Evropska unija (EU) je sicer nastala kot gospodarska skupnost izvorne šesterice držav, pri čemer pa moč odločanja v njej seveda nikoli ni bila enakomerno porazdeljena. Trojica majhnih držav (Nizozemska, Belgija in Luksemburg) je v zameno za manjši vpliv simbolno dobila sedeže glavnih institucij unije. Od velikih treh se je Italija že od samega začetka samoomejila s perpetualno domačo politično nestabilnostjo, slabim upravljanjem in nezmožnostjo obvladovanja inflacije in brezposelnosti. Evropsko unijo sta tako – ne glede na to, ali je štela 6, 9, 15 ali 28 članic – dejansko od vsega začetka vedno vodili Nemčija in Francija. Vse ključne smernice in odločitve so vedno nastale na osi Bonn (Berlin) – Pariz. Nobena odločitev v EU ni mogla biti sprejeta, če ni bila zamišljena in potrjena v obeh največjih državah.

Vse do Maastrichske pogodbe, kot politične kupčije med nemškim kanclerjem Helmutom Kohlom in francoskim predsednikom Francoisom Mitterandom, v kateri je Francija v zameno za nemško željo po združitvi obeh Nemčij dobila željeno monetarno unijo. Toda, paradoksalno, s tem ko je Francija dobila tako močno željen “objekt svojih želja”, je njena moč znotraj EU začela pešati. Po eni strani zato, ker je novoustanovljena Evropska centralna banka (ECB), simbolno s sedežem v Nemčiji, postala klon nemške Bundesbanke glede monetarne politike. Po drugi strani pa zato, ker je nepopolna monetarna unija (brez transferne in fiskalne unije) predvidljivo prek nujnega ustvarjanja trgovinskih neravnotežij pripeljala v najresnejšo krizo v Evropi po drugi svetovni vojni, ki pa ji je lahko parirala le Nemčija. Od leta 2009 je tempo politik EU dajala le Nemčija. EU se je spremenila v unijo zgolj z enim krmarjem. Navzven je to sicer izgledalo, kot da menjujoči se francoski predsedniki (od Sarkozyja, Hollanda do Macrona) niso mogli parirati elokventnosti nemške kanclerke Merklove, dejansko pa je do politične podreditve prišlo zaradi nemške gospodarske dominacije po začetku krize in francoske gospodarske šibkosti zaradi evra.

Vendar Nemčija te svoje dominantne vloge v zadnjem desetletju ni dobro odigrala. S prisilno implementacijo asketskih politik po lastnem vzoru – ki so morda zgodovinsko bile dobre za Nemčijo kot individualnega igralca, nikakor pa ne morejo delovati na ravni celotne unije (če vsi varčujejo, nihče ne more rasti) – je Nemčija celotno unijo zapeljala ne samo v dolgo gospodarsko stagnacijo ter razvojno in tehnološko zaostajanje za ZDA in Kitajsko, pač pa tudi na rob političnega razpada.

Evropska monetarna unija (in s tem najbrž celotna EU) bi razpadla, če novembra 2011 Mario Draghi po srečnem spletu okoliščin ne bi postal predsednik ECB. Draghi, oborožen z doktoratom na MIT in predhodnim mandatom guvernerja italjanske centralne banke, je razumel makroekonomske implikacije prisilnega fiskalnega stiskanja v času Velike recesije ter kaj to pomeni za Italijo, Francijo in druge EU države. Draghi je z izjavo “whatever it takes” (julij 2012) najprej zaustavil špekulacije finančnih trgov proti šibkim EU državam, nato pa – ker gospodarski stagnaciji ob fiskalnem stiskanju ni bilo videti konca – septembra 2014 napovedal program odkupovanja državnih obveznic (začetek delovanja marca 2015). S tem programom, v katerem je ECB do začetka pandemije odkupila za več kot 2,600 milijard evrov državnih obveznic, je Draghi povzročil predvsem znižanje zahtevanih donosov in omogočil znosno refinanciranje proračunov Italiji, Franciji in perifernim evrskim državam.

