Rusija je lani zahvaljujoč zahodnim sankcijam (in posledično visokih cen energentov in manjšega uvoza) ustvarila rekordni presežek v trgovinski bilanci (227 milijard dolarjev). Vendar pa se zahodni analitiki (denimo Financial Times, BNE Intellinews) frenetično sprašujejo, kje se ta zaklad (trgovinski presežek) nahaja, seveda v upanju, da bi ugotovili, da Putin ne more do njega in da s tem ne bi mogel več financirati vojne v Ukrajini. Razmišljanja analitikov gredo v tej smeri: če je cena Urals nafte kot benchmark cena, na katero ruski izvozniki nafte plačujejo izvozne carine v ruski proračun, zelo nizka, medtem ko so dejanske cene, po katerih se nafta prodaja, bistveno višje (kot je bilo ugotovljeno v zadnjih neodvisnih analizah), potem je ruski proračun deležen nizkih prihodkov od carin, medtem ko se dobički od izvoza morajo nabirati na računih ruskih energetskih družb v tujini. Toda, se analitiki sprašujejo, kje so ti dobički skriti in kako bi lahko zahodne države preprečile, da Putin pride do njih?

Vendar pa so ta razmišljanja bolj kot ne irelevantna, ker zahodni analitiki – hote ali nehote – pozabljajo na tri ključna dejstva v zvezi z izvozom ruskih energentov. Prvič, izvozne carine predstavljajo dokaj majhen delež v davčnih prihodkih od izvoza energentov. Na ruski izvoz nafte obstajata namreč dva ključna davka: davek na pridobivanje mineralnih goriv (MET) in izvozni davek (ED). Za leto 2022 je bila ciljna stopnja za MET približno 37 USD na sodček (na podlagi predpostavljene povprečne prodajne cene 62.2 USD/sodček), medtem ko je bil izvozni davek določen na le 5.91 USD na sodček. Slednji izvozni davek je ruska vlada s 1. januarjem letos celo znižala na vsega 2.28 USD/sodček.

Za prihodke ruskega proračuna so torej kotacije Urals ali dejanske dosežene cene pri prodaji nafte praktično irelevantne, pomembne so zgolj izvozne količine. Doslej je pri nafti ruski proračun dobival le 14% iz naslova izvoznega davka, preostalih 86% pa iz naslova davka na pridobivanje mineralnih goriv, od 1. januarja letos pa se bo delež prihodkov iz naslova izvoznega davka v skupnih davčnih prihodkih od izvoza nafte zmanjšal le še na 6%. Pri čemer pa proračun ne bo bistveno na slabšem, saj so pomembne predvsem količine izvoza, ki pa so praktično na podobni ravni kot pred začetkom vojne v Ukrajini. Te visoke stopnje davka dokazujejo, da so mejni stroški proizvodnje nafte v Rusiji zelo nizki in pri trenutnih prodajnih cenah polovico prihodkov od prodaje zadrži država kot davek.

Drugič, zahodni analitiki pozabljajo, da Rusija od kupcev v zahodnih državah zahteva plačilo za plin v rubljih (prek konverzije na računih pri Gazprom banki). Kar pomeni, da “ruskega zaklada” iz naslova izvoza plina na Zahod ni treba iskati po računih ruskih naftnih trgovcev v tujini, pač pa ta denar avtomatsko prihaja v Rusijo.

In tretjič, zahodni analitiki pozabljajo, da je Rusija večino izvoza nafte, plina in naftnih derivatov že preusmerila v azijske države in da skoraj polovico izvoza nafte opravi prek svoje “skrite flote tankerjev”. To pomeni, da tokov tega denarja sploh ni mogoče spremljati, ker ne poteka prek računov na zahodnih bankah. Dodatno pa je še treba upoštevati, da lahko ta denar prihaja neposredno nazaj na račune v ruskih bankah.

Torej ruski zaklad se ne skriva na računih zahodnih bank. Dvomim tudi, da bi si po zaplembi (zamrznitvi) ruskih monetarnih rezerv v tujini ter premoženja ruskih bogatašev v tujini, ruske energetske družbe želele svoje izvozne prihodke puščati v obliki depozitov na računih zahodnih bank, kjer bi jih lahko doletela enaka usoda.

No, če pa bi ruskemu proračunu resnično začelo zmanjkovati denarja, pa se je treba zavedati, da ima Putin neposredno kontrolo nad lastniki nahajališč nafte in plina. Vsakega osebno pozna in vsakemu lahko v trenutku nacionalizira nahajališča in proizvodne enote, če bi se kdo izmed njih izmikal plačevanju “pravičnega” davka.

Russian oil companies making record profitsThe exports from Russia to refineries owned by Russian companies have soared as the leading Russian companies cash in on distortions caused by the sanctions.

