Pred časom sem navajal statistike, ki kažejo jasno geopolitično ločnico v Evropi glede cepljenosti: zahodno od nekdanje železne zavese je precepljenost višja, vzhodno od nje pa občutno nižja. Podobno se kaže tudi znotraj Nemčije, kjer je zahodni del Nemčije bistveno bolje precepljen od vzhodnih dežel, ki so spadale v nekdanjo Demokratično republiko Nemčijo. Glede na jasen geopolitični vzorec je očitno, da morajo te razlike glede odnosa do cepljenja imeti svoje korenine v različnih družbenopolitičnih sistemih, iz katerih zgodovinsko izhajajo te države. Zahodne evropske države imajo dolgo demokratično tradicijo, medtem ko so bile vzhodnoevropske države vsaj 45 let v objemu bolj ali manj avtoritarnih socialističnih (ali celo komunističnih) režimov.

Nekako smo špekulirali, da bi morala ta averzija do cepljenja proti Covid v nekdanjih socialističnih državah biti povezana s povečanim nezaupanjem v državo in institucije zaradi predhodne dolgotrajne kolektivne izkušnje z avtoritarno represijo, vendar neke kredibilne razlage nismo imeli. No, pred nekaj dnevi sta Ghodsee & Orenstein (oba iz University of Pennsylvania) v Project Syndicate predstavila možno razlago tega fenomena. Ghodsee & Orenstein pa, zanimivo, pravita, da visoka stopnja skepticizma glede cepiv ne odraža nujno dolgotrajnih učinkov več desetletij dolge komunistične vladavine, temveč da je ta skepsa posledica erozije javnega zaupanja zaradi travmatične izkušnje z več desetletij dolgimi negativnimi družbenimi posledicami propada komunistične vladavine. Številne države v regiji naj še ne bi obrnile trenda globoke erozije javnega zaupanja, ki se je začela po letu 1989.

Ghodsee & Orenstein na osnovi ankete o vrednotah (ki jih je pripravljala EBRD) trdita, da je bilo izmerjeno javno zaupanje (v državo in njene institucije) v času komunizma bistveno večje, kot v desetletjih po prehodu v demokracijo in tržno gospodarstvo. Njuna razlaga je, da so nekatere države utrpele močne travme zaradi dolgih tranzicijskih obdobij, v katerih so ljudje izgubili službe, blaginjo in socialno varnost. V državah, kjer je bila tranzicijska luknja globlja in daljša, je bila erozija javnega zaupanja bistveno večja. Glejte spodaj nekaj ključnih odstavkov iz njunega komentarja.

To je vsekakor zanimiva teza, ki kaže na to, da so ljudje, ki so v času komunizma hlepeli po demokraciji in tržnem gospodarstvu, bili razočarani po tem, ko so prišli v “obljubljeno deželo” kapitalizma. Če so imeli prej zagotovljene službe in stanovanja (kakorkoli so bili standardi obeh mizerni v primerjavi z zahodnimi) in če so imeli zagotovljeno socialno varnost in bili vsi enaki med seboj, so to po prehodu v kapitalizem izgubili. Po prvem tranzicijskem šoku, ko je velik del prebivalstva izgubil službe, so ljudje izgubili ne samo socialno varnost, pač pa predvsem gotovost in občutek stabilnosti in varnosti, česar pa jim niso odtehtale na novo pridobljene demokratične pravice. Razočaranje nad realizmom kapitalizma je bilo večje od pridobljene pravice ljudi, da lahko demokratično volijo (pri čemer se je slednje kmalu sfižilo v spoznanje “vsi so isti”).

Čeprav mi je ta teza Ghodseejeve in Orensteina zanimiva, pa še nisem povsem prepričan, ali ta razlaga s post-komunistično travmatično izkušnjo s kapitalizmom in demokracijo lahko povsem pojasni ta odpor do cepljenja. Res je tudi, da se podoben učinek kaže tudi v ZDA v regijah, ki jih je močno prizadela globalizacija. Tudi v teh travmatiziranih regijah se kaže tendenca, da ljudje volijo bolj ekstremno (populiste), da so bolj dovzetni za lažne novice in alternativne resnice ter da so se manj pripravljeni cepiti. Vsekakor moram to še malce “prebaviti” in premisliti tudi na podlagi drugih vzorcev, ki se kažejo.

