Dobra in dolga razlaga. Vendar pa je Ray Dalio še vedno ujet v pretekliku in “če-ju”. Preteklika in če-ja ni več – ZDA so izgubile nadzor nad Hrmuško ožino in ga ne morejo dobiti nazaj pod nobenimi razumnimi pogoji. Kar pomeni, prvič, da Iran dobiva nadzor nad izvozom petine svetovne ponudbe nafte in s tem nad svetovnimi cenami nafte. In drugič, da so ZDA izgubile status globalnega hegemona, trgovinski in finančni tokovi bodo sledili zmagovalcu te vojne za ožino. In to sta Iran in Kitajska.

Comparing what is now happening with what has happened in analogous historical situations and triangulating my thinking with smart, well-informed leaders and experts has always helped me make better decisions. I have found that most wars are filled with big disagreements about what is likely to happen and big surprises. However, in the case of this Iran war, it is obvious, and there is near-universal agreement, that it all comes down to who controls the Strait of Hormuz. I hear from those who run governments, geopolitical experts, and people all over the world that if Iran is left with control over who can pass through the Strait of Hormuz, or is even left with the power to negotiate:

1. The United States will be judged to have lost the war, and Iran will be judged to have won. That is because Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz to use as a weapon would be a clear demonstration that the U.S. does not have the power to fix this situation.  The consequences of allowing Iran to shut down the most important strait in the world, through which the right of passage must be ensured at all costs, would be hugely damaging to the United States, its allies in the region (especially its Gulf allies), countries that depend most on its oil flow, the world economy, and the world order. If Donald Trump and the U.S. don’t win this war—with victory being easily measured by whether they can ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz—they also will be perceived to have caused a disastrous situation they could not fix. Whatever the reason that the United States doesn’t win control of Hormuz—whether it is because anti-war politics threaten President Trump’s political control ahead of the upcoming mid-term elections and he is afraid of that, because of his and the American electorate’s lack of willingness to suffer the losses of lives and money required to win this war, because the U.S. doesn’t have the military power to get and maintain control, or because he cannot bring together other countries in a consortium to keep this strait open —it doesn’t matter.  President Trump and the U.S. will have lost.

My reading of history and sense of what is now happening leads me to believe that if the U.S. were to lose in this way, there would be a significant risk that losing control of Hormuz would be for the United States what the Suez Canal Crisis was for Great Britain (in 1956) and analogous defeats were for the Dutch Empire in the 18th century and the Spanish empire in the 17th century. The pattern of events that leads to the breakdown of empires is almost always the same.

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Hormuška ožina je 100 % pod iransko kontrolo. 

Iran je potegnil dve brilijantni potezi (če razmišljamo iz vidika nekoga, ki želi nadzirati prehod skozi ožino).

Prvič, miniral je ožino od sredine proti omanski obali in koridor potegnil v ozemeljske vode Irana, blizu iranske obale skozi majhen prehod med otokoma Qeshm in Larak. Da lahko preveri vsako ladjo.

In drugič, selektivni prehod za prijateljske države in za tovor, plačan v kitajskih juanih

Skozi Hormuško ožino se ne pretaka samo 20 % svetovne ponudbe nafte, pač Hormuška ožina predstavlja tudi transportno pot za 20 % trgovine z LNG, 25–33 % umetnega gnojila, 30–38 % svetovne ponudbe helija, okoli 24 % globalne proizvodnje žvepla (ključnega za žvepleno kislino), 8–9 % svetovne proizvodnje aluminija ter znaten delež drugih ključnih surovin in kemikalij. Ključna vpliva zaprtja bodo na eni strani cene goriv in posledična inflacija in recesija (zaradi zmanjšanja proizvodnje in zaradi dviga obrestnih mer s strani centralnih bank), na drugi strani pa cene hrane, saj bo zmanjkalo za eno četrtino do ene tretjine umetnih gnojil prav v času setve.

Ob tem je treba upoštevati še pomem žveplene kisline za procesiranje ključnih materialov za sodobne tehnologije (kobalt, nikelj, baker itd.) in pomen helija v proizvodnji polprevodnikov in optičnih vlakenj. Nekajmesečna zapora Hormuza lahko povzroči podoben šok kot zaprtje v času Covida.

