Letos je minilo dvajset let od kitajskega vstopa v Svetovno trgovinsko organizacijo (WTO) in 8 let, odkar so empirične študije začele odkrivati negativne učinke povečane kitajske konkurence na posamezne regije v razvitih državah. O tem sem na blogu veliko pisal in se ne bom ponavljal. Omenim naj le, da se v trgovinskih modelih učinki selitve proizvodnje v Kitajsko in povečana uvozna konkurenca iz Kitajske kažejo kot v agregatu pozitivni učinki. To pa predvsem zato, ker modeli visoko vrednotijo pozitivne učinke na potrošnike zaradi nižjih uvoznih cen ter podobno na podjetja zaradi nižjih cen inputov, hkrati pa modeli večinoma izpuščajo učinke na zaposlenost (predvidevajo takojšnjo prilgoditev na trgu dela, kjer tisti, ki izgubijo službe, takoj najdejo druge). Pri tem pa ne upoštevajo, da tisti, ki so izgubili relativno dobro plačane službe denimo v industriji kasneje večinoma pristanejo v slabše plačanih storitvenih dejavnostih, kjer so na minimalni plači ali opravljajo 2 do 3 službe, da lahko preživijo družine. Trgovinski modeli pa seveda povsem izpustijo druge negativne učinke kitajskega šoka, kot so trajna depresija celih regij, strukturna brezposlenost, povečan alkoholizem, uporaba drog, povečana smrtnost, manjša rodnost, izseljevanje, manjša inovativnost in poslovna dinamika itd. Seveda so pridobile mnoge dejavnosti in predvsem tisti z višjo izobrazbo v drugih regijah, zaradi česar pravimo, da so trgovinski učinki neenakomerno porazdeljeni, toda učinki na najbolj izpostavljene regije lahko ostanejo trajni.

Prav zaradi slednjega so bile tako dobrodošle študije Davida Autorja, Davida Dorna in Gordona Hansona, ki so od leta 2013 naprej sistematično empirično raziskovali učinke, ki jih trgovinski modeli ne zaznavajo. Autor, Dorn & Hansen (2021) so pred kratkim objavili zadnjo raziskavo v seriji, kjer analizirajo, kako trajni so ti globalizacijski učinki kitajskega šoka (v ZDA). Ugotavljajo, da je sicer kitajski šok dosegel svoj vrh leta 2011, vendar pa se od takrat negativni učinki niso zmanjšali, pač pa ostajajo na isti ravni. Drugače rečeno, kitajski šok je ostal trajen.

Spodaj je daljši povzetek raziskave. Naj omenim le tri. Prvič, v celotnem obdobju po letu 2001 je kitajski šok odgovoren za dobro polovico zmanjšanja deleža industrije v skupni zaposlenosti, pri čemer pa se je skoraj 90% tega zmanjšanja prelilo v trajno povečano brezposelnost. Drugič, negativni trgovinski šok ni povečal izseljevanja, razen za tuje delavce in za mlade v starosti med 25 in 39 let, kar pomeni, da se izseljujejo predvsem mlajši, ostali del prebivalstva pa ostane trajno prizadet s šokom, s tem pa tudi razvojne perspektive celotne prizadete regije. In tretjič, tudi če uporabimo najvišje modelske ocene potrošniških koristi naraščajoče trgovine s Kitajsko, je precejšen del regij utrpel tudi absolutni upad povprečnih realnih dohodkov kot posledice kitajskega šoka.

Ključno vprašanje ob teh ugotovitvah je seveda, kako odgovoriti na te negativne učinke. Standardni odgovor mainstream (neoliberalne) ekonomske doktrine bi seveda bil, da nič, kajti trgi bodo že sami poskrbeli za uravnoteženje teh učinkov. Seveda pa, tudi če so agregatni učinki nevtralni, njihova porazdelitev ni in nekatere regije ostanejo trajno prizadete, zato ima neukrepanje ob teh učinkih lahko ob ekonomskih in socialnih učinkih tudi politične. Kot so pokazali Autor, Dorn & Hanson (2016) v raziskavi o “uvozu populizma” je negativni kitajski šok pripomogel k izvolitvi Trumpa za predsednika leta 2016, saj so v treh zveznih državah prizadete regije s kitajskim šokom vplivale na skupno zmago Trumpa.