What is wrong with Eastern Europe? In a word: disinformation. The region is awash in it, a legacy of the breakdown of public trust in governmental institutions after communism. Feverish conspiracy theories have gripped these countries like the coronavirus’s shadow. A

Ukrainian doctor recently summed up the situation in her country: “Fake stories have spread widely, making people believe in microchips and genetic mutations … Some Orthodox priests have openly and aggressively urged people not to get vaccinated, and social networks have been filled with the most absurd rumors. Ukrainians have learned to distrust any authorities’ initiatives, and vaccination isn’t an [exception].”

…

The low level of public trust that distinguishes Eastern Europe is a legacy of the collapse of communism, the deep transitional recessions in many countries, and the failure of post-communist governments to mitigate the effects. While a much-shared Reuters article reports the opinion of unnamed “experts” who blame “decades of Communist rule that eroded public trust in state institutions,” public trust was actually much higher under communism.

In the course of writing our recent book, Taking Stock of Shock: Social Consequences of the 1989 Revolutions, we explored Eastern Europeans’ lack of public trust using data from the World Values Survey and the Life in Transition Survey produced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

With few exceptions, the World Values Survey shows a steady decline in the former communist countries in the percentage of people who agree with the statement that “Most people can be trusted.” This decline was more pronounced in countries that suffered a deeper post-communist recession, and it did not reverse when economic growth finally returned. Instead, public trust continued to slide. In Bulgaria, between 1995 and 1998, some of the worst years of the transition recession, 23.7% of respondents had faith in their fellow citizens, compared to only 17.1% in 2017-20. In Romania, social trust fell from 17.9% to 12.1% in the same period.

Even in the relatively successful cases of Poland and the Czech Republic, for which the World Values Survey has more complete data, trust fell during the post-communist transition. In 1989-92, 31.3% of Poles and 30.2% of Czechs believed that most people could be trusted. In 2017-20, that share was significantly lower – just 24.1% and 21.1%, respectively. Revealingly, while social trust declined across Eastern Europe between 1991 and 2007, it increased in Western Europe.

The EBRD launched its massive Life in Transition Survey in 2006 using 1,000 face-to-face interviews in each of the 28 post-communist countries. It found that whereas two-thirds of respondents believed that, before 1989, most people could be trusted, only about a third agreed that most people could be trusted 17 years later. This result was consistent across all regions and countries, with majorities of respondents in all age groups and income categories agreeing that people were generally “more trustworthy” under communism.

Not surprisingly, disappointment with the results of transition also drove down average trust in public institutions (including government, parliament, courts, army, and police) across the post-communist region from the 1990s through the 2010s. From 1990 to 2013, trust in political institutions in Central and Eastern Europe fell by half.

Reflecting on these data, Erik Berglöf, the EBRD’s chief economist at the time, concluded, “It is important to keep in mind that the damage done during the hard times, not only to material well-being but also to general levels of trust and subjective well-being, should not be underestimated.”

In fact, the survey data highlight a little-known fact: the post-communist recessions were the worst in modern history, far worse than the Great Depression. But not all countries suffered equally. While some, particularly the Central European countries, recovered relatively quickly and progressed toward EU norms, many others suffered unimaginable losses. The average post-communist country returned to pre-1989 levels of economic output only after 17 years, nurturing a deep legacy of distrust and a sense of abandonment in countries that, under communism, fostered a culture of mutual assistance against the state.

Eastern Europe’s experience with the pandemic shows that many countries have not yet reversed the profound erosion of public trust that began after 1989. Well before the crisis erupted, these countries had become fertile ground for disinformation campaigns – often of Russian origin – that seek to turn public opinion against the EU, against the West, and against successful experts in their own countries. The region’s high degree of vaccine skepticism and surging death rates are a visible result – one that reflects not decades of communist rule, but rather the decades-long social consequences of its collapse.

Vir: Ghodsee & Orenstein, Project Syndicate