Odlično in obvezno branje, za vernike in nevernike ZDA kot garanterja svetovnega miru, oziroma bolje rečeno, nestabilnosti. Raziskovalni novinar in Pulitzerjev nagrajenec Seymour M. Hersh v London Review of Books piše o veliki napaki ameriške zunanje politike v Siriji, ko je poskušala za vsako ceno zrušiti Asadov režim ter o notranjem uporu v vojski (Pentagonu), ki je vlado opozorila na nevarnosti rušenja Asada in vzpona islamističnega fundamentalizma. Vlada ni poslušala vojaških obveševalcev in vojaškega vrha, kar je omogočilo vzpon ISIS, toda na drugi strani je ameriška vojska s širjenjem obveščevalnih informacij zaveznikom na način, da so prišle tudi do sirske vojske oziroma Asada, omogočila, da se je Asad obdržal na oblasti in da ISIS ni mogel popolnoma zavzeti Sirije.
To je zgodba o dejanski, umazani realpolitiki ZDA, ki v zasledovanju nekih višjih interesov peščice ljudi destabilizira države in kontinente in na koncu tudi ves svet.
Če še niste, morate nujno kot dopolnilno čtivo k temu prebrati najprej poročilo “Possible Implications of Faulty US Technical Intelligence” nekdanjega inšpektorja OZN Richarda Lloyda in profesorja na MIT Theodora Postola o izmišljenem kemičnem napadu na civilno prebivalstvo v Siriji ter nato še poročilo “Serious Questions about the Integrity of the UN Report” raziskovalca Subrata Ghoshroya na MIT o ameriški izmišljotini glede tega kemičnega poboja s strani sirskega režima in kako so s to zgodbo nategnili medije in posledično ves svet. Zgodba je skorajda kopija Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeldove izmišljotine glede obstoja “orožja za masovno uničenje” v Iraku in kako so z njo nategnili ves svet. S to razliko, da je tokrat v njej na vrhu piramide zla Obama. In iz tega vidika je dobro, da se je v to zgodbo vmešal Vladimir Putin, ki je takrat (se še spomnite njegovega uvodnika v New York Timesu?) preprečil pogrom nad Asadom in ki danes Evropo rešuje pred terorizmom ISIS in pred še večjim valom beguncev.
V tej zadnji zgodbi je noro oziroma shizofreno le to, da nas pred posledicami absolutno neodgovornih dejanj ameriških (navideznih) “pozitivcev” oziroma negativcev s prijaznimi maskami rešuje dejanski ruski negativec.
Barack Obama’s repeated insistence that Bashar al-Assad must leave office – and that there are ‘moderate’ rebel groups in Syria capable of defeating him – has in recent years provoked quiet dissent, and even overt opposition, among some of the most senior officers on the Pentagon’s Joint Staff. […]
The military’s resistance dates back to the summer of 2013, when a highly classified assessment, put together by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then led by General Martin Dempsey, forecast that the fall of the Assad regime would lead to chaos and, potentially, to Syria’s takeover by jihadi extremists, much as was then happening in Libya. A former senior adviser to the Joint Chiefs told me that the document was an ‘all-source’ appraisal, drawing on information from signals, satellite and human intelligence, and took a dim view of the Obama administration’s insistence on continuing to finance and arm the so-called moderate rebel groups. By then, the CIA had been conspiring for more than a year with allies in the UK, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to ship guns and goods – to be used for the overthrow of Assad – from Libya, via Turkey, into Syria. The new intelligence estimate singled out Turkey as a major impediment to Obama’s Syria policy. The document showed, the adviser said, ‘that what was started as a covert US programme to arm and support the moderate rebels fighting Assad had been co-opted by Turkey, and had morphed into an across-the-board technical, arms and logistical programme for all of the opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. The so-called moderates had evaporated and the Free Syrian Army was a rump group stationed at an airbase in Turkey.’ The assessment was bleak: there was no viable ‘moderate’ opposition to Assad, and the US was arming extremists.
Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, director of the DIA between 2012 and 2014, confirmed that his agency had sent a constant stream of classified warnings to the civilian leadership about the dire consequences of toppling Assad. […] ‘We understood Isis’s long-term strategy and its campaign plans, and we also discussed the fact that Turkey was looking the other way when it came to the growth of the Islamic State inside Syria.’ The DIA’s reporting, he said, ‘got enormous pushback’ from the Obama administration. ‘I felt that they did not want to hear the truth.’
Yet the Obama administration continues to condemn Russia for its support of Assad. A retired senior diplomat who served at the US embassy in Moscow expressed sympathy for Obama’s dilemma as the leader of the Western coalition opposed to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine: ‘Ukraine is a serious issue and Obama has been handling it firmly with sanctions. But our policy vis-à-vis Russia is too often unfocused. But it’s not about us in Syria. It’s about making sure Bashar does not lose. The reality is that Putin does not want to see the chaos in Syria spread to Jordan or Lebanon, as it has to Iraq, and he does not want to see Syria end up in the hands of Isis. The most counterproductive thing Obama has done, and it has hurt our efforts to end the fighting a lot, was to say: “Assad must go as a premise for negotiation.”’ He also echoed a view held by some in the Pentagon when he alluded to a collateral factor behind Russia’s decision to launch airstrikes in support of the Syrian army on 30 September: Putin’s desire to prevent Assad from suffering the same fate as Gaddafi. He had been told that Putin had watched a video of Gaddafi’s savage death three times, a video that shows him being sodomised with a bayonet. The JCS adviser also told me of a US intelligence assessment which concluded that Putin had been appalled by Gaddafi’s fate: ‘Putin blamed himself for letting Gaddafi go, for not playing a strong role behind the scenes’ at the UN when the Western coalition was lobbying to be allowed to undertake the airstrikes that destroyed the regime. ‘Putin believed that unless he got engaged Bashar would suffer the same fate – mutilated – and he’d see the destruction of his allies in Syria.’
Preberite več v Seymour M. Hersh, London Review of Book