Tako lahko razumemo odzive držav v razvoju na dogajanje v zadnjih nekaj letih. Medtem ko se ZDA in EU neznosno trudita z uvajanjem protekcionizma, da bi zavrli vzpon Kitajske na področju tehnologije, pa se države v razvoju, ena za drugo, razvrščajo za Kitajsko in z njo sklepajo bilateralne dogovore o trgovini in investicijah. S tem ko predvsem ZDA poskušajo izolirati Kitajsko, dejansko izolirajo sebe. Nekdanji ameriški top politiki in analitiki to spoznavajo. Trije tovrstni članki v velikih medijih, ki sem jih danes prebral, svarijo pred tem. Prvi je pogovor s Hankom Paulsonom, nekdanjim finančnim ministrom v vladi Busha mlajšega (ki je reševal ameriške banke po propadu Lehman Brothers), v Financial Timesu. Paulson govori o izolaciji ZDA kot kolateralni škodi ameriške drastične protekcionistične politike:

Paulson se dotakne vzroka za ameriški protekcionizem in bistva problema: je možna stabilna koeksistenca med dosedaj vodilno silo in vzpenjajočo se novo velesilo? Njegov kitajski sogovornik se ni mogel spomniti nobenega takšnega primera v zgodovini:

“When I asked a Chinese leader a number of years ago if he could think of a situation where you have an existing power and a rising power coexisting stably, this man, who is very wise, said, ‘I can’t think of any, but we are going to do it this time because if we don’t the result is going to be catastrophic.’”

Paulson tudi modro pravi, da bi ZDA morale ostati pri dosedanji politiki “ene Kitajske”, ki so jo ZDA spoštovale od sredine 1970-ih in je bila koristna za vse:

Our ‘One China policy’ has served us very well over the years and it’s very important that we stick to it. If we stick to One China and have a deterrent in the region, war is not inevitable.

Ključno vprašanje je, zakaj se države v razvoju obračajo h Kitajski in stran od dosedanjega absolutnega hegemona ZDA. In to velike države, kot so Brazilija in Mehika, izvoznice nafte in dosedaj največje zaveznice ZDA, kot je Saudska Arabija, do zadnje afriške in azijske države v razvoju. Odgovor je v tem, da Kitajska ponuja dolgoročno gospodarsko sodelovanje in obojestransko koristno trgovino, ZDA pa dajejo lekcije in grozijo s silo. Razliko v pristopu med obema je za Bloomberg lepo povzel Larry Summers (nekdanji finančni minister v Clintonovi administraciji):

“Somebody from a developing country said to me, ‘what we get from China is an airport. What we get from the United States is a lecture,”

Problem poskusa izolacije Kitajske pa je še bistveno večji in vprašanje je, ali je to sploh mogoče. Prvič, če Kitajska kontrolira večino “redke zemlje”, ki se uporablja v večini sodobnih tehnoloških naprav, če kontrolira večino proizvodnje litija, če kontrolira veliko večino inputov za sončne panele itd. itd., je odcepitev od Kitajske nemogoča. Brez Kitajske zahodne države ne morejo narediti “zelenega prehoda” – ne morejo proizvesti sončnih panelov za proizvodnjo električne energije in inverterjev ter ne morejo proizvesti baterij za električne avtomobile.

In drugič, odcepitev je težka oziroma nemogoča tudi tam, kjer se zdi mogoča. Vzemimo primer “novoreka”, ki ga je lansirala ameriška predsednica Evropske komisije Ursula von der Leyen. UvdL govori o “zmanjševanju tveganj” (de-risking) namesto o “odcepitvi” (decoupling). To v praksi pomeni, da naj bi se evropska podjetja zavarovala tako, da bi del proizvodnje imela še naprej v Kitajski, drugi del pa pospešeno prenašala v druge, bližnje in “prijateljske” države. Podjetja to označujejo kot strategijo “Kitajska plus ena”. Vendar je ta strategija, kot piše James Crabtree v Financial Timesu, zelo vprašljiva in ne pomeni nujno večje varnosti. Oziroma sploh ne pomeni varnosti, če večino inputov za proizvodnjo sodobnih aparatov proizvedejo kitajska podjetja. Primer podjetja Samsung, ki je leta 2020 preneslo del proizvodnje telefonov iz Kitajske v Vietnam, je zelo poučen. Samsung danes res naredi nekaj milijonov telefonov v Vietnamu, toda večina inputov pride prek uvoza iz Kitajske. Kakšno zmanjšanje tveganja je to prineslo za Samsung in Južno Korejo?

Kot pravi Crabtree, rezultat tega “de-riskinga” je dvojni paradoks: Prvič, namesto da bi se s to politiko države v razvoju tesneje povezale z Zahodom, jih naredi še bolj gospodarsko odvisne od Kitajske in ne manj. In drugič, čeprav se zdi, da se zaradi premikanja dobavnih verig stran od Kitajske Zahod manj zanaša na Kitajsko, pa potreba po komponentah, ki še vedno večinoma prihajajo iz Kitajske, pomeni, da se ranljivost zahodnih držav ni nič zmanjšala.

