Spodaj navedena sveža študija ameriškega vojaškega think-tanka RAND svari pred možno jedrsko eskalacijo v Ukrajini. Pri čemer kot glavno nevarnost vidi dobavo raket dolgega dometa Ukrajini, s katerimi bi ta lahko napadala občutljive cilje v notranjosti Rusije (kot denimo včerajšnji napad z britanskimi Storm shadow raketami na poveljniški center v Sevastopolu na Krimu), zaradi česar bi se Rusija lahko odzvala s taktičnimi jedrskimi raketami na ključne cilje, centre odločanja v Ukrajini. Tega sicer ni mogoče izključiti in dobro je, da avtorji RAND študije svarijo pred tem. Vendar pa menim, da Rusija zaenkrat nima potrebe poseči po jedrskem orožju, saj zmaguje to vojno in bo po upehanju ukrajinske ofenzive šla v protifenzivo, hkrati pa s ciljnimi napadi sproti uničuje ukrajinske cilje s strateškim zahodnim orožjem. Rusija bi se jedrskega orožja poslužila le, če bi bila resno ogrožena njena nacionalna varnost oziroma če bi ji grozilo, da bo izgubila zasedena ozemlja v Ukrajini.

Seveda pa ničesar ni mogoče izključiti. Bomo videli odziv na ukrajinski napad na Sevastopol, kar utegne trajati nekaj časa. Kot je rekel direktor Cie Burns: “Putin is someone who generally thinks that revenge is a dish best served cold“.

The Ukraine War is now 19 months old, and so far it hasn’t seen either of the two most feared kinds of escalations. The war hasn’t expanded into NATO nations, and it hasn’t gone nuclear. A report released yesterday by the RAND Corporation warns that, though this containment of the war may leave observers “desensitized” to escalatory risks, those risks are real and could lead to a bigger conflagration than is commonly recognized.

The RAND study, based on workshops involving 15 analysts, found “six plausible options for Russian escalation” that could “fundamentally alter the nature of the conflict, ranging from a limited attack on NATO to the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine.”

And if Russia does go nuclear, the resulting attack could be “surprisingly extensive” because “the Kremlin may assess that the costs and risks it would face from breaking the nuclear taboo would be similar regardless of whether a small or large number of weapons were used… Moscow may decide, therefore, to use whatever number and size of weapons it deems are necessary to achieve its battlefield objectives.”

The most likely trigger for a decision by Russia to escalate, the study found, “is a perception that battlefield losses are threatening the security of its regime.” And the report notes some signs of regime “fragility,” as Putin faces pressure from hardline nationalists who champion maximalist war aims.

Even in the absence of dramatic battlefield setbacks, growing regime insecurity, combined with the prospect of a long, costly, and frustrating war, could make “escalatory options that shorten the conflict more appealing, including potentially nuclear use, even at the risk of possible NATO involvement or loss of support from China.”

The report also notes the possibility of “inadvertent” escalation—triggered by such events as a Russian missile strike killing a NATO-nation official who is visiting Ukraine—and observes that “the longer the conflict drags on, the more such risks will accumulate.”

The RAND report amounts to a kind of reply to hawks, such as Max Boot, who say President Biden shouldn’t worry about crossing Putin’s “red lines”—by, say, giving Ukraine longer-range missiles—because red lines have already been crossed without consequence. One way to put the study’s upshot is this: Though there is no one “red line” that will automatically bring escalation, there are combinations of circumstances that could, in effect, make a given line suddenly red, even if the redness is visible only in retrospect, after the ensuing escalation.

For example: Boot notes that Ukrainian drone strikes on Moscow haven’t led to major escalation, as was once feared. But whether such strikes could prove escalatory depends on various factors—like, whether Russia is facing battlefield setbacks, how restive hardline Russian nationalists are, and what exactly the strikes are striking. The RAND report states: “Should Ukraine expand its attacks on sensitive targets inside Russia, and should those attacks increase in their effectiveness, these factors may increase Russian incentives to also consider more escalatory options given the political risks for the Kremlin of appearing unable to prevent or respond to such attacks…”

Therefore: “US and allied policymakers should carefully evaluate the trade-offs between enhanced support for Ukraine, including the provision of weapons systems with longer ranges, and managing escalation risks, which may become more acute over time…  Giving Kyiv the military capabilities to execute long-range strikes against sensitive targets inside Russia likely poses the greatest escalation risks.”

Vir: Robert Wright, Nonzero