Germany’s political future may indeed be blue, with shades of dark red. Not because the radical right and radical left have suddenly become ideological siblings, but because the failures of the centre have created an electoral majority demanding a fundamental change of course. After two decades of extraordinarily misguided policies, Germany has sunk too deeply into economic stagnation, energy insecurity and political paralysis for cosmetic corrections to suffice. It urgently needs a major political, energy and economic reset.

The landslide victory of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Saxony-Anhalt is not an isolated eastern German anomaly. It is another stage in the accelerating collapse of Germany’s traditional political architecture. The CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP, which governed Europe’s largest economy for decades, are losing support, while parties once dismissed as “populist” are advancing on both sides of the political spectrum. AfD won 44% of the vote and 39 of the 83 seats in the regional parliament, narrowly missing an absolute majority. At the national level, it has climbed to around 28%, while support for the CDU/CSU has fallen to approximately 20%. (Reuters)

The conventional explanation is that Germany is experiencing a shift to the extreme right. This is only half the story. The real development is a broader revolt against the political centre. On the right, discontent flows towards AfD; on the left, towards Die Linke and, increasingly, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). These parties are not drawing from identical constituencies, but they are feeding on the same reservoir of economic insecurity, frustration with declining public services, distrust of political institutions and rejection of Germany’s current foreign, energy and migration policies. Together, these dissatisfied voters already constitute more than half of the electorate in parts of eastern Germany.

This does not mean that AfD and the radical left are natural allies. Economically, they remain far apart. The AfD programme combines economic nationalism with a substantially market-liberal agenda: lower taxes, less regulation, preservation of the debt brake and a smaller redistributive role for the state. Its welfare policies are strongly tied to nationality, employment history and the traditional family. BSW, by contrast, advocates higher wages and pensions, stronger collective bargaining, greater taxation of wealth, public investment, rent controls and a much more active industrial state. In the terminology of traditional political economy, AfD remains significantly more neoliberal, while BSW is protectionist, redistributive and interventionist. BSW representatives themselves explicitly describe AfD’s economic position as neoliberal and reject any dismantling of the welfare state. (digital.bsw-vg.de)

The differences are equally profound in social policy. AfD promotes an ethnocultural conception of the nation, a traditional family model and a far-reaching rollback of progressive identity politics. Its Saxony-Anhalt programme envisages accelerated deportations, separate classes for refugee children, restrictions on Islamic public expression and a more explicitly patriotic education and cultural policy. (Reuters) BSW is culturally conservative by the standards of today’s left and rejects uncontrolled immigration, but it does not embrace AfD’s ethnic nationalism or its concept of “remigration”. It distinguishes between asylum, labour migration and integration, accepts the need for foreign workers and argues that legally admitted migrants should be integrated more rapidly into the labour market. Die Linke is further removed from AfD still: it defends liberal asylum rules, minority rights and progressive social policies. Therefore, speaking of a unified “extreme left” conceals an important distinction. The real potential bridge to AfD is BSW, not Die Linke.

Yet the areas of overlap between AfD and BSW are politically more important than these differences might suggest. Both oppose large-scale and poorly controlled migration, although for different reasons: AfD stresses national identity and cultural cohesion, while BSW argues that mass immigration places pressure on wages, housing, schools and the welfare state. Both reject the moralising identity politics of the liberal establishment. Both distrust the mainstream media and oppose the Brandmauer—the political firewall through which established parties refuse any cooperation with AfD. After the Saxony-Anhalt election, BSW’s leading candidate declared that his party was willing to talk to all parliamentary parties, including AfD, and described the blanket refusal to engage with it as undemocratic. (Reuters)

The strongest convergence, however, concerns foreign and energy policy. AfD and BSW want Germany to end military and financial support for Ukraine, promote negotiations with Russia, lift sanctions and restore diplomatic and commercial relations with Moscow. They oppose the permanent transformation of Germany into a war economy and favour the return of Russian energy imports. Both see expensive energy not as an unavoidable cost of moral leadership but as a self-inflicted blow to German industry. BSW explicitly connects sanctions and high energy prices with the existential difficulties of industrial centres such as Leuna, while AfD calls for closer relations with Russia, reduced support for Ukraine and an end to the present course of the Energiewende. (digital.bsw-vg.de)

This is where a future blue–dark-red accommodation becomes conceivable. It would not be a coherent ideological coalition but a functional alliance against the existing consensus: restrictive migration, restored economic relations with Russia, cheaper energy, less support for Ukraine, resistance to deindustrialisation and opposition to the political and media establishment. They could also cooperate through a minority government or shifting parliamentary majorities rather than a formal coalition. BSW has already floated precisely such a model—a non-partisan government dependent on issue-by-issue majorities—and its representatives have indicated that they would not automatically prevent AfD from attempting to form a government. (Reuters)

The traditional parties are responding to this transformation in the least productive manner possible. Instead of reconsidering the policies that generated the revolt, they continue to deny the substance of the problem. Falling social security, industrial decline, high energy costs, deteriorating infrastructure, uncontrolled migration, unconditional support for Ukraine and Israel, confrontation with Russia and the failures of the Energiewende are treated either as communication problems or as matters on which voters must simply be educated. The policies remain unchanged; only the rhetoric becomes more alarmist.

An attempt to preserve the old order by administratively excluding or even banning “extremist” parties would not remove the causes of their popularity. It would merely tell millions of citizens that their votes are legitimate only when cast for parties approved by the political establishment. That would deepen distrust and could eventually transform electoral rebellion into political unrest.

The more effective democratic response is to expose anti-establishment parties to the constraints of governing. Political responsibility moderates radical programmes more quickly than any firewall. Giorgia Meloni’s government in Italy illustrates how the realities of public finance, international commitments and economic interdependence can force a supposedly radical party into conventional political channels. Once in office, such parties must choose between their promises and what is actually feasible—and voters can then judge them on results rather than mythology.

Germany’s political future may therefore indeed be blue, with shades of dark red. Not because the radical right and radical left have suddenly become ideological siblings, but because the failures of the centre have created an electoral majority demanding a fundamental change of course. After two decades of extraordinarily misguided policies, Germany has sunk too deeply into economic stagnation, energy insecurity and political paralysis for cosmetic corrections to suffice. It urgently needs a major political, energy and economic reset.