Nič dobrega se ne obeta. Glejte spodaj komentar glede vpliva na kmetijstvo in proizvodnjo hrane.

Hours ago, Trump went on Fox News to announce he is calling European allies and regional governments to form a coalition to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Hours later, Germany said no.

“As long as this war continues, there will be no participation, not even in any effort to keep the Strait of Hormuz open by military means.”

That is the German government spokesperson. On the record. Today.

This is the moment the market’s quick-resolution thesis died.

Think about what just happened. The United States asked the largest economy in Europe, the country that received the most American support during the Russian energy crisis, the NATO ally that benefits most from Gulf energy transits, to help reopen a 21-mile waterway carrying one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade and a fifth of world oil.

Germany said it has nothing to do with NATO. And walked away.

Japan already declined. Australia already declined. The US Navy confirmed on March 12 it is not ready for escorts. Minesweeping assets were retired in 2025. Trump is demanding roughly seven countries send warships. The number of confirmed commitments as of this evening: zero.

Now do the math on the calendar.

Even if a coalition somehow materializes next week, minesweeping a 21-mile corridor saturated with Iranian mines and drone threats under active fire takes weeks of operational preparation. Then escorts must begin. Then insurance must recalibrate. Solvency II capital buffers depleted by 26 months of Red Sea losses do not rebuild in days. Reinsurance treaties must be renegotiated. Individual vessels must be re-underwritten. The Red Sea precedent is 26 months old and premiums never returned to pre-crisis levels.

The Corn Belt needs nitrogen by mid-April. India needs Kharif prep by May. Australia needs urea by June.

Do you see the problem.

The coalition timeline is measured in months. The planting window is measured in weeks. These two clocks do not intersect. The food the world eats in late 2026 is being decided right now by soil chemistry, not by which foreign minister picks up Trump’s phone call.

Nearly 49% of globally traded urea is tied to conflict-exposed Gulf exporters. Transit has collapsed 97%. Bangladesh has shut five of six urea factories during its primary rice season. India formally asked China for emergency urea. China responded by banning phosphate exports through August. Egypt is bleeding foreign reserves to feed 69 million people on bread subsidies priced for a world that no longer exists. 318 million people were at crisis-level hunger before any of this started.

Germany’s GDP will take a 0.2 to 0.4 percentage point hit from the energy shock alone. TTF gas is up 45 to 60 percent since the closure. And Berlin just told Washington it will not lift a finger to fix it. The country that shut down its nuclear plants, became dependent on imported gas, and now refuses to help secure the strait through which that gas flows. The irony writes itself. The consequences do not.

The $20 billion DFC reinsurance backstop with Chubb has zero confirmed fertilizer vessel utilization. Insurance compensates for financial loss. It does not sweep mines that Germany will not help clear.

Every hour that passes without escorts is another hour closer to the planting deadline. Every ally that declines is another month added to the normalization timeline. Every month added is another harvest lost on the steep side of the quadratic yield curve where the world’s poorest farmers operate.

Germany’s rejection is not a diplomatic footnote. It is the confirmation signal that the molecules stay trapped through spring.

The planting window does not care about your coalition politics.

It is closing.

Sem generacija, ki je odrasla ob Tup Gun mistifikaciji. Top Gun je bil veličastna propaganda za ameriško mornarico. Propagiral je neuničljivo moč ameriške vojske, utemeljene na velikih letalonosilkah in lovcih tipa F 14. In to zelo uspešno.