Vakulenko reports that most of the voyages from Russia to Italy in recent months went to the ISAB refinery on Sicily owned by the Russian major Lukoil (which it has recently agreed to sell, but will retain its other refineries).

Tankers going to the Netherlands, meanwhile, moored at the berth in Rotterdam harbour that feeds the Zeeland Refinery, in which Lukoil has a 45% stake. Lukoil also owns the main Bulgarian refinery in Burgas on the Black Sea, as well as a refinery in Constanta, Romania. Italy doubled its purchases of Russian crude from 0.65 to 1.3mn tonnes per month, while Bulgarian volumes went up from 0.3mn tonnes in an average pre-war month to 0.7mn in October 2022.

And here is the rub: while the price for Urals quoted on the Baltic Exchange, the main exchange for Russian oil export deals, tumbled by 50%, the price for the refined product like diesel and naphtha did not change. That introduces a huge spread between the cost of crude and the ultimate refined products. Normally a refinery earns a $10 margin on turning a barrel of crude into a more valuable refined product, but in second half of last year this margin swelled to $40-$50, making refineries insanely profitable.

In an indication that the numbers don’t add up, while MinFin reported that oil and gas receipts were down by almost half in December, the leading Russian oil companies are reporting record profits.

Since the war started the leading Russian companies are no longer obliged to report their results but in November privately owned Russian oil major Lukoil stated that profits had doubled y/y in January to September to RUB648bn ($8.6bn) after sales were up by 52% to RUB2.3 trillion ($39.6bn). The same month the board announced that it would pay a full 100% of cash flow as the 2021 dividend and launched a second $3bn share buyback programme. Unlike most big Russian companies, Lukoil’s importance to the EU economy means it has so far largely escaped the Western sanctions.

State-owned oil major Rosneft was also reporting high profits, although its bottom line was hurt after Germany appropriated some of its assets. Rosneft said its nine-month net income was RUB591bn ($9.4bn), down 15% from a record-high RUB696bn reported for the same period in 2021. That follows on from a spike of record profit in the first half of 2022 of RUB432bn ($7.2bn) despite the sanctions. Rosneft said it had successfully reorientated its exports to Asia. The fall in profits in the third quarter was largely due to the loss of its German assets and is nowhere as large as the 46% fall in oil and gas revenues seen by MinFin.

The story is the same at Gazprom Neft, the oil production arm of the state-owned gas behemoth Gazprom, which reported a four-fold increase in profits in 2022 last week to an all-time record RUB503.4bn ($6.7bn). Like Lukoil, sales were up by half y/y to RUB3.1 trillion, making it Russia’s fastest growing oil producer in terms of production.

Business is booming at all these leading oil producers. The price of Urals oil may have plunged in December, but the number of shipborne oil cargos leaving Russia has continued to unchanged suggesting that demand has not been affected. The strong profits of the companies does not tally with the collapse in revenues reported by MinFin unless the price of Urals is no longer a good indication of the profits that oil companies are making.

This might change in 2023, as Lukoil in particular is in talks to sell more its refineries in Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova, while the governments of these countries are switching away from Russia crude supplies, but in the meantime the leading Russian companies remains extremely profitable.

One of the side-effects of this was not just it provides a way for Russia to dodge sanctions, as sanctions key to the FOB price of Urals leaving Russia, but it also means the profits accumulate to the oil companies’ offshore trading arms inside the EU, not the government, which charges tax on the FOB Urals price at Primorsk.

Kremlin second tax manoeuvre

Russia earned a massive $227bn current account surplus in 2022 on paper – more than double the surplus of $120bn in 2021, itself an all-time record. However, it turns out that the Kremlin probably has little access to a lot of that money, as the cash is accumulated not in the Kremlin’s coffers as oil tax revenues, but in the oil companies’ offshore accounts. 

The government has already reacted by performing a second “tax manoeuvre”, more adjustments to the tax code to better tax Russia’s oil companies, says Macro Advisory’s Weafer and this work is likely to be ongoing.

In order to have a more realistic price of oil the Russian government is also currently talking about adopting the Dubai crude price as a better benchmark, or simply using Brent minus a discount as the benchmark.

The Kremlin maybe unable to tap the excess profits that oil companies are making – MinFin is currently in negotiations with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), the big business lobbying association, asking them to make a “voluntary” payment of RUB200bn ($2.6bn) – but the companies can largely offset the loses they have from selling cheap Urals crude on the open market with the outsized profits they make from selling oil products in the EU market to European customers.

The de facto transfer pricing refined oil business also creates large slush funds of privately owned cash outside Russia that can also be used to buy technology and other sanctioned goods to keep these companies in business. IIF’s Ribakova speculates that the Kremlin has a good idea of where and how much money is in these funds and has some, limited, control over them.

Vir: BNE Intellinews