Kot pravilno ugotavlja Shahin Vallee v New York Timesu, je nasilno kapituliranje Grčije zlomilo tisto krhko politično ravnotežje med Nemčijo in Francijo, ki je držalo skupaj evropsko integracijo zadnjih 60 let. Nemčija je z ultimativnim, militantnim pritiskom na Grčijo prek evropskih institucij in ECB demonstrirala ostalim članicam, kaj jih čaka, če se bodo upirale pravilom, ki jih je postavila Nemčija. Nemčijan je postavila nov temelj prihodnje monetarne unije: “beggar thy neighbor” merkantilizem z za večno zamrznjenimi tečaji, kjer se trgovinska neravnotežja razrešujejo izključno s fiskalnim konzervatizmom. Ta “nesrečna poroka” pa za Francijo, ki je šla v monetarno unijo z romatično idejo diskrecijske fiskalne politike v keynesianskem okolju, ni več prijetna in kmalu tudi ne več znosna.
Razpad evra na najmanj dva dela je tako neminovno pred nami. Na nemški del (Nemčija, baltske države, Nizozemska, Avstrija in Slovaška) ter južni del okrog Francije. Komu se bo pridružila Slovenija?
Upam, da nobenemu. Življenje v dveh monertarnih integracijah, jugoslovanski in evropski, nas je – upajmo – izučilo, da so krize bistveno manjše in njihovo razreševanje bistveno lažje, če ima država prosti obe roki. Torej če se država lahko samostojno brani z lastno monetarno in fiskalno politiko. Res je, da se v samostojnosti povečajo tveganja glede folklore domače politike in politikov. Toda gledano iz retrospektive na jugoslovansko folkloro in srbski hegemonizem ali sedanji nemški hegemonizem so ta tveganja, če si samostojen, vseeno bistveno blažja. Pomembno sidro pa ostaja vključenost v EU in njeno carinsko unijo.
Ko bo torej prišlo do razpadanja evrskega območja, upam, da bomo imeli referendum o tem, ali želimo nadaljevati s samostojno monetarno politiko ali pa se pridružiti enemu izmed obeh blokov.
Neuvrščenost? Ne. Pač pa trdna evropskost, vendar z lastno monetarno in fiskalno politiko.
Še enekaj izsekov iz Valleejevega razmišljanja:
The July 13 deal offering more financing for Greece has been billed as a last-minute step back from the brink, but the threat of a “temporary exit” from the euro proposed by a German coalition government has shaken the foundation of the euro in a far more fundamental way than meets the eye.
It has undermined what little Franco-German cooperation was left in economic affairs; it has made the single currency as it stands politically indefensible in France; and it has substantially increased the risk of euro exit across the monetary union. In short, the prospect of Grexit today has made a French, or even German, exit tomorrow far more likely.
Through its actions, Germany has made a broader political point about the governance of the euro. It has confirmed its belief that federalism by exception — the complete annihilation of a member state’s sovereignty and national democracy — is in order whenever a eurozone member is perceived to challenge the rules-based functioning of the monetary union. In essence, Germany established that some democracies are more equal than others. By doing so, the agreement has sought to remove politics and discretion from the functioning of the monetary union, an idea that has long been very dear to the French.
The negotiations leading to the Greek agreement also destroyed the constructive ambiguity created by the Maastricht Treaty by making it absolutely clear that Germany is prepared to amputate and obliterate one of its members rather than make concessions. Germany appears to believe that the single currency ought to be a fixed exchange-rate regime or not exist at all in its current form, even if this means abandoning the underlying project of political integration that it was always meant to serve.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Germany signaled to France that it was prepared to go ahead alone and take a clear contradictory stand on a critical political issue.
France has still not completely overcome its inclination to put French sovereignty and decision-making first and has failed to articulate its own post-Maastricht vision of a prosperous monetary union, backed by a federal budget, governed by a real European executive power and legitimized by the European Parliament.
Despite the recent call by President François Hollande to address these issues, progress is unlikely. That’s because French elites are now unable to convince the public of the merits of the Union’s current economic policies in general — and toward Greece in particular. They are also too divided to propose a new shared vision, too disoriented to challenge the German narrative, and too afraid to start building alliances with like-minded countries such as Italy and Spain.
This unhappy marriage could last for years, but it will substantially increase the chances of anti-establishment parties coming to power across Europe, because mainstream leaders can no longer disprove the assertion that the euro as it stands has become both economically and politically destructive.
This will force all parties, including pro-European ones, to engage in a discussion about the potential merits of leaving the currency union and it will encourage political posturing, especially in France, where there is an undercurrent of Germanophobia that is easy to rekindle.
Regardless of what happens in Greece now, the July 13 agreement has made the prospect of a future euro breakup far more likely. The question is whether it will take the form of an orderly departure by Germany or a prolonged and economically more destructive exit by France and the south of Europe.
Vir: Shahin Vallee, New York Times