Draghi je rešil EU iz nemške fiskalno-monetarne mišolovke, imenovane evrska monetarna unija. Ironično je le, da je Draghi to naredil z monetarno politiko, ki je bila nemška domena v EU. In še huje, da je to naredil tako, da je spervertiral monetarno politiko oziroma z bogoskrunskim monetarnim financiranjem fiskalne politike (sicer posrednim, ampak to je le izgovor za varuhe formalnega prava).

No, in v tej točki, septembra 2014 oziroma formalno marca 2015, se začne erozija nemške dominance v EU. V trenutku, ko je Angela Merkel “povozila” nasprotovanje Jensa Weidmanna, ki ga je pred tem iz svojega kabineta imenovala za predsednika Bundesbanke, se je nemška prevlada v EU začela sesuvati. Weidmann je ves čas nasprotoval nekoncencionalnim ukrepom ECB, jih želel čimprej ukiniti (pri čemer je rad igral skupno melodijo z nemškimi tabloidi ter nacionalistično AfD), vendar neuspešno zaradi blagoslova ukrepov s strani Merklove. Imenovanje Christine Lagarde, seveda s soglasjem Merklove, za naslednico Maria Draghija na čelu ECB (novembra 2019) je zacementiralo erozijo nemške dominance v EU. Weidmann, ki se je nadejal te funkcije, je zato še pred zaključkom svojega drugega mandata na čelu Bundesbanke odstopil.

In Nemčija se je očitno s tem sprijaznila. Tako je mogoče interpretirati nedavno imenovanje Joachima Nagla za novega predsednika Bundesbanke s strani nove nemške vlade pod vodstvom Olafa Scholza. Nagel je sicer dolgoletni član vladajoče SPD, vendar v prvi vrsti ekonomist ki se je kalil na različnih pozicijah, precej let tudi v Bundesbanki, pred in v času Weidmanna. Če kaj, Nagla od Weidmanna razlikuje to, da ni monetarni jastreb in da se zavzema koordiniran pristop k ekonomskim politikam (to sledi tudi iz njegove doktorske disertacije). Ima dokaj zmerno stališče do ukrepov ECB. Hkrati pa ima, kar je velika prednost, zelo pozitivno stališče do ukrepanja proti podnebnim spremembam. To je lahko zelo pomembno v naslednjih, če bo Lagardeova vztrajala pri “zeleni” monetarni politiki – torej da bi ECB s posebnim programom odkupovala “zelene obveznice” evrskih držav in s tem financirala vladne ukrepe za zeleni prehod. Seveda slednji ukrepi pomenijo nadaljevanje bogoskrunske zlorabe (nekonvencionalne) monetarne politike v korist financiranja fiskalnih ukrepov v imenu “višjih ciljev”.

Ključno vprašanje, kot se sprašuje zgodovinar Adam Tooze, je, ali lahko Weidmannov naslednik Nagel v javnosti organizira bolj elegantno “prilagoditev” novi in zmanjšani vlogi Bundesbanke v Evrosistemu? Bo Naglova funkcija, da zgolj “bolj prijazno” v nemški javnosti interpretira ukrepe ECB? Če bo, bo odstranil glavni vir napetosti v evropski politiki in znatno prispeval k trdnosti skupne evropske valute. Bo torej Nagel tisti nemški centralni bankir, ki bo nemško politiko uskladil z de facto umikom Bundesbanke z najvišje ravni globalne monetarne politike v njeno današnjo vlogo podrejenega akterja v Evrosistemu?

In če se je Nemčija z imenovanjem Nagla na čelo Bundesbanke simbolno res umaknila iz vrha evrske monetarne politike in ko se je hkrati po 16 letih obvladovanja nemške politike poslovila kanclerka Angela Merkel, sledi seveda ključno vprašanje, kakšna bo nova hierarhija moči v EU. O tem pa več v drugem delu.

