Nevarnosti proste zunanje trgovine, drugi del: Pomen sindikatov

Paul Krugman ima dober point, ko pravi, da čeprav ima prosta trgovina (kot napoveduje večina standardnih modelov zunanje trgovine) tudi distributivne učinke (povečanje brezposelnosti v panogah brez primerjalne prednosti), pa je materializacija teh negativnih učinkov odvisna vsaj od dveh faktorjev. Prvič, od moči sindikatov, torej od stopnje vključenosti zaposlenih v industriji v sindikate. In drugič, od stopnje razvitosti socialne države oziroma “varnostne mreže” za šibkejše, ki jih je globalizacija bolj prizadela.

Ja, globalizacija je imela depresivne (negativne) učinke na zaposlenost in plače v trgovinsko bolj odprtih sektorjih (industrija) ter neenakost v razvitih državah , toda učinki so bili manj negativni v državah, kjer imajo zaposleni močne sindikalne predstavnike (sogovornike vladi in delodajalcem) in kjer imajo varnostno mrežo, da jih ujame, ko jih prizadenejo globalizacijske sile. Ja, in desničarji in libertarci, ki se zavzemajo za popolnoma prosto trgovino in ideologijo popolnoma prostega tržnega gospodarstva, kot pravi Krugman, niso vaši prijatelji. Kajti s tem, ko blodijo o optimizacijski lepoti možnosti svobodne izbire in škodljivosti kakršnekoli regulacije, se dejansko zavzemajo za interese korporacij, ne pa za interese ljudi.

Ključno je, kot je že pred desetletjem zapisal Dani Rodrik iz Harvarda: Kako rešiti globalizacijo pred njenimi navijači?

Serious economic analysis has never supported the Panglossian view of trade as win-win for everyone that is popular in elite circles: growing trade can indeed hurt many people, and for the past few decades globalization has probably been, on net, a depressing force for the majority of U.S. workers.

But protectionism isn’t the only way to fight that downward pressure. In fact, many of the bad things we associate with globalization in America were political choices, not necessary consequences — and they didn’t happen in other advanced countries, even though those countries faced the same global forces we did.

Consider, for example, the case of Denmark, which Bernie Sanders famously held up as a role model. As a member of the European Union, Denmark is subject to the same global trade agreements as we are — and while it doesn’t have a free-trade agreement with Mexico, there are plenty of low-wage workers in eastern and southern Europe. Yet Denmark has much lower inequality than we do. Why?

Part of the answer is that workers in Denmark, two-thirds of whom are unionized, still have a lot of bargaining power. If U.S. corporations were able to use the threat of imports to smash unions, it was only because our political environment supported union-busting. Even Canada, right next door, has seen nothing like the union collapse that took place here.

And the rest of the answer is that Denmark (and, to a lesser extent, Canada) has a much stronger social safety net than we do. In America, we’re constantly told that global competition means that we can’t even afford even the safety net we have; strange to say, other rich countries don’t seem to have that problem.

And there’s a lesson here that goes beyond this election. If you’re generally a supporter of open world markets — which you should be, mainly because market access is so important to poor countries — you need to know that whatever they may say, politicians who espouse rigid free-market ideology are not on your side.

Vir: Paul Krugman

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