V zadnjih štirih desetletjih se je tržna koncentracija v razvitih državah, predvsem pa v ZDA, močno povečala. Študije kažejo, da so se tem času marže (dobički) velikih podjetij povečale za več kot 30%. Podobno ugotavljamo tudi mi v lani objavljeni raziskavi tudi za Slovenijo, kjer so se marže po letu 1995 povečale za okrog 15%. Problem porasta tržne koncentracije (=prevlade nekaj velikih podjetij) je večplasten. Ob izrivanju manjših konkurentov (strateški nakupi inovativnih podjetij z namenom pridobitve pravic do potencialno disruptivne inovacije ali zaprtja potencialnega nišnega konkurenta), gre za diktiranje cen, lobistične aktivnosti in regulatorni state capture, za oligopolne protikonkurenčne dogovore, za zlorabo tržne moči nasproti zaposlenim in diktiranje plačne dinamike in pogojev zaposlitve (problem monopsona na trgu dela) itd.

No, zadnja raziskava ekonomistov MDS (Duval, Furceri & Tavares, 2021) pa osvetljuje še eno dodatno problematično komponento povečane tržne koncentracije, in  sicer da je tržna koncentracija škodljiva za učinkovitost monetarne politike, saj velika podjetja manj reagirajo na njene spremembe. Velika podjetja se namreč večinoma ne zadolžujejo na bančnem trgu, pač pa zaradi povečanja marž in dobičkov kopičijo velike zadržane dobičke,s katerimi lahko financirajo večino potrebnih investicij. To posledično pomeni, da so velika oligopolna podjetja manj občutljiva na spremembe politik centralne banke (predvsem obrestne mere). To pomeni, da lahko prekomerna tržna moč ovira sposobnost centralnih bank, da spodbujajo gospodarsko aktivnost med recesijo in jo ohladijo med širitvami. Če je denarna politika zaradi povečane tržne koncentracije manj močna, bodo morale centralne banke biti bolj agresivne pri sproščanju obrestnih mer in likvidnosti, da bi dosegle željeni cilj v boju proti recesiji. In obratno, v primeru porasta inflacijskih pritiskov bodo ob povečani tržni koncentraciji morale centralne banke močneje zaostrovati denarno politiko, kot bi to veljalo za bolj konkurenčno gospodarstvo. To pa bi lahko ogrozilo kasnejše okrevanje.

Vse to pa seveda zahteva bolj aktivno politiko konkurence, omejevanje združevanja velikih podjetij in preprečevanje zlorabe tržne prevlade, predvsem na področju tehnoloških podjetij in digitalnega gospodarstva. Izvršni ukaz ameriškega predsednika Josepha Bidena o vladnih ukrepih za omejevanje protikonkurenčnih praks v številnih sektorjih (od živilske industrije do tehnološke panoge) je ukrep, ki gre natanko v to smer.

Our study finds that firms with greater market power respond less to monetary policy actions, possibly because of their bigger profits. Larger profits make these firms less sensitive to changes in external financing conditions, such as those triggered by central banks’ decisions. For example, as of March 2021, Apple had over $200 billion in cash and investment in marketable securities, while Alphabet had over $150 billion. Firms with such large cash cushions can decide on investment and other projects without having to worry about how easily they could tap other funding sources. In contrast, firms that face greater credit constraints, such as young, low-markup firms, are much more responsive to monetary policy actions than older, larger, higher-markup corporations. It could also be that firms with greater market power rely less on funding sources whose conditions respond swiftly to monetary policy actions, such as bank credit.

Specifically, using data for the United States and a panel of 14 advanced economies, we find that high-markup firms respond a lot less to a monetary policy shock—an unexpected change in the policy rate—than the average firm in the economy. For example, in the US, a 100 basis point increase in the policy rate causes a low-markup firm to cut sales by about 2 percent after four quarters, while a high-markup firm barely reduces its sales. Results for the panel of advanced countries are qualitatively similar.

On top of being generally harmful to business dynamism and growth, excessive market power can also hamper central banks’ ability to stimulate economic activity during recessions, and to cool it down during expansions. In principle, if monetary policy is less powerful, central banks could just use more of it—by easing more aggressively to fight a recession, for example; however, this approach may not be fully successful in advanced economies when so many central banks are constrained by the effective lower bound on interest rates, and also face (actual or perceived) limits to quantitative easing—such as financial stability concerns from very large and persistent asset purchases. Conversely, greater market power implies that, should inflationary pressures become persistent, central banks may need to tighten monetary policy more aggressively than would be the case in a more competitive economy, all else equal. Lower-markup firms and more competitive industries would be hit disproportionately. More broadly, aggressive tightening might put the recovery at risk. One silver lining is that market power may dampen the passthrough from higher input costs to output and inflation in the first place, all else equal—market power can reduce the response of inflation and output to a wide range of macroeconomic shocks beyond just monetary policy shocks.

These considerations further strengthen the case for reforms to increase competition in advanced economies. High on the agenda are enhancements to competition law and policy frameworks. These include, depending on the jurisdictions, tighter merger control—particularly when it comes to dominant firms, stronger enforcement of abuse of dominance, greater reliance on market investigations, and more specific measures to cope with the fast-changing digital economy.

Policymakers will need all available tools to secure a dynamic, sustainable, and inclusive recovery. Curbing corporate market power would not only support the recovery directly by stimulating investment, innovation and wage growth, but also indirectly by making monetary policy more powerful. Encouragingly, improvements in antitrust frameworks are currently under consideration in key jurisdictions.

Vir: IMF