španski znanstveni publicist in podnebni analitik, v zadnji kolumni plastično pravi, da tako kot bela kraljica v “Alice v čudežni deželi” želi, da verjamemo nemogočim stvarem, tudi evropske oblasti poskušajo, da verjamemo v šest nemogočih trditev o podnebnih spremembah in energetski tranziciji — in mnogi v njih kljub vsemu resnično verjamejo.

1. To, da imamo ljudje nadzor nad podnebjem

Prva nemogoča trditev je prepričanje, da ljudje nadziramo ali bomo lahko v bližnji prihodnosti nadzirali podnebje in vremenske pojave do te mere, da bi lahko preprečevali ali zmanjšali intenzivnost orkanov, poplav, suš ali dvig morske gladine. Po Vinósu gre za idejo, ki je povsem izven realnosti in ki pomeni, da je mogoče ljudi prepričati skoraj v karkoli, če je sporočilo dovolj pogostokrat ponovljeno in moralno zapakirano.

2. To, da je podnebje odvisno le od koncentracije toplogrednih plinov

Druga nemogoča trditev je, da je podnebje – izjemno kompleksen sistem s številnimi povratnimi zankami in naravnimi cikli – v celoti odvisno od ene same spremenljivke, to je koncentracije toplogrednih plinov. Vinós opozarja, da sicer dobro razumemo fizikalne lastnosti CO₂, vendar imamo bistveno slabše razumevanje celotnega podnebnega sistema, vključno z vlogo oceanov, oblakov, sončne aktivnosti in naravnih oscilacij. Po njegovem mnenju ni empiričnih dokazov, da bi ena sama spremenljivka lahko determinirala obnašanje tako kompleksnega sistema.

3. To, da poteka energetska tranzicija

Tretja nemogoča trditev je, da poteka ali bo kmalu potekala resnična energetska tranzicija. Vinós poudarja, da v zgodovini človeštva ni bilo primera, ko bi novi energetski viri nadomestili stare. Namesto tega se je vedno povečevala skupna poraba vseh virov hkrati. Biomasi se je pridružil premog, nato nafta, plin, jedrska energija in nazadnje obnovljivi viri, pri čemer nobeden od starih virov ni izginil. Tudi danes poraba fosilnih goriv dosega rekordne ravni, obnovljivi viri pa so močno odvisni od fosilnih goriv za proizvodnjo, namestitev in vzdrževanje.

Nadaljujte z branjem→

Do leta 2026 naj bi, po napovedi profesorja Guya McPhersona, človeška rasa zaradi podnebnih sprememb izumrla. Napoved je podal leta 2023.

Guy McPherson je sicer upokojeni univerzitetni profesor (Univerza v Arizoni), ki je postal znan predvsem kot radikalen okoljski alarmist in zagovornik teze, da bo človeška rasa zaradi podnebnih sprememb in okoljskega kolapsa izumrla v zelo kratkem času (sprva do leta 2030, kasneje celo do 2026).

00:47: Climate change vs abrupt climate change and why McPherson believes we’re in the midst of abrupt climate change

Craig Tindale je v nedavno objavljenem vrhunskem članku analiziral temeljni strukturni premik v globalnem gospodarstvu, ki ga označuje kot »vrnitev materije«. V ospredje se vrača fizična materialna baza gospodarstva – rudarjenje, predelava, taljenje in rafinacija – ki je bila v zadnjih desetletjih v zahodnih gospodarstvih sistematično zapostavljena v korist finančnih storitev, intelektualne lastnine in programske opreme. Predpostavka o neomejeni dostopnosti surovin prek globalnih trgov se je izkazala za strateško zmotno. 

Spodaj je povzetek članka, pred tem pa štiri uvodni odstavki, ki zadenejo v srčiko naše zahodne teoretske zablode  in zablode ekonomskih politik v zadnjih desetletjih. 

The global industrial system is currently navigating a profound structural bifurcation, a phenomenon best described as the “Return of Matter.” For the past three decades, Western economies have operated under the tacit Neoclassical assumption that control over intellectual property, financial instruments, and software code constitutes the apex of value creation. In this worldview, the physical processes of industrialism, the dirty, energy-intensive work of mining, refining, smelting, and alloying, were viewed as commoditised, low-margin utilities that could be outsourced to low-cost jurisdictions without strategic peril.

The post-Cold War era was defined by the assumption of “infinite materiality”: the deeply held economic belief that, with sufficient capital and open trade routes, any physical resource could be procured in the necessary quantities, at any time, from a friction-free global market. This paradigm facilitated the rise of the “Just-in-Time” logistics model, which ruthlessly optimised supply chains for financial efficiency, stripping out inventory buffers and redundancy at the expense of systemic resilience. As of late 2025, this era of assumed abundance has definitively concluded. We have entered an era of complex constraints, where the physical availability of matter, not the availability of credit, sets the limit on national power.

