Z Georgeom Sorosom se brez težav strinjam v vseh ključnih elementih analize vzrokov razkroja EU – pri čemer sta ključna napačen odziv na finančno krizo s politiko drastičnega posta in napačen odziv na migrantsko krizo. Prvo je vzelo službe in prihodnost milijonom mladih, ki živijo v “napačnih” državah evropske južne periferije, drugo pa jih je do konca razkačilo, ker se jim zdi, da jim bo z begunci vzeta tudi socialna pomoč.

Soros še vedno verjame, da je Evropo mogoče rešiti. Pri čemer pa so njegove rešitve nekoliko naivno romantične. Denimo, da je migrantski problem mogoče rešiti s spodbujanjem demokracije v severni Afriki in Bližnjem vzhodu namesto sodelovanja z diktatorji. In da je evrsko krizo mogoče rešiti s priznanjem, da ima evro napake in da je zato treba dovoliti, da neevrske države gredo naprej brez evra (“multi-track” namesto “multi-speed” EU). Glede prvega Soros pozablja, da je v času, preden je EU začela pomagati ZDA pri “demokratizaciji” severne Afriki in Bližnjem vzhodu, v EU drlo bistveno manj migrantov kot po uvedbi “demokracije”. Predvidevam pa, da ima z Marshallovim planom za Afriko v višini 30 milijard evrov letno namen spodbujati lokalna gospodarstva,

Glede drugega (evro) pa Soros pozablja, da je za mnoge evro civilizacijska vrednota, za druge pa način, kako si s strogimi pravili podjarmiti ostale evropske države. In temu se ne bodo odpovedali. V mirnem času prav gotovo ne.

The European Union is mired in an existential crisis. For the past decade, everything that could go wrong has gone wrong. How did a political project that has underpinned Europe’s postwar peace and prosperity arrive at this point?

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I personally regarded the EU as the embodiment of the idea of the open society. It was a voluntary association of equal states that banded together and sacrificed part of their sovereignty for the common good. The idea of Europe as an open society continues to inspire me.

But since the financial crisis of 2008, the EU seems to have lost its way. It adopted a program of fiscal retrenchment, which led to the euro crisis and transformed the eurozone into a relationship between creditors and debtors. The creditors set the conditions that the debtors had to meet, yet could not meet. This created a relationship that was neither voluntary nor equal – the very opposite of the credo on which the EU was based.

As a result, many young people today regard the EU as an enemy that has deprived them of jobs and a secure and promising future. Populist politicians exploited the resentments and formed anti-European parties and movements.

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The economic case for remaining an EU member is strong, but it has become clear only in the last few months, and it will take time to sink in. During that time, the EU needs to transform itself into an organization that countries like Britain would want to join, in order to strengthen the political case.

Such a Europe would differ from the current arrangements in two key respects. First, it would clearly distinguish between the EU and the eurozone. Second, it would recognize that the euro has many unsolved problems, which must not be allowed to destroy the European project.

The eurozone is governed by outdated treaties that assert that all EU member states are expected to adopt the euro if and when they qualify. This has created an absurd situation where countries like Sweden, Poland, and the Czech Republic, which have made it clear that they have no intention to join, are still described and treated as “pre-ins.”

The effect is not purely cosmetic. The existing framework has converted the EU into an organization in which the eurozone constitutes the inner core, with the other members relegated to an inferior position. There is a hidden assumption at work here, namely that, while various member states may be moving at different speeds, they are all heading to the same destination. This ignores the reality that a number of EU member countries have explicitly rejected the EU’s goal of “ever closer union.”

This goal should be abandoned. Instead of a multi-speed Europe, the goal should be a “multi-track Europe” that allows member states a wider variety of choices. This would have a far-reaching beneficial effect. Currently, attitudes toward cooperation are negative: member states want to reassert their sovereignty rather than surrender more of it. But if cooperation produced positive results, sentiment might improve, and some objectives, like defense, that are currently best pursued by coalitions of the willing might attract universal participation.

Vir: George Soros, Project Syndicate