Ukrajinska poletna ofenziva je pri koncu, iz večine žarišč na fronti viri poročajo, da so se ukrajinske vojaške aktivnosti skoraj povsem umirile. Z ozirom na neuspeh ofenzive in hkratno ohladitev zahodnih sponzorjev te vojne je očitno nastopil čas za iskanje krivcev za neuspeh. Preden preidemo na to, je treba jasno povedati, da ukrajinska ofenziva že pred sami začetkom ni imela niti najmanjših možnosti za uspeh. Vsem vojaškim analitikom, ki so obdržali vsaj malo strokovne integritete, je bilo že aprila jasno, da ukrajinska vojska brez izrazite premoči v zraku, artileriji in oklepnih enotah nima možnosti za uspeh. V zgodovini 20. stoletja ni bilo primera, kjer bi prišlo do preboja fronte brez navedene premoči (predvsem v zraku). Kljub zavedanju tega so zahodni sponzorji ukrajinsko vojsko poslali v klavnico in se pri tem sklicevali, da lahko razliko naredi “ukrajinski pogum”. Sramotno. In podobno sramotno je, da zahodne obveščevalne službe niso uspele detektirati kompleksnosti ruske obrambne 1000-kilometrske fronte v 3-4 linijah, ki so jo ruske sile z mehanizacijo gradile celih 9 mesecev pred začetkom ukrajinske ofenzive. Sramotno in neresno je danes govoriti, da so bile zahodne obveščevalne službe ob vsej satelitski in drugi tehnologiji nadzorovanja presenečene nad kompleksnostjo te ruske obrambne linije.

Očitno je, da so zahodni sponzorji močno podcenjevali rusko obrambno strategijo. Na to navaja tudi članek v Politicu, ki navaja pričevanja ukrajinskih vojakov, da so jih zahodni vojaški trenerji v Nemčiji “urili za napačno vojno”. Urili so jih za zahodni način vojskovanja, za katerega je značilna vojaška premoč v zraku, razminiranje in artilerijska premoč. Ukrajinci ničesar od tega niso imeli in niso mogli imeti. Urjenje tudi ni vsebovalo nove vojaške tehnike bojevanja z droni, ker “zahodni vojaški priričniki tega še ne vsebujejo”. Tehnike bojevanja nisop prilagodili ukrajinskemu terenu itd. Nekaj več uspeha so ukrajinske sile začele dosegati šele, ko so opustile zahodni stil bojevanja. Preprosto rečeno, ko so namesto oklepnih vozil na minska polja spustile majhne enote pešadije, ki so nato po principu “trial and error” poiskale pot skozi minska polja s po 5 minami na kvadratni meter. Ukrajinske sile so pri tem izgubile med 50 in 60 tisoč vojakov, “osvobodile” pa 0.25% ozemlja, ki ga je zasedla Rusija.

Seveda pa zahodni sponzorji te svoje gromozanske strateške in taktične napake ne bodo priznali. Pač pa bodo obtožili Ukrajino, da se je bojevala na napačen način, da ni upoštevala zahodnega  treninga, da se ni fokusirala samo na eno točko preboja … in na korupcijo (kar še pride).

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With progress painstakingly slow on the Zaporizhzhia front — the main axis of three lines of attack — there’s been plenty of second-guessing and armchair generalship going on, apportioning blame, identifying missteps or highlighting things that could have been done better.

But among them, the most intriguing thinking is coming from soldiers on Ukraine’s front lines, or those who have newly returned, and they fault NATO for preparing them for a different fight.

Of course, Ukraine has been encountering criticism of its own in recent weeks, with Western military officials faulting forces for failing to observe the combined warfare tactics taught by NATO instructors earlier this year. The most notable reprimand was contained in July’s leaked battlefield assessment by Germany’s Bundeswehr, which complained the Ukrainian military was failing to implement NATO training, and criticized commanders for splitting their Western-trained brigades into small units of just 10 to 30 soldiers to attack enemy positions. 

But some front-line veterans are now turning this criticism on its head, saying NATO prepared them for the wrong kind of war, and that the training they received was a mixed bag, and taken from manuals that weren’t adjusted for the realities on the ground in Ukraine. According to them, there was a clear schism between theory and practice, a disconnect that has cost lives.

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It seems the training Ukrainian soldiers received was based more on what NATO forces have been most used to in recent years — counterinsurgency warfare, with some American-style “show-and-awe” thrown in. And while Ukrainians praise the drills on basic infantry tactics, reconnaissance and how to get close to the enemy unseen, as well as methods taught for storming trenches and buildings, they cite a lack of training on drone and mine awareness, explosive ordnance disposal and defensive combat.

When it comes to integrating drone warfare and how to overcome enemy drones, they received scant counsel — most likely because NATO forces have not yet caught up and adapted their own infantry training to the technology.

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And further north, on the front lines in Kharkiv, this criticism is echoed by soldiers with the 32nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, who spoke with the Kyiv Independent. The brigade received only three weeks of NATO training in Germany, and while grateful for some of the Western drilling and kit, they complained that NATO officers didn’t understand the hard reality of warfare in Ukraine.

“A NATO infantryman knows he’s supported and can advance with the confidence that there’s a high likelihood that he won’t be killed or maimed,” a soldier named Ihor said. NATO’s way of war calls for massive preparatory airstrikes, artillery barrages and demining before the infantry advances, and, of course, Ukraine’s military — without the modern warplanes, long-range missiles and demining equipment they requested — has had to fight in a very different way than what standard NATO doctrine dictates.

That is why, during the first phase of the counteroffensive, Ukraine suffered substantial losses of soldiers and Western-supplied armor, as they got bogged down in some of the thickest minefields ever seen and had to switch tactics to this attritional second phase, using small infantry units to try and find ways through.

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Some Ukrainian combatants say the training would have gone off better if battle-experienced Ukrainian officers and non-commissioned officers with knowledge of the local geography and landscape had been integrated into the NATO training — or if there had been an added component of intense instruction in Ukraine before draftees were deployed.

As a result of their lack of knowledge of the landscape, NATO trainers did not consider how much of the fighting would involve small units having to battle through thick tree lines — much like the Allied forces failed to account for northwestern France’s hedgerows after the 1944 Normandy landings. Similarly, on the Zaporizhzhia front — as well as in much of southern Ukraine — Soviet agronomists had divided the land into vast fields with oak, holly and poplar trees planted between them as windbreaks.

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Meanwhile, others are more skeptical, blaming, in part, unrealistic expectations from the get-go, as well as Western powers’ risk aversion — including the administration of United States President Joe Biden — in the provision of advanced military weaponry for the assault.

On this front, Ukrainian officials point the finger at the West for their dither and delay in approving and supplying the gear they’ve requested — especially as some asks were made immediately after the invasion. They also fume at the sense of pessimism regarding the prospect of achieving the counteroffensive’s main goals.

But it is clear to most military analysts and Western officials that we are now nearing the counteroffensive’s end, with little time before the weather turns. And despite a breach of Russia’s first defensive line at Robotyne at the end of August, the counteroffensive has not altered overall positions much.

Vir: Politico