Spodaj je nekaj odlomkov iz odlične analize Adama Toozea, ki omogoča razumevanje monetarnega in zgodovinskega konteksta evropske integracije. Zelo vredno branja.

There can be little doubt that what Olaf Scholz will be looking for in a Bundesbank boss, is not a conservative tribune of the Weidmann type, but someone who can continue to close the gap between German confidence in their national institutions and the authority of the ECB.

Schnabel was performing that role to a high degree at the ECB. Moving her to the Bundesbank would have been a demotion and would have posed the question of how to find an adequate replacement at the ECB. Joachim Nagel may be the man for the job.

The bios of Nagel rehearse the same lines, but in some sense miss the obvious. He’s a West German success story.

Nagel was born 1966 in Karlsruhe and, strikingly, he also chose to study there. The Karlsruhe TH is a renowned institution, but for Germany at the time this was an unusually conservative choice. There is little I can find on Nagel’s family background, but constrained family circumstances would be one explanation.

In the early 1990s, he won a coveted gig as an assistant and reseacher (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the University.

In March-October 1994 during Rudolf Scharping’s failed bid to unseat Helmut Kohl, Nagel took time out to join the SPD economics team. The party at the time was rocked by bitter arguments between left and right wings.

Nagel chose not to stay in politics. Instead, in 1997 at the ripe age of 31 he took his PhD from Karlsruhe with a PhD on the supply-sideconomic policy of Ronald Reagan.

Having skimmed the PhD two things stand out. It is not a highly technical exercise, more a narrative treatment of the 1980s economic policy scene in the US. He concludes that the Reagan administration was not successful in dramatically lowering marginal tax rates (state-level increase offset federal cuts). But, rather than rejecting supply side measures outright, in conclusion Nagel pleads for a reconciliation between demand-side macroeconomic policy and supply-side policy. Above all he calls for a coordination of policy.

After this rather undistinguished start, in 1998 he headed to Washington DC to do a year of research. Again this was enabled by local support, in this case the SEW-Eurodrive Stiftung, a Baden-Württemberg corporate foundation.

Nagel’s career began to accelerate when he returned to join the Bundesbank in 1998. Nagel spent his first few years at the Hanover Regional Office before transferring to the Bundesbank’s Central Office in Frankfurt am Main in 2003.

At the Bundesbank Nagel was a protege of Hans-Helmut Kotz, also of the SPD.

In 2008 he was appointed Director General Markets. (Some timing, AT)

In December 2010, at the precocious age of 44, with the backing of Kotz, Nagel was promoted to the Bundesbank’s Executive Board, where his responsibilities encompassed the Directorates General Markets and Information Technology. This is a big career leap. He replaced the right-wing SPD man Thilo Sarrazin, who will later become notorious for his views on immigration.

In this role Nagel represented the Bundesbank in international negotiations and until the end of April 2016 headed the bank’s crisis-management team.

In the BIS database of central bank speeches, Nagel has a limited presence. He Speaks most often about renminbi internationalization and seems to have been focused above all on markets.

In 2013 Nagel gave a joint interview with Benoit Coueré which suggests that he kept his cool during the taper tantrum. He does not come across as heady like Coueré, but he holds his own.

“Question: Some people argue that the ECB should not worry about risks and losses because central banks can operate with negative capital.

Nagel: There is a general understanding that central banks can function with negative capital. But the Bundesbank believes that this would be a dire signal.

Cœuré: This is exactly the right answer. Technically and legally it would be possible for the ECB to run with negative capital, but it would undermine the confidence in the ECB and the trust in the euro and therefore it should not happen.”

Nagel is widely seen as an “ordoliberal”, whatever that means. In German media that may just be code for “he is one of us”.

In 2015, as the FT reports, he gave an interview to the Börsenzeitung in which he expressed reservations about Draghi’s new QE program.

