Kdo je ta Bernanke, da bi solil pamet Schäubleju in Merklovi?!

Ben Bernanke, prejšnji predsednik Fed, ki je tako dobro menedžiral ameriški izhod iz Velike recesije, se sprašuje, ali bo po sporazumu o grškem tretjem bailoutu evropskim voditeljem končno uspelo pripraviti široko gospodarsko okrevanje, ki bi kriznim državam, kot je Grčija, dalo razumne možnosti, da bi dosegle rast BDP in zaposlenosti ter fiskalne cilje.

Odgovor? Schäuble in Merklova ga ne želita slišati:

Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are also obvious. Since the global financial crisis, economic outcomes in the euro zone have been deeply disappointing.

The risks for the European project posed by these economic developments are real, no matter what the reasons for them may be. In fact, the reasons are not so difficult to identify. The slow recovery from the crisis of the euro zone as a whole is the result, among other factors, of (1) political resistance that delayed by many years the implementation of sufficiently aggressive monetary policies by the European Central Bank; (2) excessively tight fiscal policies, especially in countries like Germany that have some amount of “fiscal space” and thus no immediate need to tighten their belts; and (3) delays in taking the necessary steps, analogous to the banking “stress tests” in the United States in the spring of 2009, to restore confidence in the banking system. I would not, by the way, put “structural rigidities” very high on this list. Structural reforms are important for long-run growth, but cost-saving measures are less relevant when many workers are already idle; moreover, structural problems have existed in Europe for a long time and so can’t explain recent declines in performance.

Vir: Ben Bernanke, Brookings

Naj povem še v domačem jeziku: evropski voditelji se zaradi ideološko-političnih razlogov predolgo niso mogli dogovoriti niti o potrebnosti agresivnejše monetarne politike, nato so se obsesivno fokusirali na preveč restriktivno fiskalno politiko, pet let so zanemarjali panevropski problem v bankah, zdaj pa pričakujejo čudeže od strukturnih reform. In pri tem Bernanke pove tisto, kar je očitno že najmanj študentom v prvem letniku ekonomske fakultete: strukturne reforme so lahko pomembne za dolgoročno gospodarsko rast, na kratek, kadar je dela voljnih ljudi, ki ne morejo najti službe, ogromno preveč, ker pač služb ni, pa ne morejo imeti nobenega učinka. V času rekordno visoke brezposelnosti in prenizkega agregatnega povpraševanja predpisovati strukturne reforme kot zdravilo za izhod iz krize je idiotizem, skregan z vsako ekonomsko logiko. To zadnje je seveda moja kvalifikacija.

Iz tega vidika Grčiji predpisovati še dodatno dozo varčevanja in četverno dozo strukturnih reform, seveda ne more imeti nobenega drugega učinka kot samo negativnega.

Ampak kdo je Bernanke?! Kdo je Bernanke v primerjavi s takšnima avtoritetama, kot sta Schäuble in Merklova?! Prav zares, kaj pa on ve o primernih ekonomskih politikah? Kaj pa lahko ve o primernih ekonomskih politikah profesor ekonomije, specialist za globoke ekonomske krize, dolgoletni član boarda Fed in predsednik Fed v dveh mandatih Velike recesije v primerjavi z dvema ortodoksnima nemškima krščansko-demokratskima politikoma?! Prav zares, kdo je ta Bernanke?!

No, če boste njegov zapis prebrali do konca, si je Bernanke drznil EU svetovati tudi glede bolj primernega ravnanja z Grčijo ter institucionalne spremembe, ki bi naredile rigidno evrsko monetarno unijo bolj vzdržno (bi pa seveda breme prilagajanja prenesle tudi na Nemčijo):

I’ll end with two concrete proposals. First, negotiations over Greece’s evidently unsustainable debt burden should be based on explicit assumptions about European growth. If European growth turns out to be weaker than projected, which in turn would make it tougher for Greece to grow, then Greece should be allowed greater leeway after the fact in meeting its fiscal targets.

Second, it’s time for the leaders of the euro zone to address the problem of large and sustained trade imbalances (either surpluses or deficits), which, in a fixed-exchange-rate system like the euro zone, impose significant costs and risks. For example, the Stability and Growth Pact, which imposes rules and penalties with the goal of limiting fiscal deficits, could be extended to reference trade imbalances as well. Simply recognizing officially that creditor as well as debtor countries have an obligation to adjust over time (through fiscal and structural measures, for example) would be an important step in the right direction.

Ampak spet, kdo je ta Bernanke?!

2 responses

  1. Jože, gre le za pesek v oči. Resnica je drugačna. Lepo jo je pokazal eden najboljših člankov na temo evra na sploh. Samo bistven del:

    As Palast pointed out in the Guardian:

    The idea that the euro has “failed” is dangerously naive. The euro is doing exactly what its progenitor – and the wealthy 1%-ers who adopted it – predicted and planned for it to do.

    ***
    For him, the euro wasn’t about turning Europe into a powerful, unified economic unit. It was about Reagan and Thatcher.

    ***
    And when crises arise, economically disarmed nations have little to do but wipe away government regulations wholesale, privatize state industries en masse, slash taxes and send the European welfare state down the drain.

    ***
    Far from failing, the euro, which was Mundell’s baby, has succeeded probably beyond its progenitor’s wildest dreams.

    IN OTHER WORDS, THE EURO WAS INTENDED TO IMPOSE A SCHOCK DOCTRINE STRAIGHTJACKET ON EUROPE, WHERE THE BIG BANKS ARE STRIPPING GREECE AND OHER COUNTRIES OF THEIR PUBLIC ASSETS, PILLAGING, PLUNDERING AND LOOTING THEM OF THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES AND WEALTH.

    Postscript: Mundell is also the creator of supply side economics … also known as “trickle down” or “piss on the poor” economics.

    Many of Reagan’s top economic advisors subsequently admitted that supply side economics don’t work to help the economy.

    So the wealthy nations like Germany – intentionally or unintentionally – and the other wealthy nations laid the groundwork from the start for asset stripping in Greece and other indebted states.

    In še moj komentar. “Asset stripping” je bistvo “reševanja slovenske bančne krize. Zato je bilo potrebno najprej krizo povzročiti, nato pa umetno povečati obseg bančne luknje in s tem obseg državne intervencije. Da bi se preneslo več sredstev na DUTB in da bi se povečalo na tak način zaveze slovenske države po razprodaji slovenskih bank.

    Ljudje zbudite se ker boste drugače na koncu goli in bosi in ….zasužnjeni.

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