Če torej mainstream ekonomija ne vidi potrebe po ukrepanju, to izkoristijo populisti. No, in populisti odgovorijo s protekcionizmom. Trgovinske vojne pa niso primeren odgovor, saj ne pripomorejo niti k porastu agregatnih učinkov niti k dvigu prizadetih regij. Edini primeren odgovor na neenakomerne učinke ktajskega šoka so ciljane politike za prizadete regije, kot so aktivne politike zaposlovanja, socialne pomoči ter politike, ki spodbujajo investicije in zaposlovanje v prizadetih regijah.

We evaluate the duration of the China trade shock and its impact on a wide range of outcomes over the period 2000 to 2019. The shock plateaued in 2010, enabling analysis of its effects for nearly a decade past its culmination. Adverse impacts of import competition on manufacturing employment, overall employment-population ratios, and income per capita in more trade-exposed U.S. commuting zones are present out to 2019. Over the full study period, greater import competition implies a reduction in the manufacturing employment-population ratio of 1.54 percentage points, which is 55% of the observed change in the value, and the absorption of 86% of this net job loss via a corresponding decrease in the overall employment rate. Reductions in population headcounts, which indicate net out-migration, register only for foreign-born workers and the native-born 25-39 years old, implying that exit from work is a primary means of adjustment to trade-induced contractions in labor demand. More negatively affected regions see modest increases in the uptake of government transfers, but these transfers primarily take the form of Social Security and Medicare benefits. Adverse outcomes are more acute in regions that initially had fewer college-educated workers and were more industrially specialized. Impacts are qualitatively—but not quantitatively—similar to those caused by the decline of employment in coal production since the 1980s, indicating that the China trade shock holds lessons for other episodes of localized job loss. Import competition from China induced changes in income per capita across local labor markets that are much larger than the spatial heterogeneity of income effects predicted by standard quantitative trade models. Even using higher-end estimates of the consumer benefits of rising trade with China, a substantial fraction of commuting zones appears to have suffered absolute declines in average real incomes.

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Few economists would interpret our empirical results as justifying greater trade protection. As expected, quantitative models indicate that U.S. aggregate gains from trade with China are positive. Yet, the fact that the losses from trade are regionally concentrated and long lasting suggests that existing policies failed to insulate workers from the disruptive impacts of globalization. We close the paper by discussing what we know, and do not know, about policies that help shield workers from concentrated job loss.

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The favored solution of populist politicians to regional distress is to raise import barriers and block immigration. Indeed, the Donald J. Trump Administration cited the adverse impacts of the China trade shock to justify taking aggressive trade action against China (Redding, 2020). The subsequent U.S. China trade war succeeded in elevating U.S. product prices (Amiti et al., 2019; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020; Cavallo et al., 2021) but not in expanding employment in importprotected sectors (Flaaen and Pierce, 2019). We are aware of no research that would justify ex-post protectionist trade measures as a means of helping workers hurt by past import competition. Recent literature suggests that fostering employment growth in regions beset by chronic joblessness may help workers hurt by persistent negative local labor demand shocks.54 Austin et al. (2016) find that employment impacts of labor demand shocks are larger in local markets in which joblessness was initially high. Bartik (2020) argues further that job growth in distressed regions is especially beneficial for low-wage workers. Absent success in helping regions left behind by globalization, one may expect continued popular support for political platforms that disparage foreign trade, despite the apparent inefficacy of these platforms to date. Because of the distinctiveness of the China trade shock—in terms of its enduring magnitude and concentration in place and time—some see it as holding few lessons for policymakers. Such characterizations are mistaken. Large, localized contractions in labor demand—e.g., trade and technology shocks to autos and steel in the 1970s, price shocks to coal in the 1980s, and ongoing automation and roboticization—are unfortunately common events. The global economy is now witnessing another round of localized shocks, arising from the energy transition. If economies succeed in sharply reducing reliance on fossil fuels, demand will plummet for the workers who mine coal, drill for oil and gas, refine petroleum, and transport and distribute these outputs (Chen et al., 2021). Industries that are energy intensive in production, and that located their operations close to carbon-based energy sources, may also experience significant disruptions. Although increased demand for renewable energy will surely create new jobs in harnessing solar, wind, and hydro power, these jobs may be located far from existing carbon-based production facilities. New energy intensive industries, such as data centers, may choose to locate near renewable energy providers, possibly further disadvantaging those working in the carbon-based economy. We are now armed with knowledge both of the consequences of localized job loss and the likely location of future worker displacement. This should enable policymakers to prepare for assisting workers, as carbon-based jobs disappear, and regions, as they reorient toward less carbon-intensive activities. Without such preparation, the energy transition may add to the painful history of regionalized job loss.

Vir: Autor, Dorn & Hansen (2021)