Shortly after the ECB started its quantitative easing policy of buying vast amounts of government bonds in 2015, Nagel warned in an interview with German newspaper, Börsen-Zeitung, of the “key danger” of an “intermingling of monetary policy and fiscal policy”. Echoing concerns often expressed by Weidmann during his decade at the helm of the Bundesbank, Nagel said: “There is a risk that the budgetary consolidation required in some euro countries will be put on the backburner”, which he said “could then increase political pressure on the ECB council to postpone an interest rate hike that is necessary from a monetary policy point of view”.

At his farewell from the Bundesbank in 2016, Weidmann stressed Nagel’s

“decisiveness, ability to communicate, detailed knowledge of the financial markets and analytical skills. He also reminded the audience of Nagel’s key role in bringing a renminbi clearing hub to Frankfurt am Main.”

Why did Nagel leave the Bundesbank in 2016?

According to German sources it was down to politics. In 2014 the SPD wanted Nagel to get the deputy position at the Bundesbank, but they were in a weak position. The CDU preferred Claudia Buch. Realizing that the wind was not blowing in his favor Nagel jumped.

Clearly, the idea of the Bundesbank as an independent institution does not mean that party cards do not play a major role in top careers!

After leaving the Bundesbank in 2016, Nagel joined the executive board of KfW, the German state-owned development and investment bank.

At the KfW 2017-2020, he was responsible for promoting developing and emerging countries. At the same time he was chairman of the supervisory board of KfW Ipex-Bank.

“Here comes the less pleasant episode.” According to one muckraking website:

“As part of a banking consortium, KfW Ipex-Bank granted the payment service provider Wirecard a loan of more than 100 million euros in September 2018 and extended it in mid-2019. At this point in time, however, the problems at Wirecard were no longer a secret. The lending falls during Nagel’s tenure as chairman of the bank’s board of directors. Wirecard went bankrupt in 2020. At Ipex-Bank, searches of the police and the public prosecutor’s office took place in the same year because of the initial suspicion of infidelity. Ipex-Bank ended up having to write off 90 percent of the money. Now it will become clear to what extent his mandate at KfW could be dangerous for Nagel if he soon took on a top position at the Bundesbank.”

Not recognizing the risk posed by Wirecard is a failure that Scholz and his team have in common.

At the KFW, Nagel found himself in a leadership position in one of key, public promotional banks, which is widely cited as a model for climate finance. To judge by his KfW web-presentation, Nagel may be greener than Weidmann.

“Many young people in particular are demanding greater climate action today; they do not think the measures taken against global warming to date have been adequate. What would you say to them? Where do we stand four years after the passage of the Paris Agreement?

Dr Joachim Nagel: The international climate agreement is still intact, despite scepticism in some capital cities, particularly in Washington. What’s more: we are seeing a growing commitment to climate change mitigation in all areas of the world, for example in countries like Costa Rica, Colombia, Morocco or Ethiopia, all countries that have set ambitious climate goals. The issue is currently experiencing welcome momentum. Still, we need to accelerate our efforts considerably. We ultimately need to sustainably change the global economy. We cannot and must not leave the brunt of climate change mitigation to the next generation.

Does this acceleration also apply to KfW?

Nagel: Definitely. We will further expand our commitment domestically and abroad.”

All in all everything suggests that this non-dogmatic, SPD-aligned veteran of 2008 will play nicely with Lagarde and his European colleagues.

It was telling that the FT wrapped up its report with a quote from Karsten Junius, chief economist at Bank J Safra Sarasin.

He said he hoped Nagel’s appointment would allow the Bundesbank “to criticise the monetary policy of the ECB less from the edge, but rather help shape it and explain it better in Germany”.

Likewise in Politico:

“He would signal a degree of Bundesbank continuity, coupled with market and international experience,” said Berenberg economist Holger Schmieding. “He could turn into a bridge between the ECB and the German public, shaping ECB decisions while helping to explain them to the German public.”

This is, indeed, what the Scholz administration and Europe need from the Bundesbank, a post-heroic accommodation with the dramatic change and a willingness to put Germany’s weight behind the irreversible project of monetary (and eventually financial) unification.

Vir: Adam Tooze