To zombi idejo, da znižanje davkov na najvišje dohodke vpliva na povečanje investicij in zaposlenosti ter pospešitev gospodarske rasti, smo večkrat razkrinkali kot povsem neutemljeno in je bila v empiričnih študijah vedno zavrnjena. Glejte denimo “Ti nesrečni davki“. Se pa ta zombi ideja vedno znova vrača z vsakim novim valom neokonzervativcev – donedavno v ZDA s Trumpom in zdaj s Trussovo v V. Britaniji. Zato še enkrat kratek povzetek najbolj kredibilnih empiričnih študij, ki sistematično zavračajo to “trickle down” hipotezo.

V resnici velja ravno obratno: znižanje davkov ali povečanje transferjev tistim z najnižjimi dohodki pospeši gospodarsko rast (ker ti sloji praktično ves dodatni dohodek takoj potrošijo, kar dvigne agregatno povpraševanje, medtem ko premožnejši ta dodatni dohodek večinoma prihranijo, kar je iz narodnogospodarskega vidika večinoma neproduktivno*).

The empirical evidence is just not there for the ‘trickle -down theory or the Laffer curve. Analysis published in 2012 by the Congressional Research Service found that reductions in top tax rates were not correlated with economic growth  Instead they were much more associated with rising income inequality. A 2012 study by the Tax Justice Network indicates that wealth of the super-rich does not trickle down to improve the economy, but it instead tends to be amassed and sheltered in tax havens with a negative effect on the tax bases of the home economy.  A 2015 paper by researchers for the International Monetary Fund argued that there was no trickle-down effect as the rich get richer: “[I]f the income share of the top 20 percent (the rich) increases, then GDP growth actually declines over the medium term, suggesting that the benefits do not trickle down. In contrast, an increase in the income share of the bottom 20 percent (the poor) is associated with higher GDP growth.”

A 2019 study in the Journal of Political Economy found contrary to the claims of trickle-down theory that “the positive relationship between tax cuts and employment growth is largely driven by tax cuts for lower-income groups and that the effect of tax cuts for the top 10 percent on employment growth is small.”  Finally, a 2020 working paper by London School of Economics and Political Science researchers compared the results of countries that passed tax cuts in a specific year with those that did not, over a five decade period from 1965 to 2015 in the 18 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It found that contrary to the claims of trickle-down theory, tax cuts for the rich had no “significant effect on employment or economic growth”. They found no evidence that the cuts induced “labour supply responses” from high-income individuals (i.e. “lead to more hours of work, more effort, etc.“) that boosted economic activity. On the other hand, they did find evidence of a “sizable” increase in income inequality. “Major tax cuts for the rich increase the top 1% share of pre-tax national income in the years following the reform. The magnitude of the effect is sizeable; on average, each major reform leads to a rise in top 1% share of pre-tax national income of 0.8 percentage points.”  Indeed, it was under PM Liz Truss’ hero, Margaret Thatcher from 1979-90 that inequality of income rose the most as she cut personal and corporate taxes. 

Vir: Michael Roberts

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* V makroekonomiji sicer velja predpostavka, da so na agregatni ravni investicije enake varčevanju (I = S), vendar je zadeva bolj kompleksna, saj je treba upoštevati zasebne in državne “prihranke” ter uvožene prihranke prek tujega financiranja. Ta identiteta med I in S se vedno vzpostavi za nazaj (če zasebni sektor poveča prihranke, mora imeti država primanjkljaj, da uravnoteži I in S; in obratno).

Primer, ko bi povečanje prihrankov zaradi nižjih davkov lahko povečalo investicije je naslednji: premožnejši večje prihranke zaradi nižjih davkov usmerijo v kupovanje novoizdanih korporativnih obveznic ali delnic, s katerimi podjetja financirajo nove investicije. V Evropi ta povezava ne velja, ker se podjetja okrog 90-odstotno za investicije zadolžujejo pri bankah, v ZDA pa je tako globok finančni sektor z velikimi presežki likvidnosti, da se morebitni priliv povečanih prihrankov premožnejših (zaradi znižanja davkov) na finančni trg ne pozna v agregatnem obsegu finančnega sektorja in se ne prenese v dodatne nakupe novoizdanih korporativnih obveznic ali delnic za financiranje investicij.