Anatole Kaletsky v Project Syndicate izvrstno analizira grški boj z Nemčijo iz vidika teorije iger. Pravi, da je Grčija igro izgubila zaradi napačne strategije. Prehitro je pokazala svoje karte. Do konca bi morala igrati na karto znižanja dolga, nato pa na koncu pristati na njen resnični cilj, to je na omilitev politike varčevanja. Tako kot je Draghi izigral Nemčijo s tem, ko je z Nemci javno diskutiral le o neprevzemanju dolgov zaradi politike QE, na koncu pa ta sekundarni cilj opustil in zmagal s primarnim ciljem – to je z visokim monetarnim stimulusom (ki je za Nemce sicer a priori nesprejemljiv). Namesto tega je Grčija – sicer šarmantno in romantično – že na začetku prišla ven s kompromisnim predlogom, ki ne govori o znižanju dolgov, ampak le o omilitvi varčevanja. Zdaj več nima manevrskega prostora, nima prostora za popuščanje. Lahko le zamenja vlado z bolj poslušnimi “kolaboranti” z EU, ali pa igra radikalno do konca in izstopi iz evro območja.
S tem pa je zapravila priložnost tudi za vse ostale države, da bi odpravili to neumno politiko varčevanja, ki je celotno evrsko območje odpeljala v recesijo in deflacijo.
Greece started the negotiation by insisting on debt reduction as its red line. But, instead of sticking to this position and turning a debate over debt forgiveness into a Draghi-style diversionary tactic, Greece abandoned this demand within days. Then came the pointless provocation of refusing talks with the troika, despite the fact that the three institutions are all much more sympathetic to Greek demands than the German government.
Finally, Varoufakis rejected any extension of the troika program. This created an unnecessary new deadline of February 28 for the withdrawal of ECB funding and consequent collapse of the Greek banking system.
Greece’s idealistic new leaders seem to believe that they can overpower bureaucratic opposition without the usual compromises and obfuscations, simply by brandishing their democratic mandate. But the primacy of bureaucracy over democracy is a core principle that EU institutions will never compromise.
The upshot is that Greece is back where it started in the poker contest with Germany and Europe. The new government has shown its best cards too early and has no credibility left if it wants to try bluffing.
So what will happen next? The most likely outcome is that Syriza will soon admit defeat, like every other eurozone government supposedly elected on a reform mandate, and revert to a troika-style program, sweetened only by dropping the name “troika.” Another possibility, while Greek banks are still open for business, might be for the government to unilaterally implement some of its radical plans on wages and public spending, defying protests from Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin.
If Greece tries such unilateral defiance, the ECB will almost certainly vote to stop its emergency funding to the Greek banking system after the troika program expires on February 28. As this self-inflicted deadline approaches, the Greek government will probably back down, just as Ireland and Cyprus capitulated when faced with similar threats.
Such last-minute capitulation could mean resignation for the new Greek government and its replacement by EU-approved technocrats, as in the constitutional putsch against Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi in 2012. In a less extreme scenario, Varoufakis might be replaced as finance minister, while the rest of the government survives. The only other possibility, if and when Greek banks start collapsing, would be an exit from the euro.
Whatever form the surrender takes, Greece will not be the only loser. Proponents of democracy and economic expansion have missed their best chance to outmaneuver Germany and end the self-destructive austerity that Germany has imposed on Europe.
Preberite več, predvsem izvrstni uvodni del v: Anatole Kaletsky, Project Syndicate