Dokler jih ni povozil tehnološki razvoj (mimogrede, ameriška mornarica je kasneje umaknila lovce F 14 prav zaradi iranskih raket). Ostale države (Rusija, Kitajska, Iran) so namesto tega šle v razvoj dronov, hipersoničnih raket in nadzvočnih letal 5. generacije (in tudi 6. generacije). Ameriške letalonosilke so, kot se je izkazalo v času izraelskega napada na Gazo (hutijisko zaprtje ožine Bab-el-Mandeb v Rdečem morju) in ameriško-izraelskega napada na Iran, izkazale kot neučinkovite, saj so ranljive na napade dronov (zračnih in vodnih) in hipersoničnih raket. Že v času hutijskega zaprtja Bab-el-Mandeb so se ameriška letalonosilka in spremljajoče frigate bile prisiljene umakniti iz dosega hutijskih dronov). Podobno se je zgodilo v času vojne proti Iranu, kjer je letalonosilka Ford dobesedno pobegnila v zavetje Savdske Arabije blizu Jede, letalonosilka Lincoln pa v zavetje omanskih gora v arabskem morju, 1100 kilometov zračne linije od iranske meje.

Problem ranljivosti letalonosilk na napade z droni in rakete je seveda v tem, da s tem letalonosilke postanejo neuporabne kot platforme za zračno delovanje ameriške vojske. Bojni domet ameriških lovcev F 16 in F 35 je med 800 in 1000 kilometri (tja in nazaj), kar pomeni potrebo po dvakratnem vmesnem zračnem polnjenju, da bi ameriški lovci lahko opravili bojno misijo in se vrnili nazaj na letalonosilko. Logistično zelo kompleksno in zelo drago. Zato so se ameriška letala v zadnjih dveh tednih posluževala predvsem letališč v Izraelu in Savdski Arabiji. Ampak tudi od tam so jih izrinile iranske rakete.

Tako kot je bil film Top Gun najboljša propaganda za moč ameriške vojske, bodo iranski droni Shahed in rakete Soumar, Paveh, Hoveizeh, Ya Ali,  Shahab-3, Emad, Ghadr, Sejjil in Khorramshahr simbolizirali efektivni pogreb ameriške vojaške moči. Ker so ZDA v svojem napuhu globalnega predatorja pozabile na tehnološki razvoj in ekonomiko. No, pozabile so tudi na to, da globalne prevlade ne morejo več uveljavljati prek surove vojaške moči.

Po tej iranski vojni nič več ne bo tako, kot je bilo. 

Ameriški predsednik Donald Trump je čez vikend, ko je priznal, da ZDA ne morejo odpreti Hormuške ožine, v sebi lastnem stilu še izjavljal, da mu je vseeno, saj ZDA ne dobivajo nafte prek Hormuza. Res je, da so ZDA postale avtonomne glede nafte (celo neto izvoznik).

Vendar pa imajo, kot ugotavlja Rosemary Kelanic v New York Timesu, dvojni problem. Prvič, cene nafte se oblikujejo globalno. In če cene nafte zaradi podaljšane vojne v Iranu gredo čez 100 $/sodček in tam vztrajajo dlje časa, bodo ameriške naftne družbe svojo lastno nafto prodajale tudi po temu ustreznih cenah. Torej tudi za ameriške odjemalce (industrija, gospodinjstva, strateške rezerve). In drugič, ameriško gospodarstvo je neprimerno bolj naftno intenzivno kot konkurenčne države, zaradi česar bodo visoke cene nafte relativno bolj prizadele ZDA.

Te trditve Kelaniceve sem preveril s pomočjo podatkov OWID. Spodnja slika kaže naftno intenzivnost gospodarstev EU-27, ZDA, Kitajske in Rusije. Ta je izračunana kot primarna raba nafte na enoto BDP (po PPP). Slika potrjuje trditve Kelaniceve, da je ameriško gospodarstvo bistveno bolj naftno intenzivno od ostalih konkurenčnih držav.

Prava razmerja pa se pokažejo, če podatke preračunamo glede na EU-27. Kot kaže spodnja slika, je ameriško gospodarstvo za skoraj 60 % bolj naftno intenzivno od evropskega in za skoraj polovico (50 %) bolj naftno intenzivno od kitajskega. Je bolj naftno intenzivno celo od ruskega gospodarstva.

Grda resnica, ki jo bodo kmalu zaznali tudi v ZDA, je, da je tudi Amerika na istem čolnu z ostalimi državami. In s tem, ko je z (neuspešnim) napadom na Iran Amerika dvignila globalne cene nafte, je – ob strateškem porazu – gospodarsko prizadela sebe še bolj kot druge.

