To je seveda trenutno centralno vprašanje v EU. Pri čemer je treba na začetku povedati, da je to postalo umetno ustvarjen problem samo in izključno samo s strani EU. Rusija ni nikoli zagrozila, da bi zaprla plinsko pipico. Gazprom dobavlja plin dosledno v skladu s pogodbami. Rusija nima nobenega interesa zaustaviti dobave plina. Je pa Evropska komisija uvedla sankcije proti Rusiji in zagrozila, da bo ob popolnih sankcijah na uvoz ruske nafte (do konca letošnjega leta) srednjeročno povsem zaustavila tudi odjem ruskega plina. Zdaj pa taista Evropska komisija zganja histerijo, češ da Rusija izsiljuje evropske države s plinom. Kar je seveda perverzno početje, skregano z zdravo pametjo. Kar vam ga kot takšnega opiše vsak običajen človek, ki ga srečate na cesti.

Ampak pustimo to histerično perverzno obnašanje Evropske komisije in si ekonomske posledice hipotetičnega ruskega zaprtja plinske pipe zastavimo kot tehnično vprašanje. Se pravi, kakšni bodo učinki prenehanja dobav ruskega plina, ne glede na razloge za to. Pred meseci so z nekaj modeli to poskušali oceniti že nemški ekonomisti in zaradi uporabe napačnih modelskih orodij prišli do zanemarljivo nizkih negativnih učinkov. Problem modelskih orodij je bil, da temeljijo na predpostavki popolne mobilnosti in nadomestljivosti energetskih virov. Kar je nonsens ob zavedanju, (1) da je nadomestljivost plina z električno energijo v industriji ekstremno nizka (med 5% in 8%) in (2) da ruskega plina zaradi neobstoja zadovoljivih plinovodnih kapacitet proti jugu ter pomanjkanja prostih tankerskih kapacitet in terminalov utekočinjenega plina srednjeročno ni mogoče nadomestiti iz drugih virov. Zaradi tega bi se z zaustavitvijo dobav ruskega plina povsem zaustavila aktivnost večine podjetij v štirih panogah, nato pa bi zaradi pomanjkanja inputov iz teh panog prišlo do zaustavitve ali resnih težav v dobavah v preostanku industrije. Primer za Nemčijo:

Petr Cingr, the chief executive of Germany’s largest ammonia producing company, and a key supplier of fertilisers and exhaust fluids for diesel engines, warned of the devastating consequences of the ending of Russian gas supplies. “We have to stop [production] immediately,” he said, “from 100 to zero.” According to UBS analysts, no gas for the winter will result in a “deep recession” with GDP contracting 6 percent by the end of next year. Germany’s Bundesbank has warned that the effects on global supply chains of any Russian cut-off would increase the original shock effect by two and a half times. ThyssenKrupp, Germany’s largest steelmaker, has said that without natural gas to run its furnaces “shutdowns and technical damage to our facilities cannot be ruled out.

Nemški gospodarstveniki, ki so odvisni od ruskega plina, ter posledično nemški politiki seveda teh modelskih ocen niso mogli vzeti resno.

No, zdaj so se ocene tega potencialnega problema lotili ekonomisti IMF. Njihov pristop je nekoliko boljši, čeprav še vedno problematičen. V plus jim je treba šteti, da se zavedajo dejstva, da obstajajo infrastrukturne omejitve glede geografske nadomestljivosti dobav plina. Zato so primerjali učinke ob predpostavki tako “integriranega trga” (popolna nadomestljivost dobav ruskega plina) kot “fragmentranega trga” plina (ko zaradi infrastrukturnih razlogov plina preprosto ni na voljo, ne glede na to, kako močno poraste njegova cena). Naj omenim, da te predpostavke večina sodobnih ekonomskih modelov zaradi vgrajenih predpostavk popolne nadomestljivosti med produkcijskimi faktorji in med različnimi viri inputov ne more zajeti. Tovrstno predpostavko fragmentiranih trgov lahko potencialno zajame denimo t.i. Leontiefova tehnologija (fiksirana razmerja med produkcijskimi faktorji) ter input-output modeli, ki dodatno temeljijo na fiksiranih razmerjih inputov iz različnih panog.

Ocene ekonomistov IMF kažejo za primer predpostavke integriranega trga plina, da bi zaprtje ruske plinske pipe za celotno EU pomenilo upad BDP letos med 0.4% in 1.4% BDP. Seveda so te ocene zaradi brezpredmetne predpostavke popolne nadomestljivosti ruskega plina z drugimi viri povsem irelevantne. Ocene v primeru predpostavke fragmentiranega trga pa za celotno EU kažejo upad BDP za 1.7% do 2.6%. Najbolj prizadete države naj bi bile Madžarska, Češka, Slovaška, Italija, Nemčija in Avstrija. Slovenija je na osmem mestu po negativnem učinku – s predvidenim upadom BDP med 1.6% in 2.5%.

