Kako je evro razklal Skandinavske države

Frances Coppola izvrstno pokaže, kako je bila navezava na evro oziroma evrske politike smrtonosna za Skandinavske države v času te zadnje krize. Kot lahko vidite na spodnji sliki, sta izmed štirih držav, ki so si zelo podobne po obsegu države blaginje (socialne države) in visokih davkih ter visoki ravni inovativnosti, le dve državi – Norveška in Švedska – uspešno okrevali in rasteta. Finska in Danska pa sta sedem let po začetku krize, podobno kot Slovenija, še vedno v recesiji ali izpod ravni iz leta 2008.

Kaj je šlo narobe? Hja, Finska je članica evro območja in njeni zmešani politiki – kljub že 4 leta trajajoči drugi recesiji po 2008 – mučijo gospodarstvo s strogo varčevalno dieto, ki so jo predpisali še bolj zmešani evrokrati. Danska nima evra, je pa članica ERM2 mehanizma, kar pomeni vezavo valute na evro in sledenje pravilom zaostrenega fiskalnega pakta (zniževanje strukturnega deficita za vsako ceno). Nasprotno pa imata Švedska in Norveška monetarno suverenost in neodvisnost od zmešanih evrokratskih fiskalnih politik. Monetarna in fiskalna suverenost sta očitno ključ za uspešnost v času krize. Državi namreč dajeta avtonomnost, da v najtežjih časih svojim potrebam ustrezno oblikuje ekonomske politike, ne pa da sledi nekim neumnim “one fits all” pravilom, ki se jih spomni Nemčija.

The reason is not difficult to find. Finland, the worst-performing of these countries, is a member of the Euro. Not only does this prevent it from managing its own monetary policy, including devaluing to protect its economy from exogenous shocks, but it also chains its fiscal policy to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Finland is in the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and as a Euro member, that means it must comply with the actions required under that procedure or face sanctions – even if those actions are directly harmful to its economy.

None of the others is a Euro member. But Denmark is a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) which is a precursor to Euro member. It is obliged to maintain the value of its currency within agreed bands around the Euro. Its monetary policy is therefore determined to a large extent not by local conditions, but by the decisions of the ECB – whether or not they are appropriate for the Danish economy. Denmark has also agreed to be bound by the stricter form of the Stability and Growth Pact known as the Fiscal Compact, which means it is subject to the same fiscal rules and penalties as if it were a member of the Eurozone.

In contrast, Sweden is not a member of ERM II. It is supposed to join the Euro at some point, but – mysteriously – persistently fails to meet convergence criteria. The Swedish krona floats against world currencies including the Euro, giving Sweden much greater control of its monetary policy than Denmark or Finland. On the fiscal side, although Sweden ratified the Fiscal Compact, it refused to allow itself to be bound by its provisions while it remains outside the Euro. So although it is supposed to keep within Maastricht fiscal limits, it does not face penalties for failing to do so.

The ability to manage monetary and fiscal policy is precious. Eurozone central banks, locked into a one-size-fits-all monetary policy, have little ability to protect their economies from local shocks; with the centralisation of bank supervision, they have even largely lost control of macroprudential policy. Eurozone fiscal authorities, too, have little autonomy once the country is in the Excessive Deficit procedure; for those outside it, avoiding Brussels supervision can become an overriding concern. For Eurozone countries, the real monetary target is not inflation but deficit/GDP. The ECB is fighting a losing battle trying to raise inflation against the determination of the Brussels bureaucracy to force 19 fiscal authorities to depress demand in the name of balancing the books.

So Finland’s economic disaster is at least partly a consequence of its Euro membership. And Denmark suffers from loss of monetary autonomy due to its membership of ERM II, and loss of fiscal autonomy because it chooses to be bound by the Fiscal Compact. Conversely, Sweden has control of both monetary and fiscal policy, while Norway not only has control of monetary and fiscal policy but is further buffered by its large sovereign wealth fund.

There seems little doubt. Welfare states, taxation and structural reforms, pfft. The Great Scandinavian Divergence is principally caused by the Euro.

Vir: Frances Coppola

One response

  1. Kaj pa Češka oz. Poljska na eni strani in Slovaška, Slovenija na drugi? Lepo bi bilo videti podobno analizo med temi državami.

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