Nemčija je “vojni dobičkar” grške krize

Kolegi iz inštituta IWH v Halleju (Dany, Gropp & von Schweinitz, avgust 2015) so ponovno izračunali, kar je pred dvema letoma pokazal že Der Spiegel: z grško krizo je največ pridobila Nemčija, ki je (po konzervativni varianti) med letoma 2010 in 2015 privarčevala okrog 100 milijard evrov pri plačilu obresti na nemški javni dolg. Pred dvema letoma, ko je o tem poročal der Spiegel, je bila ta cifra “samo” okrog 40 milijard evrov (vendar ob drugi metodologiji). Nemčija je z grško krizo privarčevala več kot lahko potencialno izgubi, če bi Grčija bankrotirala in bi Nemčija morala v celoti odpisati vse grške dolgove (90 milijard evrov).

Glavni razlog za nemške “krizne dobičke” je v tem, da ob vsaki najavi slabih novic v Grčiji začnejo vlagatelji pospešeno bežati v bolj varne naložbe (t.i. flight-to-safety), kar zniža donose na nemške obveznice, in obratno. Ali drugače rečeno, slabe novice za Grčijo so dobre za Nemčijo, in dobre novice za Grčijo so slabe za Nemčijo. Kumulativno so v zadnjih petih letih slabe novice za Grčijo znižale donose na nemške obveznice za 1.5 odstotne točke.

Spodaj je kratek izsek iz članka kolegov Dany, Gropp & von Schweinitz ter tabela z izračuni nemških “kriznih dobičkov” ob različnih scenarijih.

[…] German public sector balance benefited significantly from the European/Greek debt crisis, because of lower interest payments on public sector debt. This is due to two effects: One, in crisis times investors disproportionately seek out safe investments (“flight to safety”), bidding down the returns on safe-haven assets. We show that German bunds strongly benefited from this effect during the Greek debt crisis. Second, while the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy stance was quite close to an “optimal” monetary policy stance for Germany from 1999 to 2007, during the crisis monetary policy was too accommodating from a German perspective, due to the emerging disparities across the Euro area. As a result of these two effects, our calculations suggest that the German sovereign saved more than 100 billion Euros in interest expenses between 2010 and mid-2015. That is, Germany benefited from the Greek crisis even in case that Greece defaults on all its debt (a total of 90 billions) owed to the German government via diverse channels (European Stability Mechanism [ESM], International Monetary Fund [IMF], or directly).

After winning the election, the new Syriza government stopped many of the reforms imposed on previous governments by creditors, arguing that austerity had only hurt the Greek population in the past. However, in the dramatic negotiations on con-tinuing reforms and support by the Euro area (including the first default by an advanced economy on IMF loans in the beginning of July 2015), the Greek government had to agree to even harsher austerity measures than before. We see that every time an event made agreement on a reform package less likely (and a Grexit more likely), German government bond yields fell and each time an event increased the likelihood of an agreement on package, German government bond yields increased . Cumulatively, bad news for Greece resulted in a decline of German ten-year bund yields of more than 1.5%. The effect is symmetric: Good news for Greece resulted in increases in German bund yields of about equal magnitude.

German gainsVir: Dany, Gropp & von Schweinitz, avgust 2015

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