Nauk te zgodbe je, da je za odcepitev od Kitajske prepozno, ker so zahodne države zapravile zadnjih 30 let razvoja brez razvojne vizije. Izgubljale so se v načelnem bluzenju o pomenu inovativnosti (proslula Lizbonska agenda) in škodljivem samopohabljanju prek politike fiskalne konsolidacije, razvoj tehnologije in proizvodnjo sodobnih tehnoloških naprav pa prepustile Kitajski. Kitajska je potrpežljivo kopirala zahodno tehnologijo, jo nadgrajevala in razvijala novo in oblikovala dolge globalne proizvodne verige. V državah v razvoju je zakupila vse ključne surovine za proizvodnjo tehnologij prihodnosti, doma postavila razvojne centre in svetovne tovarne, prek katerih lahko zadovolji celotno svetovno povpraševanje. Kako se je mogoče odcepiti od Kitajske ali zmanjšati tveganja odvisnosti od nje, če pa Kitajska že kontrolira vse faze od razvoja, potrebnih inputov do proizvodnje?

Zaenkrat je edina smiselna strategija ohranjati dobre odnose s Kitajsko, začeti z resnim razvojem doma in začeti vzpostavljati dobre odnose z državami v razvoju. Namesto pridiganja in groženj jim je treba začeti graditi (in financirati) infrastrukturo ter jim omogočiti enakopravnejšo trgovino. Toda Zahod tega nikoli ni znal, pozna samo imperialistične / kolonialistične politike, ki so izšle iz občutka superiornosti zahodne civilizacije.

Toda tudi če v EU gremo v to smer, Kitajska je že tam in njen goodwill je bistveno boljši…

A few days earlier, von der Leyen had delivered a speech in which she argued that Europe should “de-risk” rather than decouple its Chinese ties. Full decoupling was undesirable, she said, so the west should instead reduce risks in strategic sectors such as semiconductors, batteries and critical minerals. This week G7 finance ministers also talked up the need for supply chain “diversity” with plans to “empower” emerging economies.

Anwar’s visit to Beijing could hardly have been more different. Here there was no talk of decoupling. Rather, Malaysia’s leader hailed China’s economic prowess and encouraged greater investment. He took a group of Malaysian businesses too, returning with deals worth almost $39bn, on paper at least.

The sight of leaders from the “global south” streaming back to Beijing should alarm the west. Having previously focused on solving China’s Covid-19 crisis and securing his own third term, Xi Jinping is once again flexing his diplomatic muscles — from peace deals in Ukraine and the Middle East to investment deals for south-east Asian neighbours.

While western leaders are trying to unpick decades of globalisation, Asian nations from Bangladesh and Indonesia to Malaysia and Thailand view China as central to their economic future. Rather than decoupling, they seek more trade with Beijing. And, paradoxically, this is an outcome western policies might actually deliver.

Global businesses now talk about “friend-shoring”, meaning moving production towards geopolitical partners such as India, Mexico or Poland. Alternatively, they might set up facilities in south-east Asia, where most nations are geopolitically neutral between Beijing and Washington. The likes of Malaysia and Vietnam are often predicted to be winners from decoupling, able to hoover up western businesses as they leave China.

There are problems with this account, however, the first being that so far decoupling has barely begun to happen. Semiconductors are one notable exception, given successful American attempts to stop global chipmakers selling to China. But for all the talk of supply chain de-risking and resilience, similar moves in other sectors are hard to spot.

Western multinationals talk more often about a “China plus one” strategy, in which they keep making things in China but also pick another manufacturing base, Malaysia say, as a hedge.

But imagine for a second that geopolitical events take a further turn for the worse, western companies get spooked, and decoupling does begin to move forward more quickly. What then? Here, many in the west assume that shifting production will make them less reliant on China, while the decoupling process will probably draw countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam closer to the west itself. Both assumptions are questionable, to say the least.

Take Samsung. Its decision in 2020 to shift production to Vietnam means the South Korean giant now assembles millions of phones in Vietnamese factories each year. Many are then exported to the west. Many components that go into those phones are still made in China, however, so Vietnam must also import more of those too.

Vietnam’s bilateral trade with China has rocketed in recent years, with similar patterns discernible in the rest of what is sometimes called “factory Asia”. Forthcoming research from Aaditya Mattoo, an economist at the World Bank, suggests that east Asian nations have lately been exporting more to the US but also importing much more from China.

The result is a double paradox. First, rather than connecting emerging economies more tightly to the west, decoupling often leaves countries in regions such as south-east Asia more economically dependent upon China, not less. Second, while shifting supply chains around the world appears to leave the west less reliant on China, the continuing need for components that still mostly come from there means the fundamental vulnerability remains.

Vir: James Crabtree, Financial Times