Seveda tukaj zanemarjamo velike dobičke ameriških naftnih družb, toda to je slaba tolažba za ameriško industrijo in gospodinjstva, ki ljubijo avte z velikimi bencinskimi motorji.

Cene nafte danes zjutraj….

… po vikendu, ko je Trump priznal, da je zavozil, da ZDA ne morejo odpreti Hormuške ožine in da ne ve, kaj Američani sploh tam še počnejo, saj to ni njihov problem

Aja, in Putin mu pošilja pozdrave, ker je ceno ruske nafte dvignil iz 50 na 90 $/sodček

I want to share an exercise from 2002 that has a lot to do with the current war, but also shows how astute commanders didn’t get the recognition they deserved.

Today, Iran doesn’t operate long or medium-range radars; it keeps almost all its equipment hidden inside mountains, including its planes, while deploying missiles, drones, and a asymmetric naval force.

This is a war the U.S. doesn’t know how to fight. Let me tell you a story, follow along:

The Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) took place from July 24 to August 15, 2002, under the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Planned over two full years, it simulated a hypothetical 2007 scenario where the U.S. invaded a Middle Eastern country, clearly inspired by Iran or Iraq.

The scale was massive: it cost $250 million and involved 13,500 personnel across 17 simulation sites and nine live locations. At the time, it was the largest and most expensive exercise in American history, designed to test the ‘network-centric’ warfare doctrine, featuring high-tech electronic surveillance and integrated command.

Then came the twist: the opposing force, the ‘Red Team’ representing a simulated Iran, was led by retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, a three-star general known for his unconventional tactics and for being ‘devious’ – shrewd and unpredictable. He was chosen specifically for that reason: to provide a realistic challenge.

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Drago Babič

Hormuška ožina je zaprta, vojna z Iranom še kar traja in ni znano, koliko časa še. Ker gre skozi to ožino okoli petina vse svetovne porabe nafte in nekaj manj plina, to bistveno vpliva na svetovno preskrbo z nafto in plinom. Na udaru je predvsem Evropa, ki praktično nima lastne proizvodnje nafte (plina le petino porabe), poleg tega je pred kratkim prekinila kupovanje energentov iz Rusije, od koder je prihajala večina nafte in predvsem plina. Celotni Evropi in s tem tudi nam grozi dosedaj največja energetska kriza in posledično ekstencialna kriza. Kaj bomo storili?

Vsaka spodobna država ima načrte za ravnanje v kriznih razmerah, tudi pri oskrbi z energIjo. Vendar se ti načrti ukvarjajo v večji meri z varnostnimi vprašanji in so praviloma, vsaj kar se tiče ekstremnih razmer, tajni. V nadaljevanju se bom omejil na energetiko, čeprav se v krizah področja prekrivajo, predvsem s finančnim upravljanjem, saj je denar najbolj učinkovito orodje za upravljanje kriz. V krizah je ključna  sposobnost državnega vodstva za upravljanje v izrednih razmerah, ki v zadnjih letih zaradi pomehkuženja (in feminizacije) politike, vsaj v EU, strmo upada. V Sloveniji ni dosti boljše, kvaliteta celotnega političnega razreda že nekaj desetletij upada, ne glede na politično orientacijo in spol.

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Za tiste, ki ne spremljate zapisov Roberta Papeja, profesorja političnih ved iz univerze v Chicagu (specializiranega za varnostna vprašanja), ki od prvega dneva ameriško-izraelskega napada na Iran konsistentno razlaga, kako se bo (in se tudi je) Trump v Iranu ujele v eskalacijsko past. V eskalacijsko past vojne, začete z zračnimi napadi,, ki je ne more zmagati.

Problem te eskalacijske pasti pri Iranu pa je še dodatno, specifično kompleksen. Lahko se greš 20 let eskalacije v Afganistanu, ker s tem ne vplivaš na nič, razen gostujoče države, toda če se zapleteš v eskalacijo z državo, ki lahko efektivno kontrolira 20 % svetovne ponudbe nafte kot ključnega in nenadomestljivega globalnega energenta, si te eskalacije ne moreš prav dolgo privoščiti.