Te ocene temeljijo na oceni uradne izpostavljenosti države dobavam ruskega plina. Pri čemer pa ne upoštevajo, da so nekatere države lahko v boljšem ali slabšem položaju. Madžarska naj bi bila po teh ocenah najbolj ranljiva glede izpada dobav ruskega plina (upad BDP za do 6.5%). Vendar si je madžarski premier Orban s pametno politiko zagotovil dolgoročne dobave ruskega plina (po fiksnih cenah). Hkrati Madžarska ne dobiva ruskega plina preko Severnega toka 1, s čimer bo Madžarska bistveno manj prizadeta od Nemčije, če bi Rusija zaprla Severni tok 1.

Tega seveda ekonomski modeli “ne vedo”, zato so tovrstne ocene, ki ne upoštevajo teh specifičnih pogojev, irelevantne in zavajujoče.

Dodatno pa večina teh modelov (razen kadar imamo opravka z globalnim trgovinskim modelom) ne upošteva trgovinskih in kapitalskih povezav med državami. Denimo dejstva, da če bi zaprtje ruskega plina zaprlo gospodarsko dejavnost v ključnih štirih gospodarskih panogah v Nemčiji, bi se praktično zaustavila vsa nemška industrijska proizvodnja, s tem pa tudi povpraševanje po inputih iz drugh držav. Preprosto rečeno, zaprtje ruskega plina ne bi prizadelo samo Nemčije in Italije, pač pa tudi Slovenijo in ostale trgovinsko povezane države z njima.

Ocene ekonomistov IMF so zaradi tega bolj kot ne irelevantne. Prav tako kot napovedi ukrepov.

Using the integrated-market approach—as the market remains so—to estimate the direct impact to date suggests that it may have amounted to a 0.2 percent reduction for European Union economic activity in the first half of 2022.

When we consider a full Russian gas shutoff from mid-July, we focus on the impact relative to a baseline of no supply disruption this year. This simplifies the estimation and makes it comparable with other economic research.

We derive a broad range of estimates of impact over the next 12 months. Reflecting the unprecedented nature of a full Russian gas shut-off, the right modeling assumptions are highly uncertain and vary between countries.

If EU markets remain integrated both internally and with the rest of the world, our integrated-market approach suggests that the global LNG market would help buffer economic impacts. That is because reduced consumption is distributed across all countries connected to the global market. At the extreme, assuming no LNG support, the impact is magnified: soaring gas prices would have to work by depressing consumption only in the EU.

If physical constraints impede gas flows, the fragmented market approach suggests that the negative impact on economic output would be especially significant, as much as 6 percent for some countries in Central and Eastern Europe where the intensity of Russian gas use is high and alternative supplies are scarce, notably Hungary, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. Italy would also face significant impacts due to its high reliance on gas in electricity production.

The effects on Austria and Germany would be less severe but still significant, depending on the availability of alternative sources and the ability to lower household gas consumption. Economic impacts would be moderate, possibly under 1 percent, for other countries with sufficient access to international LNG markets.

Germany’s exposure

We dug deeper to understand the German outlook and policy options in the event of a full shutoff. Starting with the baseline outlook in our Article IV Consultation—which already embeds the existing partial shutoff—we extended the assessment through 2027 and incorporated additional demand-side impacts that stem from the uncertainty that households and firms face, and which reduce aggregate consumption and investment.

Our estimates suggest uncertainty channels would notably add to the economic impacts from a full shutoff. Impacts would peak next year, then fade as alternative gas supplies become available.

The rise in wholesale gas prices could also increase inflation significantly which we explicitly study in our work on Germany. Simulations also illustrate that voluntary consumer conservation could reduce economic losses by one-third, and a well-designed rationing plan, which for example lets downstream users and gas-intensive industries bear more of the shortages, could reduce them by up to three-fifths.

Easing consumption

Countries that already encourage households and businesses to save energy include Italy, where the government mandates minimum and maximum levels for heating and cooling. REPowerEU, the European Commission’s plan, also contains measures to conserve energy and reduce dependence on Russian fuels.

There is still a gap, however, between ambition and reality. Forthcoming IMF research shows that many countries have chosen policies which strongly limit how wholesale prices are passed on to consumers. A better alternative would be to allow greater passthrough to incentivize conservation while offering targeted compensation to households that can’t afford higher prices.

Addressing challenges

Our research shows that the economic fallout from a Russian gas shutoff can be partially mitigated. Beyond measures already taken, further action should focus on risk mitigation and crisis preparedness.

Governments must boost efforts to secure supplies from global LNG markets and alternative sources, continue to alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks to import and distribute gas, plan to share supplies in an emergency across the EU, act decisively to encourage energy savings while protecting vulnerable households, and prepare smart gas rationing programs.

This is a moment for Europe to build upon the decisive action and solidarity displayed during the pandemic to address the challenging moment it faces today.

Vir: Flanagan et al (2022), IMF