The trigger for this crisis was (and still is) policy, a decades-long triumph of a specific worldview. Rooted in the comparative advantage theories of David Ricardo and the monetary theories of Milton Friedman, and later codified in the Washington Consensus, this ideology modelled nations as frictionless points on a trade diagram rather than political actors with distinct security interests and potential enemies. It prescribed a rigorous division of labour: the West should specialise in high-margin “thinking” (services, IP design, complex finance) while offshoring the “dirty” work of “doing” (smelting, refining, processing) to the lowest bidder.

Deepened by the naivety of economic rationalism and the “End of History” optimism of the 1990s, the West adopted a financial system that effectively disarmed its security. Inside that intellectual frame, dismantling the domestic material productive economy looked rational, efficient, and profitable. In the real world of power politics, geography, and supply shocks, it was a slow-motion act of strategic self-harm that hollowed out the industrial base required to sustain a conflict or a protracted crisis.

Dolgotrajno prevladujoča predpostavka zahodnih gospodarstev, da je mogoče fizične vire in industrijske procese obravnavati kot vedno dostopne dobrine, se izkazuje za strateško napačno. Finančna moč, intelektualna lastnina in programska oprema ne morejo nadomestiti fizičnih zmogljivosti rudarjenja, rafiniranja in predelave surovin. Meja nacionalne moči se ponovno vzpostavlja tam, kjer se stikajo energija, materiali in industrijska infrastruktura.

Nadaljujte z branjem→

Čemu se potem v EU histerično militariziramo, strašimo ljudi, stotine milijard dajemo za orožje namesto za razvoj in pošiljamo stotine milijard evrov v Ukrajino, če pa analize ameriških obveščevalnih agencij, po besedah Tulsi Gabbard, direktorice National Intelligence, kažejo, da Rusija ni sposobna niti zavzeti Ukrajine, kaj šele napasti Evrope?

No, this is a lie and propaganda @Reuters is willingly pushing on behalf of warmongers who want to undermine President Trump’s tireless efforts to end this bloody war that has resulted in more than a million casualties on both sides.

Dangerously, you are promoting this false narrative to block President Trump’s peace effort, and fomenting hysteria and fear among the people to get them to support the escalation of war, which is what NATO and the EU really want in order to pull the United States military directly into war with Russia.

The truth is the US intelligence community has briefed policymakers, including the Democrat HPSCI member quoted by Reuters, that US Intelligence assesses that Russia seeks to avoid a larger war with NATO. It also assesses that, as the last few years have shown, Russia’s battlefield performance indicates it does not currently have the capability to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, let alone Europe.

Jebemti, je to stara pesem. Iz onih naših časov. Najbrž največji hit Leb i sol. Preden je Vlatko postal pripoznan kot glasbeni virtuoz….

V enem stavku: Vodstvo EU in ključni evropski politiki so se ves čas zavedali, da ne morejo zapleniti ruskih sredstev in na njihovi osnovi organizirati posojila Ukrajini, vendar so igrali to igro, da bi kot “manjše zlo” spravili skozi sicer politično nesprejemljivo skupno zadolžitev EU in mutualizacijo novega skupnega med članicami EU.

Teorija zarote?

No, madžarski, slovaški in češki predsedniki vlad niso padli na finto. Naš pa je.

The core idea was never really to confiscate the frozen Russian assets. From the very beginning, Brussels knew that this option was legally unworkable on a large scale, due to international pressure, the systemic risk to the legal security of sovereign assets, and the precedent it would set for third countries.

The narrative around “confiscation” served a different purpose: to deliberately confuse European public opinion and create a false political dilemma. Either one accepted confiscation — presented as morally necessary but legally fragile — or one accepted, as the “lesser evil”, the mutualisation of debt through a large loan backed by the EU budget.

What matters is that this mutualisation was never allowed during the financial crisis that hit Spain, Greece, and other southern European countries. At that time, the response was austerity, conditional bailouts, and the transfer of costs onto the weakest states, under the banner of “fiscal responsibility” and an outright rejection of eurobonds.

Today, by contrast, a de facto mutualisation of risk has been imposed — not to stabilise European economies in distress, but to finance an external war, shifting the risk directly onto EU taxpayers.

The contrast is striking:

when the problem was internal, mutualisation was impossible;

when the objective is geopolitical, it suddenly becomes acceptable and urgent.

From this perspective, the debate over Russian assets was instrumental, not substantive. It was used to prepare the political and emotional ground for approving a measure that, in any other context, would have been unthinkable within the European Union.

The strategy did not change.

 The narrative did — to achieve the same outcome.